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Abstract 
On battlefields and within organizations, a fog obscures subordinate activity from superior 
observation, producing an information asymmetry endemic to most superior-subordinate 
relationships.  A superior’s ability to observe, to peer through this fog, distinguishes different 
types of organizations, largely determining what tasks an organization may accomplish and 
how superior control is balanced against subordinate autonomy (James Wilson, 2000).  Yet 
modern technology is lifting this fog, with each day increasing the detail and depth of what 
superiors may observe.  This thesis explores superior control with modern technology, by 
introducing and assessing a new term, nanomanagement—where superiors use technology 
to control, in ever-increasing detail, the actions of all of their subordinates. 
 
Through interviewing mid-level officers of the U.S. and British armies, who served in Iraq 
between 2003 and 2008, this qualitative study explores two questions.  “Why 
nanomanagement?” seeks to understand the causes, or what may motivate 
nanomanagement.  “How does nanomanagement influence superior control and subordinate 
autonomy?” seeks to understand the effects of nanomanagement.   This thesis employs five 
factors—organizational culture, ex ante controls, ex post controls, hierarchical control and 
exogenous factors—as different theoretical frameworks to understand nanomanagement.  
Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers, modern variants of police patrols that reduce 
transaction costs and may reverse information asymmetry, are introduced.  This thesis also 
suggests three terms to describe when nanomanaging superiors take action undermining 
traditional hierarchical control: shifting (focusing attention on subordinate levels), drifting 
(acting at subordinate levels), and grifting (cheating the hierarchy by controlling actions at 
levels beneath their immediate subordinates).  These actions signal a new form of 
hierarchical control by exclusion—ex claudere control.  By analyzing a case where much of 
the fog separating superior from subordinate thinned and lifted, this thesis assesses and 
updates the long fought battle between superior control and subordinate autonomy. 
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 Introduction CHAPTER 1
 
In the summer of 2006, the U.S. Army general in command of all allied forces in Baghdad did 
not like what he was seeing.  Surrounded by a clutch of subordinate officers, the general 
peered intensely across an air-conditioned, cavernous auditorium to the far wall, a wall 
covered with dozens of large plasma and projection screens.  The screens included a mix of 
live video images and PowerPoint slides constantly updated with data concerning topics 
ranging from the day’s weather, to the hours of electricity in Baghdad, to the number of daily 
attacks.  On the largest screen, a map of the Baghdad area, small icons indicated the real-
time position of hundreds of vehicles inching along highways.   
 
The general and his staff fixed their gaze on one of these screens.  On this particular plasma 
screen, in the clear black and white overhead image shot from an unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV), a stationary van came into focus.  Two men stood next to the van, looking into what 
seemed to be a freshly dug hole.  One of the individuals walked to the back of the van.  He 
emerged carrying an object—a large and heavy object.  He placed the object in the hole.   
 
“Do you see hostile intent?” barked the general.  His legal advisor elbowed into the centre of 
the clutch, poked his glasses up his nose and said, “Sir, I can’t say.  We can’t fire.”  The 
general, unsatisfied, stabbed his finger at the screen and spouted, “God damn it, I know that 
asshole is putting in an IED!” In Iraq, the improvised explosive device (IED) or road side bomb 
was the primary cause of U.S. Army deaths (C. Wilson, 2004a). 
 
“What are our options?” the general asked.  One of the colonels surrounding the general 
stated, “Sir, we have a squad two minutes out.”  Not taking his eyes from the screen, the 
general said, “Alright, send them in.  But give me direct comms with that squad.”   
 
As the staff and officers chartered with commanding 60,000 coalition troops in Baghdad 
quietly watched the plasma screen, for a long minute nothing happened.  Then one of the 
men on the screen stood up suddenly and pointed.   In seconds, both men jumped in their 
van and sped away.  As the overhead image seamlessly tracked the van, the frame slowly 
zoomed out.  Soon two U.S. vehicles came into the image, closing in fast on the van. 
 
The van veered off the road into a small compound of four buildings.  The two men jumped 
out and ran into one of the buildings.  “Tell them they went into the northern building of the 
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compound!” said the general.  Moments later, the two U.S. vehicles pulled into the 
compound.  Six soldiers dismounted and started towards the south, toward the closest 
structure.  “The northern house!” barked the general.   
 
In a moment, the soldiers on the screen froze.  They then turned and moved to the northern 
house.  They entered, and within minutes they had emerged with two men.  “Great work 
team.  There are two less bad guys and one less IED out there,” the general stated.  Applause 
rippled through the auditorium. 
 
 
Figure 1.1  An American general and staff react to a UAV strike1 
While the general slapped the officers on their backs, faces turned back to the other dozen 
plasma screens.  One counted the number of bodies found every morning on the streets of 
Baghdad.  The data indicated Iraq was descending into civil war.2 
 
Modern technology, as used in the Baghdad command post, enables an unprecedented 
degree of superior control.   In the past, a fog of war permeated the battlefield, obscuring a 
superior’s information about what was occurring with their subordinates (Clausewitz, 
Howard, & Paret, 1976).  Unable to fully understand what subordinates were doing or what 
they had achieved, superiors were left with few options but to build organizations around the 
principle that subordinates should be granted some level of autonomy (Schein, 1990; Van 
                                                          
1
 Source (Hill, 2008). 
2
 This scene was recreated from the author’s notes while serving as the Special Forces Liaison to the 
Multinational Division-Baghdad from March 2006-August 2006. 
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Creveld, 2008).  Militaries around the world invested in developing trusted, professional 
subordinates (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; O'Neill, 2002) while continuing a search for 
the most cost-effective monitoring controls (Brehm & Gates, 1997; P. Feaver, 2003; 
McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).  Militaries adopted hierarchical organizational structures, 
seeking order within the chaos and uncertainty of war (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Simon, 
1946; Weber, Henderson, & Parsons, 1947; James Wilson, 2000). 
 
Today the fog of war is lifting.  With the adoption of a vast array of technologies, superiors 
can monitor and control the actions of their lowest subordinates in real-time.  This use of 
new technologies invites and enables nanomanagement, a new type of control.  The 
objective of this thesis is to understand both the causes and effects of nanomanagement on 
superiors, subordinates, and organizations.  This thesis employs a case study analyzing 
mid-level officers of the U.S. and British armies in Iraq from 2003-2008, a unique period that 
captures superiors and subordinates grappling with new technologies. 
 
Section 1.1 of this introductory chapter frames the thesis by explaining the tension between 
superior control and subordinate autonomy.  Section 1.2 then defines nanomanagement and 
explains why this thesis seeks to understand both the causes and effects of 
nanomanagement.  To systematically address these two questions Section 1.3 discusses how 
this thesis will assess causes and effects, through the exploration of five factors.  Section 1.4 
presents the contribution of this thesis.  Section 1.5 outlines the structure of the thesis.  
Section 1.6 concludes. 
 
1.1 The conflict between superior control and subordinate autonomy  
 
Both autonomy and control imply a relationship between actors.  In a hierarchical 
relationship that includes delegation, a conflict exists between superiors and subordinates.  
Superiors cannot do everything; they find subordinates to do their bidding and assign them 
tasks.  The subordinate quickly develops an advantage over the superior, an information 
asymmetry, whereby the subordinate possesses more knowledge about the work being done 
and the results of that work.  For the subordinate, this information asymmetry allows 
autonomy, defined as the discretion to decide what to do and to decide how to do it 
(Cameron & Quinn, 2006; P. Feaver, 2003, p. 64; Koen, Peters, Geert, & Bram, 2004, p. 106).   
 
While subordinates seek to maximize their autonomy, superiors seek the greatest control.  
Superior control is defined as the mechanisms and instruments used by a superior to 
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influence the decisions and the behaviour of the subordinate to achieve the superior’s 
objectives (H. C. White, 1991, p. 189).  Yet in order for anything to get done, superiors must 
delegate some autonomy to subordinates.  In examining the civil-military relationship, 
scholars see striking the appropriate balance between control and autonomy as essential 
(Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960).  Civilians must grant the military enough autonomy to 
perform its function of defending the government, yet civilians must retain enough control to 
prevent the military from becoming too powerful and overthrowing or undermining the 
government (P. Feaver, 2003; P. Feaver, 1999; Huntington, 1957).  This exemplifies the 
inherent conflict between superior control and subordinate autonomy. 
 
While this conflict is inherent to delegation, there is wide variance in how this conflict 
manifests.  In some organizations, superior-subordinate relationships are characterized by ex 
ante controls where superiors design and implement tools to align the preferences of their 
subordinates prior to delegation (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1991b).  Through screening of applicants, subordinates are selected, or trained, 
to share the values and preferences desired by the superior.  However, with the difficulty of 
completely aligning the subordinate’s incentives with a superior’s, the most stringent ex ante 
controls rarely guarantee the subordinate behaves exactly as a superior wishes (Williamson, 
1985).  Other superior-subordinate relationships are characterized by ex post controls, or 
controls implemented after the task is delegated.  By employing a wide range of monitoring 
tools (e.g. reporting requirements, conducting hearings, threats of visits or spot checks), 
superiors seek to identify whether subordinates are fulfilling their delegated tasks, that they 
are working as opposed to shirking (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991b).   
 
The choice between ex post and ex ante controls can determine the level of superior control 
and subordinate autonomy one could expect to find in different organizations.  Wilson (2000) 
believes this determination produces four different types of organizations based on one 
factor—the amount a superior could observe subordinate activities.  He established this 
typology dependent on whether subordinate work (“outputs”) and the results of that work 
(“outcomes”) was observed or obscured from superiors (James Wilson, 2000, p. 158).  This 
variable observation of outputs and outcomes produce four types of organizations—
production, procedural, craft and coping—that determine a variety of organizational 
characteristics:  from incentive structures, to management styles, to the amount of freedom 
given subordinates and the types of controls employed (Gregory, 1995; James Wilson, 2000).   
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Production organizations, where both outputs and outcomes are observed, focus on 
efficiency.  As superiors observe both what their subordinates are doing and their results, 
very little is hidden from the superior’s view.  Superiors have tight control of subordinates 
relying heavily on ex post monitoring controls.  As outputs and outcomes can be observed, 
they can be measured.  In production organizations, superiors often focus on indicators of 
progress that which can be easily measured  “at the expense of those less easily observed or 
counted” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 161). 
 
Procedural organizations, where outputs are observed but outcomes are obscured, focus on 
process.   Superiors observe what their subordinates are doing, but not what result this work 
is producing.  Superiors exert tight control of subordinates, developing rules, standard 
operating procedures and processes.  Superiors focus on how subordinates do their jobs 
rather than what is accomplished.  When training for war, Wilson sees the military as a 
procedural organization, where work (i.e. the training and preparation for war) can be 
observed, yet the outcome of that work (i.e. whether the training will actually produce 
victory or defeat) is obscured (James Wilson, 2000, p. 163).   
 
Craft organizations, where outputs are obscured but outcomes are observed, focus on effect.  
Superiors cannot observe what their subordinates are doing, but only know the results of 
their work.  Superiors in craft organizations invest heavily in ex ante controls, seeking to instil 
an “ethos and sense of duty” in subordinates (James Wilson, 2000, p. 167).  Wilson sees the 
military at war as the quintessential craft organization, where the work being done is 
obscured by the fog of war, but the outcome (i.e. whether the battle was won or lost) is 
known. 
 
Coping organizations, where both outputs and outcomes are obscured, focus on maintaining 
any small semblance of order.  They combine ex ante and ex post controls, seeking to hire the 
best people and monitor what they can.  Yet there is little superior control in coping 
organizations and since so much is obscured, subordinates are granted little autonomy. 
Wilson sees few government agencies that could fall within the coping characterization.   
Figure 1.2 highlights Wilson’s four categories, their characteristics and where the military is 
found in peacetime and at war. 
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Procedural Organization 
Military in peacetime 
Outputs observed/outcomes obscured 
High superior control 
Low subordinate autonomy 
Ex post controls—focus on process 
 
Production Organization 
No military example 
Outputs/outcomes observed 
High superior control 
Low subordinate autonomy 
Ex post controls—focus on efficiency 
 
Coping Organization 
No military example 
Outputs/outcomes obscured 
Low superior control 
Low subordinate autonomy 
Minor ex post and ex ante 
 
Craft Organization 
Military at war 
Outputs obscured/outcomes observed 
Low superior control 
High subordinate autonomy 
Ex ante controls—professionalism 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2  Wilson’s organizational typology and the military 
 
This typology of organizations, based on the degree of fog separating superiors from 
observing what their subordinates were doing and what they have accomplished, frames this 
thesis’s analysis of superior-subordinate relationships.  Recognizing that 
superior-subordinate relationships may change depending on the information asymmetry 
between superior and subordinate, Wilson saw the military alternating between two very 
different types of organizations.  Yet as the opening vignette highlighted, contemporary 
technology spreading through public and private organizations is rapidly and dramatically 
altering what superiors can observe.  Superiors simply know more both about what their 
subordinates are doing and the results of this work, faster and in greater detail. As more is 
observed and less is obscured, technology makes possible a new degree and level of superior 
control. By analyzing a contemporary case, this thesis assesses both the causes and effects of 
this new type of control, what I term nanomanagement.   
 
1.2 Nanomanagement—its definition, causes and effects 
 
The opening vignette highlighted a form of management, defined as the process of 
controlling people and resources (Weber, 1968).  Some might describe the general’s actions 
as micromanagement, commonly defined as a more detailed management by superiors, 
exerting “excessive control” over subordinates with attention to small or minor details that 
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undermines a subordinate’s judgement and responsibility (Coker, 2008).  Yet the terms 
“excessive” or “minor” are clearly normative.  What may be perceived by the subordinate as 
excessive or minor may simultaneously be perceived by the superior as appropriate and 
essential.  Therefore this thesis defines micromanagement objectively: where superiors 
control in detail the actions of their immediate subordinates.   
 
However, the opening vignette represents something beyond micromanagement.  New 
technologies allowed the general a level of control only recently possible.  Just as molecular 
scientists of the 1970s and 1980s coined the term “nanotechnology” to account for the 
increased level of manipulation that new technology allowed, today’s social scientists need 
to account for new technology that allows for the more exacting level and degree of control 
seen today.  I define that term as nanomanagement—where superiors use technology to 
control, in ever-increasing detail, the actions of all of their subordinates. 
 
Through theory and empirical analysis, this thesis explores the empirical validity of 
nanomanagement and its potential implications on superior control and subordinate 
autonomy.  I argue what was observed in this thesis’s opening anecdote deserves a special 
term for four reasons.  First, all management, to include nanomanagement, exerts some level 
of superior control, curtailing some level of subordinate autonomy.  Yet nanomanagement 
differs by dramatically reducing the costs of control, and dramatically increasing the amount 
of information that can be captured, transmitted, stored and accessed.  With technology, 
tomorrow more will be observed and less will be obscured. 
 
Second, all management, to include nanomanagement, seeks to reduce information 
asymmetries that have long characterized superior-subordinate relationships (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1985).  However, nanomanagement differs in that it may reverse information 
asymmetry, where a superior may now know more about a subordinate’s actions, in 
real-time, than the subordinate knows.  This difference will influence preferences between ex 
post and ex ante control, the role of hierarchical actors, and the structure of organizations.   
 
Third, all management, to include nanomanagement, requires at least two actors—a superior 
and a subordinate—in some form a hierarchical arrangement.  However, nanomanagement 
differs from traditional management.  Where management reinforces this two actor, 
hierarchical relationship, nanomanagement undermines it by involving more actors than 
simply a superior and an immediate subordinate.  Nanomanagement can be 
micromanagement by an actor higher than a subordinate’s immediate superior.  The effects 
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of nanomanagement can be felt by a multitude of actors—the nanomanager, the 
nanomanaged, and all those levels of hierarchy that were marginalized or excluded. 
Nanomanagement bypasses and obviates entire levels of a hierarchy; this bypassing 
constitutes another form of control.   
 
Fourth, all management, to include nanomanagement, requires some level of 
communication between superior and subordinate.  Yet nanomanagement differs in that it 
allows constant and instant communication. While other technologies have existed that 
allowed communication between the highest and lowest levels of an organization, 
contemporary technologies have dramatically lowered the costs of such communication.  
 
This thesis does not suggest nanomanagement is a completely contemporary, or uniquely 
military, phenomenon.  An astute historian could surely see elements of nanomanagement in 
President Lincoln in the War Departments’ telegraph office, reading and sending telegraphs 
to help guide the Civil War; in Winston Churchill in the Cabinet War Room, using the 
scrambler telephone to communicate; in U.S. Army generals in helicopters, circling above 
platoon level engagements in Vietnam; or in the direction and approval of individual targets 
at four star and presidential level during the air war in Kosovo.  Twenty-first century 
technologies allow superior control to occur, with a speed and degree perhaps desired, but 
yet impossible in years past.   
 
Having defined nanomanagement and the importance of understanding it, I now turn to the 
two questions that this thesis employs to explore both the causes and effects of this modern 
type of control. 
 
1.2.1 Causes—Why nanomanagement? 
 
This thesis’s first research question is: why nanomanagement?  Just because information 
technology now exists does not mean that it will inevitably or invariably be employed to 
nanomanage.  A superior could employ nanomanagement under some conditions, but allow 
subordinate discretion in others.  Some superiors, based on their organization’s culture or 
degree of professionalism, may be more or less prone to nanomanagement.  This thesis 
examines factors that can explain much of the motivation to nanomanage.     
 
The question is not, “What causes nanomanagement?”  I am sensitive to employing the word 
cause; by its use, I do not imply that this thesis will develop universal and immutable maxims 
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of if x, then nanomanagement.  Instead, this thesis takes the first steps to understanding an 
observed phenomenon and testing where one could expect to find it in greater or lesser 
degrees.  The question is also not, “Should one nanomanage?”  As much as a subordinate 
may loathe being micromanaged and thus loathe further oversight, this thesis does not seek 
to provide normative judgement. Nanomanagement is not meddling; indeed it is the 
opposite.  Meddling means to “interest oneself in what is not ones concern; to interfere 
without right or propriety” (Merriam-Webster, 2011).  Nanomanagement means to use 
technology to control something that is of one’s concern.  While this thesis will analyse new 
costs of nanomanagement, new benefits will also be presented.   
 
1.2.2 Effects—How does nanomanagement influence superior control and subordinate 
autonomy? 
 
This thesis seeks to not only explore the causes of nanomanagement but also its effects.  The 
thesis’s second research question is: how does nanomanagement influence superior control 
and subordinate autonomy?  To answer how, this thesis will profile two organizations that 
adopted and employed technology at differing rates, examining how their culture, values, 
use of differing controls, and organizational roles changed.   
 
While this phenomenon will be reflected in the empirical research, by choosing questions 
that begin with “why” and “how” this indicates a more exploratory approach.  I argue that 
nanomanagement is not a onetime choice.  Instead, I argue that there are conditions where 
one may expect more nanomanagement to occur than not.  I also argue that while 
nanomanagement certainly produces disruptive effects, these effects may not break 
long-established organizational characteristics.  Hierarchical structures, organizational 
cultures, traditions, rules and roles are difficult to change.  Like an elastic band, 
nanomanagement may only stretch these organizational characteristics temporarily.  By 
exploring the effects of nanomanagement, this thesis examines to what degree the 
organization bounces back. 
  
1.3 Factors influencing the causes and effects of nanomanagement 
 
To assess the diverse causes and effects of nanomanagement, this thesis is structured around 
five broad factors, combining multiple theoretical frameworks to observe a contemporary 
phenomenon through different lenses (Dunleavy, 1990).  Each framework has its own 
literature and contribution to understanding the causes and effects of nanomanagement.  
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Nanomanagement should not be seen as a binary function with certain cultures, 
organizations or exogenous conditions determining whether a superior flips a switch 
between nanomanaging and not nanomanaging.  Instead nanomanagement should be seen 
along a continuum, with these factors pushing and pulling the superior to exert tighter 
control or grant wider autonomy.  
 
First, this thesis focuses on two factors that will set up the general state of 
superior-subordinate relationships, largely irrespective of technology.  For these two 
factors—organizational culture and ex ante controls—technology is more disruptive to 
superior control and subordinate autonomy than destructive.  Beginning this way allows the 
establishment of what actors think in general about autonomy and control.  Once this 
baseline is established, this thesis then focuses on two factors where new technology 
produces profound effects in how superiors control, monitor and interact with subordinates.  
For these two factors—ex post controls and hierarchical control—technology certainly 
disrupts, and may destroy established norms.  Finally this thesis collectively analyses 
exogenous factors—uncertainty and accountability—where technology plays a more 
interactive effect.  
 
The presentation of these five factors in this order allows a structured analysis of causes and 
effects.  The literature on organizational culture seeks to explain that actors are controlled 
through shared values, beliefs and norms (Schein, 2010).  The literature of professions sees 
control through rigorous ex ante screening and selection schools, which grant subordinates 
autonomy to be trusted to apply an abstract field of knowledge (A. D. Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 
1983).   Control by culture and ex ante control is anathema to the real-time control of 
nanomanagement. By comparing two similar organizations, both with cultures that state the 
value of subordinate autonomy in their doctrine and both investing in ex ante controls, this 
thesis can analyse whether certain cultures or professions would be more or less prone to 
nanomanage.  
 
Second, two bodies of literature focus more intently on the effects of nanomanagement.  The 
literature of transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981) sees control primarily through 
ex post monitoring (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).  The literature on hierarchies sees control 
through the establishment of rules and roles that govern the responsibilities of each level, 
and how each level interacts with superior and subordinate levels (Weber, et al., 1947; James 
Wilson, 2000).  By analyzing and comparing two organizations that adopted monitoring tools 
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at differing rates, while retaining a hierarchical structure, I expect to see the effect of 
nanomanagement on superior-subordinate relationships.   
 
Third, the literature on two exogenous factors explains both the causes of nanomanagement 
and its effects.  Control is seen as a response to environments of uncertainty (Clausewitz, et 
al., 1976; Lonsdale, 2004; Tzu, 2007; James Wilson, 2000) and accountability (Douglas, 1992; 
Hood, 2002, 2011; Power, 1994, 2000a; Radin, 2006); an analysis of these two exogenous 
factors will look at both causes and effects.   
 
While these five factors may explain causes of nanomanagement more than the effects of 
nanomanagement, or vice versa, each will contribute to answering both questions.  This 
thesis serves up a dish of nanomanagement, made up of many flavours.  By examining the 
same phenomenon from different approaches, this thesis seeks to explain both why it came 
to the table and how one should expect it to taste. 
 
1.3.1 Culture  
 
Does an organization’s culture in part determine the degree of nanomanagement?  In 
examining the causes of nanomanagement, this thesis first analyses established cultural 
beliefs of autonomy and control.  A study of a single organization would expose this thesis to 
a logical critique: just as an individual may be predisposed to nanomanage, so too could a 
single organization.  By exploring two organizational cultures that differ (the U.S. and British 
armies), but share a common hierarchical structure; that operate in the same uncertain 
wartime environment; and that both invest heavily in ex ante controls, this thesis can explore 
why culture may be a determinant of nanomanagement. 
 
Wilson (2000, p. 27) saw organizational culture as a combination of factors such as the 
environment, beliefs held by members of the organization, prior experiences and traditions.  
This thesis argues that different cultural understandings of autonomy and control, as 
expressed by an organization’s written doctrine, may predispose superiors to nanomanage.  
Both armies developed a clear understanding of autonomy, reflected in their written 
doctrine.  Yet each army differs in the degree to which the lofty goals of doctrine manifest in 
practice.  A previous work identified differences between the U.S. and British armies’ 
organizational culture and how this manifested in different approaches to granting 
subordinates autonomy (Sowers, 2005).  The British Army demonstrated a culture where 
superiors grant subordinates a broad mandate, allowing subordinates the latitude to execute 
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as they see fit.  Conversely, the U.S. Army reflected a culture where superior control was 
paramount and subordinate autonomy was more tightly restricted. 
 
With this baseline difference identified, this thesis again studies these two armies.  
Technology is seen as one of the primary causes of cultural change (Schein, 1990).  Indeed, 
both armies responded to the information age by changing their doctrine.  An analysis of 
how technology was thought to change autonomy, reflected in doctrine, will structure the 
empirical analysis.  Further, in the case of these armies in Iraq, technologies that allowed 
tighter control were adopted more rapidly by the resource rich U.S. Army than the relatively 
resource poor British Army.  As these technologies were adopted, did the British Army’s 
cultural predilection to grant subordinates broad autonomy persist?  Or did the temptation 
of nanomanagement overwhelm culture?  When powerful monitoring technologies are 
placed in the hands of superiors, can organizational culture serve as a deterrent to superiors 
that seek to employ these tools?  This thesis argues that despite differences in organizational 
culture, superiors will employ these technologies to exert ever more control.   
 
1.3.2 Ex ante control  
 
Like examining cultures seen resistant to nanomanagement, this thesis examines specific 
types of organizations where nanomanagement would not be expected, namely those that 
spend a large amount of resources in selecting, screening and training.   Subordinates that 
pass through these ex ante controls expect to be entrusted with a degree of autonomy 
greater than if they had not undergone the training (A. Abbott, 1981; A. D. Abbott, 1988; 
Freidson, 1983; Lynn, 1965b).  These ex ante controls are commonly found in professions, 
unique organizations whose strict entry and education requirements instil a level of trust in 
subordinates.   Does being a member of a professional organization mean superiors should 
nanomanage their subordinates less?   
 
By claiming a monopoly over the application of abstract knowledge, be it doctors’ 
management of medicine or soldiers’ management of violence, a profession’s very existence 
demands that they be trusted to apply that knowledge judiciously (A. D. Abbott, 1988; Lynn, 
1965b).  Trust between superiors and subordinates is vital, both for the conduct of the 
professional and for the profession itself (O'Neill, 2002).  For much of history, military 
superiors had little choice but to trust their subordinates and grant them wide autonomy.  
Indeed, militaries in the nineteenth and twentieth century increasingly professionalized, 
developing, at great expense, ex ante controls.  The rigid selection, screening and training 
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found in military schools and academies inculcated professional norms that would guide, and 
control, widely dispersed autonomous actors (Huntington, 1957; James Wilson, 2000, p. 
149).  Where most subordinates seek or hope for a degree of autonomy, being entrusted 
with a level of autonomy is what defines professionals (James Wilson, 2000).  
 
While professionals expect to be trusted in their assigned tasks, technology disrupts and 
makes obsolete tasks that previously required trust (A. Abbott, 1981, p. 35).  Telegraph, 
radio, telephone, television, computers—each new technology has created professional 
domains and destroyed others (A. D. Abbott, 1988).  Professionals constantly struggle to 
defend their domain, their monopoly of some field of abstract knowledge.  If they lose this 
struggle and their tasks can now be controlled or automated, they lose the trust that defines 
them as a professional.  If a high-level superior now possesses tools to closely control all 
actors, will the temptation to control overwhelm a profession’s tradition of trust?  As fully 
explored in Chapter 4, I assess why nanomanagement is observed in one of the least likely of 
places—within professions.  
 
1.3.3 Ex post control 
 
Where the first two factors explore organizations that value autonomy and expend resources 
on ex ante controls to assess causes of nanomanagement, the next two factors look more at 
the effects of nanomanagement.  A superior seeks subordinates who will choose working, 
defined here as performing tasks to the superior’s satisfaction, instead of shirking, defined 
here as not performing tasks to the superior’s satisfaction (P. Feaver, 2003, p. 60).  While a 
superior may be tempted to closely control subordinates, control generates costs for both 
superiors and subordinates (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981).  In establishing ex post controls, 
superiors must allocate time and resources to processing the data requested and taking 
action.  The superior’s time and resources are also spent developing and refining the control 
mechanisms and sanctioning those subordinates who choose shirking instead of working.  
The superior may bear those costs of ex post oversight through “police patrols” (expending 
time and resources to check up on subordinates) or outsource the monitoring to third parties 
that can serve as “fire alarms” to warn of subordinate shirking (McCubbins & Schwartz, 
1984).3  The superior’s degree of control is a cost calculation—how to control at the least 
cost. 
 
                                                          
3
 A third, widely discussed option of “deck stacking” of establishing ex ante controls mandating 
reporting and procedures will be examined in later chapters. 
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Ex post monitoring also creates costs for the subordinate. Every new reporting requirement, 
meeting that must be attended, or minute spent answering queries take time away from the 
delegated task.  With less monitoring, both superior and subordinate produce fewer 
transaction costs.  In Chapter 5, I argue that nanomanagement has changed the basic cost 
calculus for ex post monitoring away from fire alarms and towards new types of police 
patrols.  While traditional police patrols are as costly as ever, three sub-categories of police 
patrols (trackers, drones and long screwdrivers) have proliferated on the battlefield.  These 
tools may do far more than reduce costs but may reverse information asymmetry, allowing 
the superior to know more about a subordinate’s actions than the subordinate knows. 
 
However, if the superiors’ fundamental desire is to get subordinates to work, does increasing 
control reduce the chance of shirking?  As monitoring costs go down, how will 
superior-subordinate relationships change?  With these new options, is the preference for 
fire alarms over police patrols still valid?  Now that nanomanagement is possible, an updated 
calculation of costs and benefits to both the superior and the subordinate will be explored.   
 
1.3.4 Organizational structure 
 
How does nanomanagement influence actors at different positions within a hierarchy?  
Having explored how decreasing monitoring costs influence superior-subordinate 
relationships, this thesis examines how nanomanagement influences the organizational roles 
and behaviours of actors throughout a hierarchy.   
 
Organizations adopt hierarchical structures to organize and accomplish large tasks (Weber, et 
al., 1947).   Hierarchies seek control through structuring information flow (Arrow, 1991), 
limiting a superior’s span of control (Hamilton, 1921; Simon, 1946), and establishing a clear 
unity of command (Gulick, 1937; Simon, 1946).  Hierarchies allow for a protocolization of 
tasks as separate levels specialize and take on different roles and responsibilities.  To help 
explore the influence of nanomanagement on various actors, this thesis adopts Wilson’s 
(2000) typology of separating the hierarchy into levels of operators (low-level), managers 
(mid-level) and executives (upper-level), each with different roles and responsibilities, yet 
stable superior-subordinate relationships. 
 
Technology disrupts this stability.  With new information technologies, many organizations 
not only adopted technology but adapted their organizational structure (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
1997b, p. 5).  In many organizations hierarchies were flattened, spans of control were 
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expanded and entire levels of mid-level management were eliminated (Heclo, 1978; Leavitt & 
Whisler, 1958; Thorelli, 1986; Williamson, 1975).  Yet this did not occur in all organizations.  
After billions of dollars spent on adopting technologies, the hierarchical organization of the 
modern military remains almost entirely unchanged from its pre-information age structure.   
 
By adopting technology while retaining hierarchy, in Chapter 6 I argue that nanomanagement 
expands the available options for superiors to control subordinates.  No longer may only the 
subordinate violate the delegation contract by shirking.  This thesis argues superiors now 
may take three actions that violate their portion of the delegation contract: 
shifting, focusing their attention on subordinate levels 
 
drifting, acting at subordinate levels 
 
grifting, cheating the hierarchy by controlling actions at levels beneath their 
immediate subordinates  
 
Further, I argue that the sum effect of shifting, drifting, and grifting requires a new term for a 
type of control based on exclusion—what I term ex claudere controls.  As the superiors of 
mid-level officers increasingly observe, act and communicate with the mid-level officer’s 
subordinates, these mid-level officers are then excluded from their traditional role in the 
military hierarchy.  Now that their superiors can speak, direct and monitor their subordinate, 
what is left for these mid-level managers to do?  How does the newfound ability for superiors 
to manage not one, but multiple levels down through the chain of command influence those 
levels that are now bypassed?  I argue that as these hierarchical levels are physically retained 
but functionally excluded, organizations may enter into a cycle of nanomanagement, with 
profound effects on organizational roles and behaviours.   
 
1.3.5 Exogenous factors: uncertainty and accountability   
 
Do factors external to the organization influence nanomanagement?  The final factor looks 
outside of the confines of the organization.  By assessing factor that characterize 
contemporary military operations—the uncertainty of the environment alongside a broad 
societal shift towards greater accountability—this thesis can assess both explanations of 
whether  nanomanagement occurs as a response to exogenous factors as well as how these 
exogenous factors condition superior-subordinate relationships.   
 
I approach uncertainty by recognizing that uncertainty in the environment is related to 
uncertainty in one’s role.  War has been characterized by environmental uncertainty; military 
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commanders have a history of demanding ever more information—about the enemy, the 
terrain and their own forces—to mitigate that uncertainty (Galbraith, 1977).  For Wilson 
(2000, p. 228), a superior’s belief that more information means less uncertainty is 
questionable.  Yet with more information available at less cost, I argue that military 
commanders will increasingly nanomanage in war, just another step in their “endless quest 
for certainty” (Van Creveld, 1985, p. 264).  In Chapter 7, I assess environmental uncertainty 
as a cause of nanomanagement. 
 
However, information is not the only tool militaries have used to manage uncertainty.  
Managing uncertainty and risk is a feature of organizational design (Power, 2007; James 
Wilson, 2000).  Organizational structure, task specialization and training allow members of 
the military to prepare for assigned roles in the chaos of combat.  In war, militaries may not 
know who, what, when, where or why they will fight, but they do know how they will fight 
(their output) and the desired outcome (defeat of the enemy).  Tankers will drive tanks.  
Artillery officers will fire cannons.  Victory is clearly defined.  While conventional war may be 
uncertain, militaries do their best to reduce role uncertainty, ensuring their members are at 
least certain in their expected output and desired outcome.   
 
Yet a feature of modern war is with “increasing levels of unpredictability and complexity” 
outputs and outcomes have become uncertain (Mackay & Tatham, 2009, p. 8).  Tankers no 
longer only drive tanks; they meet with local leaders to discuss employment programs.  
Artillery officers no longer only fire cannons; they guard gates.  Victory is not defined and 
easily measured, but vague.  Role uncertainty is endemic.  If a superior is uncertain of his 
role, he will be uncertain of what to delegate to subordinates and therefore how to control 
them.  If a superior is uncertain of the desired outcome, it will be difficult to determine what 
should be measured as progress.  Complicating this role uncertainty is nanomanagement.  
While a superior may not know what to do or what to measure, with technology, they more 
easily may observe and measure more.  Chapter 7 will therefore also analyse the effect of 
nanomanagement on superior-subordinate relationships when roles are uncertain.   
 
As uncertainty has long characterized warfare, rising accountability characterizes a more 
recent trend in both the U.S. and U.K. societies. In the last two decades, accountability has 
adopted a normative quality, as governments, agencies and corporations face increasing calls 
for greater transparency in what they do and how they do it.  This environment of 
accountability incentivizes superiors, both external and internal, to monitor and control in a 
far more exacting degree (Power, 2000a, 2007; Radin, 2006).   Who is accountable—the 
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superior or the subordinate—is more difficult to determine when superiors know more about 
their subordinates’ actions. Where some scholars (O'Neill, 2006) see more accountable 
environments allowing a transfer of responsibility down the chain of command, others see 
this driving further responsibility toward the top (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; James Wilson, 
2000).  In either case, both actors may seek defensive strategies—with superiors demanding, 
and subordinates creating, unnecessary but defensible reports and audit trails, where blame 
can be avoided without fixing the problem (Hood, 2006).  
 
In Chapter 7, I will evaluate whether an environment of rising accountability may cause 
nanomanagement.  Superiors who are responsible for everything their subordinates do or fail 
to do must nanomanage both to avoid external sanction and to reduce their liability 
exposure.  If superiors can request data and emplace control mechanisms, in a more 
accountable environment they must.  If subordinates may be found accountable not just for 
their actions, but for how they documented their actions, how does this change their 
relationship with superiors?   
 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
 
The conflict between superiors seeking control and subordinates seeking autonomy is not a 
contemporary phenomenon.  Yet contemporary information technologies increasingly allow 
the highest superiors control to a degree never before possible.  The study of 
nanomanagement will offer theoretical and empirical contributions to assess how technology 
influences the tension between superior control and subordinate autonomy.  Each factor 
analysed in isolation will only provide a portion of the overall picture; I hope to advance 
theory in differing fields that are rarely integrated, yet together explain superior-subordinate 
relationships within organizations. I do not claim to provide definitive answers but seek to 
build theories that capture a phenomenon commonly understood to be occurring but to date 
not comprehensively studied in this way.   
 
Despite accounting for a large proportion of government expense and in many cases 
representing the largest government bureau in terms of manpower and resources, students 
of civil administration have paid disproportionally less attention to the military as an 
organization.  I can understand why.  As a distinct and often closed culture of dense 
language, hierarchical ranks, slang and acronyms, the military is difficult to understand.  As a 
bureau that conducts its work usually far from urban centres of learning, the military is 
difficult to survey.  As a massive and largely closed bureaucracy where knowing the 
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appropriate level of analysis and then gaining access to this level are both problematic, the 
military is difficult to penetrate.    
 
Much of civil-military scholarly work has focused on two important questions.  The first 
focuses on how much should civilians control the military.  The question is rarely if civilians 
should control the military.  A central tenet of democratic theory is the belief that the 
governed should govern and that authority flows from the ballot box to elected institutions.  
Civilians therefore have “a right to be wrong” in deciding how much they should control the 
military (Gregory & Hicks, 1999, p. 216).  However, the military must be granted enough 
autonomy such that the nation is protected from threats, yet should be controlled enough 
such that the military will not overthrow the elected government (P. Feaver, 2003).   Differing 
theories of the appropriate amount of control informs much of civil-military scholarship 
(Desch, 1999; P. Feaver, 2003; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Yoo & Sulmasy, 2007; 
Zhang, 2000).    
 
The second focuses on the appropriate distance between the military and civil society.  
Where some expect the military to form a separate and distinct culture (Huntington, 1957), 
others feel the military should reflect the society from which it springs (Janowitz, 1960).   
Civil-military scholars have studied differences in values, ideas and beliefs, and whether these 
differences create to wide a gap or a break in a covenant between a superior state and its 
subordinate soldiers (P. Feaver & Kohn, 2001; Forster, 2006; McCartney, 2010).   Many have 
examined the degree to which a military is a profession, relating this to the appropriate 
distance a military should have from its civil society (Burk, 2002; A. Larson, 1972; Matthews, 
2002; Sarkesian, 1981; Sarkesian, Connor, & Sarkesian, 2006; D. M. Snider, Nagl, & Pfaff, 
1999; D. M. Snider, Oh, & Toner, 2009; U.S. Army War College, 1970).   
 
This thesis informs these two questions.  First, this thesis examines control within the military 
which will help explain control of the military (Brehm & Gates, 1997).  Do internal superiors 
also have the right to be wrong?  Second, its analysis of technologies that let both external 
and internal superiors to know more about their subordinates’ activities will help explain 
how a ‘gap’ between civilians and their military may influence internal control.  Third, its 
discussion of how nanomanagement changes the costs, and preference, of ex ante and ex 
post controls strikes at the question of whether military professionalism is still needed in an 
era of nanomanagement.   
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Empirically, the study of these two armies’ officers has broad applications.  Governments 
around the world model their militaries after the U.S. and (to a lesser extent) British armies’ 
organization, doctrine and tactics.  How these two armies adapt to information technologies 
portends how armies of this and the next generation will organize, equip and fight.  More 
specifically to the U.S. and the U.K., both governments face increasing budgetary concerns 
with Parliament already reducing their military budget and the U.S. Congress threatening to 
do the same (Burns, 2010).  As these budgetary pressures mount, the pressure to do more 
with less costly tools will increase.  How these militaries adopt these technologies and either 
retain or modify their existing structures will have lasting effects.   
 
Further, nanomanagement is not only observed in the military.  The military has long been 
seen as both a mirror and an instigator of organizational change in other government and 
corporate structures.  While the technologies discussed in this thesis have military 
applications, they are not exclusively reserved to the military; as organizations, both public 
and private, adopt similar technologies that allow superiors to nanomanage subordinates, 
similar causes and effects may be observed.  Where the most senior CEO is able to send 
instant messages to the lowest worker, where the Chief of Surgery can record and review a 
junior surgeon’s operation, where a Cabinet official can demand information from the lowest 
street-level bureaucrat, the wider implications of nanomanagement will be felt for years to 
come.   
 
As the technologies that enable nanomanagement are ever more available at ever lower 
cost, important questions must be answered.  Does nanomanagement portend the death of 
subordinate autonomy?  Can professions continue to exist in an era of nanomanagement?  
With more being observed, will all organizations gravitate towards Wilson’s production type 
organization?  Just because a superior can know more, must they know more?  This thesis 
seeks to acknowledge that while nanomanagement may occur increasingly now and in the 
future, it is not inevitable.  By offering a snapshot of empirical evidence of two similar 
professional organizations, taken at a critical moment of transition as these technologies 
were being adopted, this thesis may help to identify and manage what superiors and 
subordinates can expect in the near future.  
  
1.5 Thesis outline 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters.  Chapter 1 has introduced the concept of 
nanomanagement, the two research questions, and the factors by which the research 
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questions will be explored.  Chapter 2 explains the research design, choice of case, subjects 
and the empirical methods.  Chapters 3 through 7 will each separately focus on the factors 
introduced above, and present empirical evidence in the form of interviews, case studies and 
organizational doctrine.   
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the factor of organizational culture, specifically how the U.S. and British 
armies understand autonomy and how they both incorporated technology into their 
doctrine.  Chapter 4 then explores the factor of ex ante controls.  Theories of professionalism 
will be offered with a discussion of the trust engendered by ex ante controls.  Empirical 
findings concerning questions of trust will be analysed.   
 
Chapter 5 delves more deeply into explaining the effect of nanomanagement on 
superior-subordinate relationships.  Sub-categories of police patrols—trackers, drones and 
long screwdrivers—will be defined and discussed with the real world manifestations in Iraq 
explained.  Focusing on the cost of ex post controls, empirical findings concerning questions 
of appropriate and inappropriate monitoring will be analysed.  In Chapter 6, I examine the 
theories surrounding hierarchical control, specifically how technology influences three 
characteristics of military hierarchies—information flow, span of control and unity of effort.  
This chapter will focus on the tension of adopting network technologies while retaining a 
hierarchical organizational structure.  Shifting, drifting, grifting and ex claudere controls will 
be defined and discussed.  A case study of the mid-level officer exodus in the U.S. Army will 
help illuminate what I term the cycle of nanomanagement.  Empirical findings concerning 
questions of evidence of shifting, drifting, and grifting as well as how nanomanagement 
influences the different levels of a hierarchy will be assessed.   
 
Chapter 7 then moves outside the organization and explores exogenous factors of 
uncertainty and rising accountability.  Empirical findings concerning the uncertainty of the 
environment, the uncertainty of an actor’s role, and how these actors responded to calls for 
greater accountability will be analysed.  Finally Chapter 8 serves as a concluding chapter, 
presenting a logic of nanomanagement.  After discussing the thesis’s contributions and 
potential for further research, I will then discuss the relative applicability of these findings 
outside the case of the military.  Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the future of 
nanomanagement. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
34 
 
This is a thesis about the tension between superiors and subordinates within organizations.  
Empowered by modern technologies, superiors have increasing ability to control their 
subordinates.  In this chapter, I first defined nanomanagement and clarified why a discussion 
of five factors could both explain why it is occurring and how it influences 
superior-subordinate relationships.  This analysis seeks to integrate a diverse body of 
literature to fully account for how and why technology is changing organizational behaviour 
and roles.   
 
More than an organizational study, this is a study of conflict—the pressures to monitor 
against the imperatives to trust; the advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical 
organizations; the advantages and disadvantages of professions; the cost calculus of ex ante 
against ex post control; and the drive for accountability against the uncertainty endemic to 
contemporary environments.  In Chapter 2, I will begin by outlining a case that uniquely 
captures this conflict and the complex factors that together explain both why and how 
nanomanagement exacerbates the tension between superior control and subordinate 
autonomy. 
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 Research design and methodology CHAPTER 2
 
The previous chapter outlined the conflict between superior control and subordinate 
autonomy, defined nanomanagement and discussed how this thesis will explore factors that 
explain the causes of nanomanagement and its effects.  In this chapter, I will explain my 
overall conceptual design, case selection, instrument development and sample. Section 2.1 
will discuss the overall conceptual design.  Section 2.2 will outline the case selection and 
rationale.  Section 2.3 will detail the instrument development.  Section 2.4 will outline the 
procedures for identifying, gaining access to and interviewing the sample.  In Section 2.5, the 
chapter will conclude by assessing the strengths and limitations of this design. 
  
2.1 Conceptual design  
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the objective of this research is to examine both the causes of 
nanomanagement and its effects on superior control and subordinate autonomy.  Three 
considerations guided this thesis’s conceptual design.   
 
First, many studies of control in public institutions use the organization as the unit of 
analysis, with one organization, usually an elected body, in a superior position to an 
unelected organization (e.g. how Congress controls a bureaucracy).  This level of analysis has 
been successfully applied to understanding the military as an organization, and how it 
interacts with external organizations—the interorganizational approach (Avant, 1994; Coletta 
& Feaver, 2006; P. Feaver, 2003).  However, in order to understand control between 
organizations (interorganizational control), this thesis looks at control within an organization 
(intraorganizational control), or how internal superiors control their subordinates (Brehm & 
Gates, 1997, p. 21; James Wilson, 2000).  This study uses the individual as the unit of analysis, 
specifically an individual’s perceptions of superior-subordinate relationships (Geddes, 2003, 
p. 177).  From this analysis of characteristics at the individual actor level, one may draw 
insight into an organization’s characteristics (Yesilkagit & Thiel, 2008).   
 
Second, to understand superior-subordinate relationships this thesis sees individuals as 
rational actors, a framework seen as promising in analyzing why individuals make choices to 
maximize their goals (Geddes, 2003, p. 25).  This analysis is best suited to examine individual 
behaviour in hierarchies, where the relationships and rules that govern how actors interact 
with each other are clearly known and understood (Tsebelis, 1990, p. 32).  By analyzing 
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individuals as rational actors I sought to build on previous work (Sowers, 2005) and apply this 
framework to understand behaviours as conditions, in this case access to new technologies, 
changed. 
 
Third, when designing a study to capture comparative variance in a complex environment, 
the need for a single case allowing control of intervening variables is essential.  The case 
study method is seen as the preferred strategy for research questions that begin with “why” 
and “how,” especially for exploratory studies of contemporary events (Yin, 1994).  Many 
military case studies compare amongst different conflicts, fought by different armies at 
different times in differing environments, exposing these studies to a variety of 
methodological questions, especially those of external validity.  To that end, I sought a single 
case where variation could be controlled for internal validity, yet a case that could be 
generalized to meet the demands for external validity (Yin, 1994). 
 
With these three considerations in mind, a case that could assess each of the five factors was 
required.  First, to understand the role of culture in causing nanomanagement, I needed two 
organizations with distinct organizational cultures.   Militaries have comparatively 
well-established and defined cultures that allow comparison (Adamsky, 2010; Nagl, 2005).  
Second, to examine the influence of ex ante controls, the case required professions 
performing professional work.  As there is debate about whether the military not at war 
should be thought of as professional, I sought to examine the military at war (James Wilson, 
2000).  Third, to examine the effect of changing monitoring costs necessitated a case over a 
period long enough to capture the adoption of new technologies.  This requirement forced 
me to examine conflicts of the past twenty years—during the adoption of ‘modern’ 
information technologies.  Fourth, to assess the effect of nanomanagement on hierarchical 
control, it was necessary to analyse organizations with extensive hierarchies of executives, 
managers and operators.  This meant I needed to assess militaries that contributed 
thousands of forces, in large hierarchical formations.  Fifth, to examine contemporary 
exogenous factors, the case needed to be recent.  And finally, to interview and collect data, I 
needed access to actors within these often closed professional organizations.  The solution: 
mid-level officers of the U.S. and British armies that served in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. 
 
2.2 Case selection and rationale  
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By answering “Why the U.S. and British armies?”, “Why mid-level officers?” and “Why the 
Iraq War?” the following section will demonstrate how I met the unique demands of a single 
case to assess both causes and effects of nanomanagement.  
 
2.2.1 Why the U.S. and British armies?   
 
I first sought a case that could compare organizational cultures defined as the “persistent, 
patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an 
organization” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 91).  The organizational culture of the U.S. and British 
armies provides an exceptional lens for comparison. While professional in nature and 
bureaucratic in structure, they critically differ in their rate of technology adoption and 
doctrine concerning superior-subordinate relationships.4  This thesis builds upon a previous 
study comparing officers of the U.S. and British armies during the Kosovo conflict (Sowers, 
2005).  U.S. Army officers stated they lacked autonomy and were tightly controlled by their 
military superiors.  Conversely, British Army officers reported a low level of monitoring and 
conversely a high level of autonomy.  By continuing the comparison between the U.S. and 
British armies’ organizational culture, this thesis seeks comparative insights and avoids 
deeming one culture superior to another.5   
 
After selecting the U.S. and British armies to be my case study’s comparative frame, my case 
needed to select an appropriate level to assess superior control and subordinate autonomy.  
With hundreds of thousands of soldiers stretched across a variety of missions and conducting 
different roles at different levels within these hierarchical organizations, what level would 
provide the best lens to understand nanomanagement? 
 
2.2.2 Why mid-level officers in the U.S. and British armies? 
 
This thesis focuses on officers, mid-level officers specifically, as the ideal actors to assess the 
causes and effects of nanomanagement. Officers comprise an elite minority of both armies; 
they differ from the rest of the uniformed service (enlisted) in the selection and screening 
                                                          
4
 This difference stems from the British Army’s emphasis on discretion and a “tradition of flexibility, 
based upon the fact that through the colonial policing campaigns of the past [the British Army] had 
been forced to make do with only limited resources” (Pimlott, 1985) in contrast to the U.S. Army’s 
strict hierarchical culture based on control modelled after World War II and the Korean war experience 
(Cassidy, 2005; Nagl, 2002). 
5
 Scholars that compare militaries are often wont to look at outcomes, such as whether a war was won 
or lost, and pass normative judgment.  Organizational cultures are neither good nor bad; yet they can 
be misaligned to organizational objectives or the operational environment (Gerras, Wong, & Allen, 
2008).   
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criteria to join the military and the autonomy granted at a comparable time in service.  The 
difference between officer and enlisted is important.  While a high school degree is preferred 
in both the U.S. and British armies’ enlisted ranks, a degree is not required to enlist.  Upon 
enlistment, new soldiers attend a three (U.S.) to six (British) month basic training.  After two 
years of service, an enlisted soldier will likely be a team leader in charge of two to four 
enlisted soldiers.  After seven years, the enlisted soldier will likely be a sergeant in charge of a 
squad of eight to twelve enlisted soldiers. 
 
The threshold for joining the officer corps is much higher.  In order to receive an officer’s 
commission in the U.S. Army, the vast majority of officers are required to attend a service 
academy (such as USMA) or participate in a Reserve Officers Training Corps (R.O.T.C.) 
program at a civilian institution.6  These four-year programs include military and leadership 
training as well as earning an undergraduate degree.  In the British Army, while officers are 
not required to be a university graduate, over 80% possess a post-secondary degree prior to 
entering the 48 week commission course at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst (U.K. 
Department of the Army, 2008b).  Following this relatively extensive training, officers of both 
armies formally enter their service, commissioned in the rank of second lieutenants.  An 
officer’s first assignment is likely as a platoon leader (U.S.) or platoon commander (British), in 
charge of three squads or approximately 20-40 enlisted soldiers.  After seven years, an officer 
will likely be a captain in command of a company of three platoons, or approximately 
100-150 enlisted soldiers. Officers are granted far greater autonomy at far fewer years of 
service than enlisted soldiers. 
 
As this thesis focuses on the conflict of superior control and subordinate autonomy, I sought 
what is thought to be the more professional part of two armies.7  While this study does not 
assume every soldier or officer should be thought a professional, through strict training and 
selection, professional norms are thought to be more extant in the officer corps than in the 
enlisted (Huntington, 1957).8   
                                                          
6 
A U.S. Army commission may also be granted through Officer Candidate School (OCS).  Candidates 
are required to complete a four year degree within one year of commissioning.  For more on the 
various routes of commission, see 6.2.4. 
7
 Chapter 4 provides an extensive discussion of professions. 
8
 To limit the level of analysis this study focuses on the professional culture of the officer corps.  
Scholars have distinguished the relative professionalization of the enlisted and officer corps 
(Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Pierce, 2010; D. M. Snider, et al., 2009).   But the distinction 
between officer and enlisted is not the only method to parse professionalism.  Indeed, each officer is a 
member of sub-cultural levels based on role trained for and executed on the battlefield (i.e. an 
infantry officer is trained to close with and kill the enemy while a signals officer is trained to maintain 
communications and repair radios) and assigned unit (i.e. 82nd Airborne Division and the U.K. 
regimental affiliation).  These sub-cultures perform different tasks and are seen as distinct in their 
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Having narrowed my focus to officers, I did not want to analyse all officers.  Brand new 
second lieutenants would likely offer starkly different observations than four star generals.   
Needing to select one level, at which level could officers be seeking to control subordinates 
while seeking to preserve their own autonomy?  Low-level officers would have too many 
superiors and not enough subordinates.  High-level officers would have too many 
subordinates and not enough superiors.  The focus on the mid-level officer (captains and 
majors) offers a unique perspective.  Organizational culture studies have often focused on 
mid-level managers as they provide a unique perspective with multiple levels of command 
existing both above and below their position (R. J. House, 2004).  With multiple hierarchical 
levels below, mid-level officers can nanomanage.  With multiple hierarchical levels above, 
mid-level officers can be nanomanaged.  With their position, mid-level officers may also be 
excluded, with their superiors now able to nanomanage their subordinates.   
 
Having selected an appropriate level of analysis within the U.S. and British armies, I finally 
needed to control for external variables.  While many previous military studies compared 
between conflicts, I sought a single conflict where both armies operated, over a time period 
long enough to determine the effect of new technology on superior control and subordinate 
autonomy. 
 
2.2.3 Why the Iraq War? 
 
The time period of the case needed to capture armies at war for two reasons.  First, war is 
where armies work.  An army professional’s task is “the management of violence” (Lasswell 
& McDougal, 1943, p. 208), or application of the abstract knowledge that separates it from 
other professions.  As this study examines autonomy, the military profession is best 
examined when they are performing their professional task.   
 
The Iraq War remains the largest engagement and major military action of the previous 
fifteen years.  The Iraq War began on March 20, 2003.  With the mission of disarming Iraq of 
weapons of mass destruction, two U.S. military (one Army and one Marine) divisions rolled 
north from Kuwait towards Baghdad as a small contingent of U.S. Army Special Forces 
secured northern Iraq.  The British Army’s First Armoured Division secured oil fields and ports 
in the southeast, near Basra.  The invasion phase concluded on April 30, 2003 when Saddam 
                                                                                                                                                                       
value, belief, norms (Deal & Kennedy, 1982), and a number of scholars have examined these military 
sub-cultures in the U.K. and the U.S. (A. King, 2006; Kirke, 2009; Reed & Bullis, 2009; Stewart, 1991). 
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Hussein’s home town of Tikrit fell to U.S. Marines.   Figure 2.1 shows the location of U.S. and 
British forces during this invasion phase. 
 
Figure 2.1  The invasion of Iraq (March-April 2003)9 
From May 2003-July 2008, U.S. and British forces were assigned to multi-national division 
(MND) areas, where they occupied and developed large forward operating bases (FOBs).  The 
British Army was responsible for a sector near Basra in the southeast.  For the majority of 
2003-2008, U.S. forces were responsible for the rest of Iraq.  No longer fighting deployed 
echelons of the Iraq military, the coalitions engaged an increasingly diverse group of 
insurgents from former Ba’ath party members and Saddam loyalists, to insurgents tied to Al 
Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to Shia groups sponsored by Iran, all the while 
seeking to create a safe and secure Iraq.  Figure 2.2 identifies the largely static location of 
British and U.S. forces, between 2003 and 2008. 
                                                          
9
 Source of Iraq map (United Nations, 2011).  U.S. and U.K. invasion routes and icons generated by 
author. 
41 
 
 
Figure 2.2  U.S. and British forces post invasion (2003-2008)10 
As this thesis examines superior-subordinate relationships, I required militaries that had 
deployed a large number of personnel.  In the Iraq War, both armies conducted their largest 
deployment of the last 20 years.  They also made up the first and second largest national 
contributors to the coalition accounting for over 95% of the committed troops in Iraq.  
Including additional armies was considered, notably the other 43 members of the Iraq War’s 
“Coalition of the Willing”.  However, only the U.S. and British armies contributed forces 
above 10,000 troops during the invasion and consistently deployed forces above brigade 
(~3,500) level.  This said, throughout 2003-2008, the size of the U.S. force dwarfed the British 
contingent by a factor of 8:1 to 30:1 (see Table 2.1). 
 
                                                          
10
 Source of Iraq map (United Nations, 2011).  U.S. and U.K. area of operations generated by author. 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
U.S. 150,000 148,000 160,000 144,000 171,000 150,000 
British 18,000 8,600 8,500 7,200 5,500 4,100 
 
Table 2.1  U.S. and British forces in Iraq (2003-2008)11 
Finally, the selection of 2003-2008 as the period of analysis captures both the exogenous 
factors pertinent to this study (uncertainty and rising accountability) and a dramatic 
expansion of technology adoption that occurred during this time.  While the U.S. fielded 
technology at greater rates, in both armies, those that deployed in 2008 had vastly more 
technologies that could be used to nanomanage than those that deployed in 2003.   
 
Having selected a unique case, I then sought to develop an instrument that could assess 
these two armies and the influence of five factors. 
 
2.3 Instrument development 
 
This study began with the intent of combining both quantitative (online survey) and 
qualitative (semi-structured interviews) methods to mitigate the disadvantages of single 
approaches (Denzin, 1970; Scandura & Williams, 2000).  As outlined below, the quantifiable 
measurement of all five factors in one instrument proved complicated.  From this insight, a 
robust qualitative approach was developed to provide the rich detail needed in an 
exploratory study.  The thesis was further strengthened by using existing doctrine and case 
studies to triangulate the qualitative findings and establish external validity.  The following 
section discusses the initial mixed method approach, and how the attempted and eventually 
discarded effort to employ quantitative methods nevertheless provided a useful path for 
what is ultimately a qualitative study. 
 
2.3.1 Quantitative instrument 
 
This study initially sought to employ a cross-sectional survey to assess perceptions of 
monitoring, relationships between subordinates and superiors, issues of liability and trust, 
the uncertainty and accountability of the environment, and ultimately how these factors 
influenced the work of a sample of U.S. and British mid-level Army officers.  The challenges of 
survey research, most notably internal validity, and operationalization of variables (Zaller, 
                                                          
11
 Sources (O'Hanlon & Livingston, 2010), (CNN, 2010), (Ashley, 2010). 
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1992) were all experienced in the piloting of a survey.  In survey questions, operationalization 
of variables as diverse as culture, perceptions of trust and autonomy, degree of monitoring 
proved highly subjective.12  In light of these challenges, I determined a pre-test would be 
employed to test the viability of a quantitative survey.13  Following the pre-test, I conducted 
interviews to probe for confusion, vague terms, looking at difficult areas that consumed an 
inordinate amount of time, noting problems and any ambiguities.14  Finally, I examined the 
paradata of the online survey—errors, navigation behaviour and reaction times—to look for 
inconsistencies.  This piloting made clear the complexity of capturing the variability in the 
surveyed officer’s perceptions.  Three significant obstacles were identified that would inform 
the final instrument development: first whether the officer was a commander or a member 
of a staff; second, whether they changed jobs during a deployment; and third, whether they 
deployed multiple times.   
 
First, in the U.S. and British armies, command and staff positions differ dramatically both in 
autonomy, hierarchical control, and in the nature of the work.  In commanding a company, a 
mid-level officer is part of the chain of command.  Clear lines of authority flow, from 
subordinates (platoon leaders, a lieutenant) to a single superior (battalion commander, a 
lieutenant colonel).  In command, mid-level officers have clear superiors and subordinates of 
differing ranks at differing hierarchical levels. 
 
In staff positions, officers are not part of this chain of command.  While working on a brigade 
staff, officers usually report to their staff section leader, who then reports to the commander 
at that level.  When serving in a staff position, mid-level officers have superiors but rarely 
have direct subordinates.  To illustrate this variance, Table 2.2 identifies four sample 
mid-level officers all serving in a typical army division.  The table shows the diversity of where 
within the division they could serve, whether they would be in command or staff at that 
                                                          
12 
Furthermore, in employing an Internet-based survey, there were disadvantages of public 
accessibility and online format (Zhang, 2000, p. 59), privacy, and technical issues of access, speed and 
browser limitations (Fink, 2006).  Concerns about the layout, format, and self-administration of web 
surveys have been raised (Baker, Crawford, & Swinehart, 2004).  With these limitations in mind, in 
constructing a survey, I sought to make each question meaningful, use standard English with a slant 
towards the military vernacular, make the questions concrete for the subject (instead of postulating 
about superior/subordinate motivations, intents), avoiding biased words and phrases (earlier surveys 
included terms like ’micromanagement’ which could have biased the results due to the normative 
understanding of this word), and trying to make each question include a single thought/observation 
(Fink, 2006).   
13
 Pretesting has a long tradition in the administration of survey questionnaires.  Between 12-50 cases 
has been considered sufficient for identifying flaws in the design and application of the survey (Rossi, 
Wright, & Anderson, 1983).  From February 16-25, 2008, I conducted an initial online survey of 15 U.S. 
Army officers based at USMA.   
14 
These methods are consistent with those proposed in (Baker, et al., 2004, p. 372). 
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organizational level, and where their immediate superior (1 UP), second level superior (2 UP), 
immediate subordinate (1 DN) and second level subordinate (2 DN) would be within a typical 
army division.15   
 Position Role  1 UP  2 UP  1 DN  2 DN 
 Company 
Commander 
(CO CDR) 
Command Battalion 
Commander 
(BN CDR) 
Brigade 
Commander 
(BDE CDR) 
 
Platoon Leader 
(PL) 
Squad Leader 
(SL) 
 
 Battalion 
Operations 
Officer 
(BN OPS) 
 
Staff 
 
Battalion 
Commander 
(BN CDR) 
Brigade 
Commander 
(BDE CDR) 
 
Battle Captain 
(BN BTL CPT) 
None 
 Brigade 
Assistant 
Operations 
Officer 
(BDE A/OPS) 
 
Staff Brigade 
Operations 
Officer 
(BDE OPS) 
 
Brigade 
Commander 
(BDE CDR) 
None None 
 Division 
Battle 
Captain 
(DIV BTL 
CPT) 
Staff Division 
Assistant 
Operations 
Officer 
(DIV A/OPS) 
 
Division 
Operations 
Officer 
(DIV OPS) 
None None 
Table 2.2  Mid-level officer positions and superior-subordinate relationships 
Table 2.2 shows that four officers of equivalent rank, depending on their assigned role, could 
experience a variety of superior-subordinate relationships.  Only one (CO CDR) has multiple 
levels of superiors and subordinates.  Two officers (BDE A/OPS and DIV BTL CPT) have no 
subordinates; these two officers’ 1 UP and 2 UP superior can be found within their 
organization level.    In order to capture this variance in a quantitative survey, I created a 
series of questions specifically focused on identifying when, and in what function (command 
or staff), subjects served while in Iraq.  As many questions for commanders did not apply to 
staff positions (e.g. “How did you control your subordinates?” would not be answered by BDE 
A/OPS or DIV BTL CPT), I created different subsets of questions that would be answered 
depending on whether the respondent was serving in command or in staff positions. 
 
Further, officers of mid-level ranks often served on staffs at various levels in the organization.  
Table 2.3 shows another challenge of using a survey with the same four sample officers now 
placed within an organizational chart. 
 
                                                          
15
 These positions could be in either the U.S. or British armies. 
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Figure 2.3  Mid-level officer positions and variance in superior-subordinate relationships 
In Figure 2.3, the four sample mid-level officers serve at different organizational levels.  Only 
one (CO CDR) is in command.  While all have multiple levels of superiors above them, only 
one (CO CDR) has multiple levels of subordinates below them; two mid-level officers have no 
subordinates.  Three (CO CDR, BN OPS, and BDE A/OPS) share the same two up superior (BDE 
CDR).  Two (CO CDR and BN OPS) share the identical superior, even as they operate in 
different roles.  One (DIV BTL CPT) shares no superiors or subordinates.   
 
Second, between 2003 and 2008, the length of Iraq deployments in both armies increased 
from four, to six, to twelve and eventually to as much as fifteen months.  As the deployments 
grew in length, officers often changed positions during a deployment.  For example, a captain 
could serve the first six months of a deployment commanding a company (CO CDR) and then 
be reassigned to the staff of a division (DIV BTL CPT).  Each position, on each deployment 
could and did have wide variance in my assessed factors; a survey that forced respondents to 
produce one answer for an entire deployment would fail to capture this variance. 
 
In attempting to overcome this, after the substantive portion of the survey, the survey asked, 
“Did you change jobs during this deployment?”  If the answer was yes, the respondent was 
asked whether this was a command or staff job and then was asked to repeat the substantive 
portion, assessing perceptions from the new position.  During the pilot, non-response rates 
increased dramatically on the second and subsequent iterations.   
 
Division 
Brigade 
Battalion 
Company 
Platoon 
Squad 
  
  
2UP: BDE CDR 
 
 
 
1UP: BN CDR 
 
 
 
CO CDR  
 
 
 
 
1DN: PL LDR 
 
 
 
2DN: SQ LDR 
2UP: BDE CDR 
1UP: BDE OPS 
BDE A/OPS  
 
2UP: BDE CDR 
 
 
 
1UP: BN CDR 
BN OPS 
1DN: BN BTL CPT 
 
Division level (~10,000 personnel) 
Mid-level officers only in staff 
Brigade level (~3,000 personnel) 
Mid-level officers only in staff 
Battalion level (~1000 personnel) 
Mid-level officers only in staff 
Company level (~100-200 personnel) 
Mid-level officers only in command 
Platoon level (~20-40 personnel) 
No mid-level officers 
Squad level (~5-10 personnel) 
No mid-level officers 
2UP: DIV OPS 
1UP: DIV A/OPS 
DIV BTL CPT   
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A third deficiency identified in the pre-test was capturing multiple deployments.  As the 
conflict had been waged for over five years prior to the survey, numerous officers had served 
multiple deployments.  Respondents of the pilot survey suggested that issues of monitoring, 
trust and control varied widely dependent on the time period deployed.  For example, those 
deployed during the initial conflict might report dramatically different perceptions then those 
deployed later.  Instead of aggregating what could be very different experiences, I sought to 
capture these as separate data points, providing a valuable comparative within single 
subjects.   
 
My attempted solution to retain the quantitative portion was creating a further iteration of 
the survey.  After completing the substantive portion of the survey for one deployment 
(which might have to be completed multiple times dependent if the officer changed 
positions), a final question was asked, “Did you have a second deployment to Iraq?”  If the 
answer was “No,” the survey concluded.  If the answer was “Yes,” the subject was directed to 
answer all substantive questions again.  At the end of this second iteration, the final question 
was “Did you have a third deployment to Iraq?”  If the answer was “No”, the survey 
concluded.  If the answer was “Yes,” the subject was directed to complete a third iteration.   
 
For example, one respondent had deployed twice to Iraq.  In his first deployment, he started 
as a commander, serving in this role for nine months.  He then served as a division staff 
officer for three months.  On his second deployment, he served as a battalion staff officer for 
the entire twelve months.  In order to capture the complexity and differentiation of his work, 
this officer would need to take the substantive portion of the survey three times.  While a 
subject such as this respondent could provide the richest detail in comparison, it was 
observed that most participants chose to only fill out only one iteration of the survey and 
non-response rates were deemed unacceptable (Zaller, 1992). 
 
The complexity of the factors needing to be assessed and the unique nature of the subjects 
changing positions and multiple deployments made the quantitative survey infeasible as a 
tool of analysis.  However, the weaknesses identified when formulating and testing the 
survey approach proved useful in highlighting the need for an approach that captured the 
variety of superior-subordinate relationships, over time, over multiple deployments.   
 
2.3.2 Qualitative instrument 
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Intended to describe the nuanced understandings and interaction between actors, the 
qualitative interview is seen as more suitable than surveys (Weiss, 1994).  As the study 
needed to assess five different influencing factors, that nevertheless are contextual and often 
overlap, the qualitative method applied to a case study is recommended by Yin when “the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (1994, p. 13).  
Further, qualitative methods are recommended in exploratory studies of new concepts 
(Marshall, 2006) and as the preferred method to analyzing contemporary events (Yin, 1994).   
 
Consistent with critiques of qualitative methods, the recollections of army officers removed 
from the battlefield could surely be coloured through the warm glow of memory (G. King, 
Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Kvale, 2007; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008).  To supplement these 
invariably subjective recollections, I sought first to compare between two armies and second 
to exceed the recommended “upper limit” of 15-25 individual interviews recommended for a 
project by a single researcher (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000, p. 43).  52 total interviews were 
conducted.   
 
The semi-structured interview was piloted at West Point from April 15-May 15, 2008.  Five 
subjects participated in the pilot interview.  I followed an interview guide (See Appendix 1) 
allowing respondents to discuss their relationships with superiors and subordinates, their 
work in Iraq, how they were controlled by superiors, how they sought to control their 
subordinates and explored issues of autonomy and trust.  I ended the interview by asking 
subjects to describe incidents of severe monitoring and control of their activities.  The 
interviews provided opportunities for probing observations. 
 
Following the pilot, I identified problems with my note taking in both speed and accuracy.  I 
then decided to employ a more structured, computer-based form (See Appendix 2).  This 
allowed quick drop down menus to capture and code biographical data, as well as open fields 
to type as I interviewed.  Further, I noted that the semi-structured interviews benefited from 
the lack of “social distance” afforded by my own position and rank as a mid-level officer in 
the U.S. Army (J. Miller & Glassner, 2004).  My familiarity with rank structure, staff positions, 
superior-subordinate responsibilities, organizational culture as well as the equipment, tactics 
and locations specific to the Iraq War enhanced the internal validity of the data.  Where the 
quantitative survey proved difficult to assess multiple deployments in multiple roles, the 
qualitative interview allowed me to probe and provide comparisons within the same subject.   
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The final semi-structured interview was based on a small number of structured questions 
combined with open-ended, exploratory questions, the answers to which were actively 
probed for elaboration.  Interviews were recorded and later transcribed.  The qualitative data 
will be presented in each of the core chapters (Chapters 3-7).  For brevity, in the reported 
findings verbal tics and crutches (e.g. “you know”, “uh”, etc.) were removed.  For clarity and 
to protect anonymity, specific unit locations and references to physical locations were 
removed; in addition references to superiors and subordinates were replaced with codes 
introduced above.16 
 
2.4 Sample 
 
While the decision to interview mid-level officers of the U.S. and British armies narrowed the 
focus, identifying and gaining access to subjects of like experience posed a challenge. For 
logistical and security reasons, surveying officers in Iraq was not a viable option.  As the 
interviews were conducted in the summer of 2008, when the U.S. Army had the highest 
number of personnel deployed to Iraq, this limited the available pool of subjects not in 
theatre.  Further, the desire to assess officers across a wide variety of units ruled out going to 
one unit at one location and surveying officers there.  What was needed was a location 
where a diverse set of both armies’ mid-level officers gathered, where they could be 
accessed, and where they would have interest in participating in an academic study. 
 
With these limitations, I chose to survey and interview officers of both armies during 
mandatory training periods.  In both armies, officers are trained at periodic intervals in their 
career.  Usually coinciding with a change of rank or authority, both armies have created 
schools to provide professional training at these key inflection points.   
 
2.4.1 Procedures 
 
For mid-level officers in the U.S. Army, this training occurs at the Command & General Staff 
College (CGSC) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where mid-level officers attend 
Intermediate Level Education (ILE).  Following company level command and falling roughly at 
the eleven year mark of service, ILE is an eleven-month course for newly promoted U.S. Army 
majors.  For mid-level officers in the British Army, this training occurs at the Joint Service 
                                                          
16
 For example, if an officer served in as a company commander and said “my battalion commander 
and the 1
st
 Infantry brigade commander both watched what my platoon leaders were doing” was 
replaced with “my *1UP+ and *2UP+ both watched what my *1DN+ were doing.” 
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Command and Staff College (JSCSC) located at Shrivenham where mid-level officers attend 
the Intermediate Command & Staff Course (Land) (ICSC(L)).  The ICSC (L) is a 30 week course 
for all British Army and Royal Marine majors (Hill, 2008).  
 
Comparing students of two schools, in different armies presents equivalency problems.  
However, there is a unique equivalency between ILE and ICSC(L), in that officers are often 
exchanged between these two schools to serve as both instructors and students.  
Furthermore, there is a formal partnership between ILE and ICSC(L).  As a culminating 
exercise for both schools, ICSC(L) students travel to Fort Leavenworth to conduct a two week 
joint exercise with their peers in ILE.  This relationship is unique and shared only between 
these two mid-level officer schools, and only these two national armies, providing the closest 
equivalency possible. 
 
Permission to survey and interview mid-level officers was obtained by presenting and gaining 
approval from the staff of each school.  For each group, I gained approval from the senior 
administrators and commanders of their respective colleges (CGSS and JSCSC) which eased 
approval at the school level.  Access to British subjects was obtained through the leadership 
of the JSCSC.  In February 2008, I travelled to JSCSC and met with the chief of staff of ICSC(L).  
There, I proposed my research methodology and objectives.  Permission was granted in 
February 2008 and data collection was set for May-June 2008.  Access to my U.S. subjects 
was obtained through the CGSC’s Quality Assurance Office.  In March 2008, I submitted my 
proposed research methodology and objectives, in accordance with CGSC procedures.  I also 
contacted the Chief of Staff of ILE.  Permission was granted in May 2008 and I collected my 
data at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in June 2008.   
 
As part of the approval process, I made it clear that the individual results of both the survey 
and interview would offer anonymous attribution.  As the research seeks both theoretical 
and practical application, I emphasized that findings would be reported to the administration 
of both schools.  Participation in the interviews was requested but not made mandatory.  
90% of the interviews were recorded.  Due to the classified nature of the content discussed 
in the interviews, five subjects preferred not to have their audible voice recorded; in these 
circumstances I received approval to type notes as the interview was being conducted. At the 
end of these interviews, I went back over my notes with the interviewees to allow any 
clarifications.  All interviews were later transcribed. 
   
2.4.2 The U.S. Army sample and British Army sample 
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The research involved two months of fieldwork.  I conducted a total of 52 interviews of 
mid-level officers, 31 from the British Army and 21 from the U.S. Army.  These 52 subjects 
had deployed a total of 72 times, and through these deployments had held 84 unique 
positions.  Table 2.3 represents the diversity of the sample, in both command and staff 
positions as well as experience across the five years of the case. 
     
 Position During Deployment Year of Deployment 
 Company Battalion Brigade Division+ 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
U.S. (n = 32)  11 10 5 6 5 5 5 11 6 
U.K. (n = 40)    19 17 2 2 15 6 9 3 7 
Total (n = 72) 30 27 7 8 20 11 14 14 13 
 
Table 2.3  Sample by position and year of service in Iraq 
Purposive sampling based on experience, notably deployed experience in Iraq, was employed 
such that those who were not Iraq War veterans were eliminated from consideration. For the 
British sample, students were drawn from ICSC (L) Course 4A.  The chief of staff of ICSC (L), 
Lieutenant Colonel David Hill, identified the Iraq veterans and organized the interview 
schedule, providing me with an office to conduct the interviews.  All interviews were 
conducted face to face at the JSCSC.  For the U.S. sample, subjects were drawn from ILE class 
08-02.  The Director of ILE, Colonel William Raymond identified the Iraq veterans and allowed 
me to contact them to request an interview.  Colonel Raymond also provided an office to 
conduct interviews.  All interviews were conducted face to face at the CGSC Headquarters.   
 
2.4.3 Limitations of the sample 
 
While the strengths of the sample and its unique characteristics have been outlined above, 
there were numerous limitations.  The sample could have been greatly strengthened by 
including mid-level officers that had left military service. As will be further explored in 
Chapter 6, there is evidence that many mid-level officers left military service because of the 
lack of autonomy and level of superior control.  The sampled officers, by their attendance at 
mid-career training, biases the sample towards officers committed to a military career and 
indicates an acceptance or at least tacit submission to the organizational culture.  While I 
explored expanding the interviews to peers and others I personally knew who had left 
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military service, I determined that the surveying of two classes of career officers allowed for 
a control that would be lost by expanding to a larger group.  Therefore the sample queried 
will likely have a much higher level of perceived appropriateness of superior control than a 
larger random sample of all officers that served in Iraq. This study is a convenience sample 
reflecting a population of career military officers, most of who had the option to leave the 
profession following their tours in Iraq but invariably did not.   
 
Furthermore, as these officers were identified by course administrators, there is the 
possibility of the halo effect in response to these questions where the subjects respond in the 
way they think they should answer instead of stating their true feelings (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977).  I sought to mitigate this by offering all subjects anonymous attribution as well as 
interviewing 52 officers with 72 separate deployments to control for individual actors that 
could skew the entire sample. 
 
I further sought to limit observer bias, by conducting the interviews in civilian clothes, using 
standardized language and not interviewing peers or those with which I had any direct 
association.  The inclusion of the British Army assisted in creating a degree of social distance 
in my observations.  My background provided unique access to subjects to which I shared 
common experiences, allowing me to more quickly sense opportunities in a way that 
someone unfamiliar with the difference between a battalion and corps commander, or 
between Predator and Raven UAVs could not.   
  
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the step-by-step process from the initial research questions, to 
selecting a conceptual design, to identifying an appropriate case and level of analysis, to 
development of instruments and finally to collecting data.   
 
In conclusion, the choice of comparing mid-level officers of the U.S. and British armies in Iraq 
offers empirical data pertinent to the five factors of this study.  Given the richness and 
diversity of factors the thesis sought to explore, as well as the limitations of a quantitative 
approach, the research methods employed provided the data needed for an exploratory 
study such as this.  In addition, my background as a U.S. Army mid-level officer who had 
twice deployed to Iraq greatly benefited the thesis.  This background provided me familiarity 
with the subjects and a degree of access that would have been difficult for a researcher 
without experience in the military culture.   
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Part of that military culture is a can-do ambition.  While my initial desire to conduct a 
combined method approach proved infeasible, the iterative process allowed for important 
discoveries that informed the final data collection.  Just as culture influenced my research 
design, the next chapter begins the empirical analysis by analyzing the differences in the 
organizational culture of the U.S. and British armies, and how these cultures influenced 
superior control and subordinate autonomy.   
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 Culture CHAPTER 3
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, many factors could determine the causes and effects of 
nanomanagement.  Before assessing these factors, it is important to establish a baseline—
the general beliefs and accepted practices of superior control and subordinate autonomy.  
The study of culture sees organizations affecting and instilling those general beliefs and 
accepted practices, patterning ways of thinking and interacting with others (Cameron & 
Quinn, 2006; Schein, 2010; James Wilson, 2000).  Organizational culture serves as the 
accreted knowledge of best practices, as guidelines that actors expect to follow and be 
followed by other members of an organization.  Often these guidelines are codified in written 
doctrine.  This doctrine and how this doctrine is or is not practiced helps explain the degree 
of superior control and subordinate autonomy an actor can expect by being a member of an 
organization.  In organizations whose doctrine advocates for subordinates to be granted 
broad autonomy, one would expect less superior control.   
 
Yet expectations, and culture, may change.  While culture is seen as resistant to change, 
technology has long been thought disruptive of culture, instilling new patterns of thinking 
and interacting with others (Barnard, 1938; Giddens, 1984; Giddens & Pierson, 1998; Schein, 
2009).  Strong organizational cultures may shape how technology is employed but weak 
organizational cultures may be shaped by technology (Farrell, 2008).    
 
This chapter analyses organizational culture as an explanatory factor that may determine 
why nanomanagement occurs.  By examining the doctrines of autonomy of both the U.S. and 
British armies, this thesis begins to assess whether individuals in certain organizations, by 
virtue of their stated culture, are more or less predisposed to nanomanage.  In order to 
address whether the cultures of the U.S. and British armies cause or inhibit 
nanomanagement, this chapter seeks three objectives: first, to clarify the doctrinal 
understandings of autonomy in each of these cultures; second, to explore the doctrinal 
understandings of how, when and to what degree new technologies should affect autonomy; 
and third, to present the empirical findings of how both armies’ officers perceived and 
experienced autonomy as more technology was fielded in Iraq.  Furthermore, by establishing 
how both armies incorporated the use of technology into their doctrines, one can assess how 
malleable or entrenched culture should be considered.  Did culture shape how technology 
was employed or did technology shape culture? 
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Section 3.1 defines organizational culture and establishes the typology by which 
organizational culture is assessed—through artifacts, values and basic underlying 
assumptions of appropriateness.  Section 3.2 will examine the U.S. and British armies’ 
organizational culture regarding autonomy, how it developed and how it is codified in their 
doctrine.  Section 3.3 will examine both armies’ organizational culture concerning the 
adoption of information technology.  Section 3.4 will present empirical findings.  Section 3.5 
will conclude. 
 
3.1 What is organizational culture? 
 
Before analyzing whether an organization’s culture may predispose or inhibit an individual’s 
proclivity to nanomanage, this section defines organizational culture and proposes a typology 
useful in comparing two organizations. 
 
3.1.1 Defining organizational culture 
 
As both the U.S. and British armies define culture along similar terms, this thesis adopts 
Wilson’s definition that an organization’s culture is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking 
about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization” (2000, p. 91).17  
Military organizations are thought to have strong and unique organizational cultures, formed 
through shared sacrifice and intense experiences (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960, p. 6; 
Pierce, 2010; Schein, 1990, p. 111; D. Snider, 2005; D. M. Snider, et al., 2009; Van Creveld, 
2008, p. 335).   
 
As organizational cultures are “embedded in the national cultures in which an organization 
operates” (Schein, 2009, p. 61), there is a tradition of cross-national cultural comparison 
between like organizations (Hofstede, 1984; R. J. House, 2004; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985).  
While some scholars see that the unique nature of a military organization inherently deviates 
from national cultures (Van Creveld, 2008), others see armies largely reflecting the societal 
culture from which they spring (Nagl, 2005; D. M. Snider, et al., 2009).   
 
While all armies differ, few armies are thought to share more in common in their 
organizational culture than the U.S. and British armies.  Scholars have observed a special 
                                                          
17
 The U.S. Army defines culture as “a group’s shared set of beliefs, values, and assumptions about 
what’s important” (U.S. Department of the Army, 1999b, pp. 2-14).  The British Army defines its 
culture as “the socially transmitted pattern of human behaviour within the organization” (U.K. Ministry 
of Defence, 2010a, pp. 2-18).   
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relationship between Britain and the U.S. where the two armies enjoy the closest strategic 
and military ties (Dunne, 2004; Farrell, 2008).  They share a “warrior culture” common in 
Western armies (Coker, 2007; Van Creveld, 2008), have broad similarities of civilian control 
(Avant, 1994) and their military cultures share a professional officer tradition.  In addition, 
few services share more in hierarchical structure, participation in contemporary warfare and 
exchange of officers than these two armies.   
 
Yet differences between the U.S. and British armies’ organizational culture have been noted 
(Kier, 1995, p. 66), in particular how different values concerning superior control and 
subordinate autonomy influenced mission accomplishment and military effectiveness (Nagl, 
2005; Sowers, 2005).18  By choosing a case where both armies were present, seeking to 
broadly accomplish the same goals, a typology is needed that can adequately compare two 
relatively similar, but subtly and importantly differing cultures. 
 
3.1.2 A typology for comparing cultures 
 
In order to compare these two armies’ organizational cultures and autonomy, I adopt 
Schein’s typology that organizational culture occurs at three levels: artifacts, values and basic 
underlying assumptions (2010).19   
 
Artifacts are visible expressions, the manifestation of culture that can be observed in 
individuals’ relationships and actions (Schein, 1990, 2010).   An organization’s hierarchical 
chart, the use of technology by its actors, the use of titles and ranks and the “*e+asy to 
observe” behaviour of the group can all be considered artifacts (Schein, 1990, p. 17). 
 
Values are the espoused statements that provide a “philosophy of operating” that give 
guidance to overcome the uncertainty that organizations face (Schein, 1990, p. 21).  In the 
military context, values manifest as written doctrine.  Regardless of whether a written 
doctrine is followed, and they are often ignored (Farrell, 2008; Kirke, 2010), military doctrine 
                                                          
18
 Comparisons of militaries’ organizational cultures are often tempted to look at outcomes, such as 
whether a war was won or lost, and pass normative judgment.  This thesis does not seek to adhere to 
a trend of deeming organizational cultures as either good or bad.  There is not a right or wrong culture; 
culture simply is, except in relation to what the organization is seeking to accomplish in a specific 
environment (Gerras, et al., 2008; Schein, 2009).   
19
 Schein’s typology has been employed and referenced in cultural studies of professions (Bloor & 
Dawson, 1994), autonomy (Carroll & Quijada, 2004; Hendry, 1995), and the use of technology by 
superiors to control subordinates (Heejun Park, 2004; Schein, 1994).  Further Schein’s typology 
dominates organizational cultural studies of both the U.S. (Carpenter, 2006; Casmus, 1997; Pierce, 
2010; D. M. Snider, et al., 2009; Tucker, 2008) and British Army (Cassidy, 2005).   
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dictates what members of the military should do.  Both the U.S. and British military share a 
common definition of doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which the military 
forces…guide their actions” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2008, p. iii; U.S. Department of 
Defense, November 8, 2010, p. 114).   
 
However, only once those values are actually acted upon and ingrained into the 
organization’s culture do they become basic underlying assumptions.  A basic underlying 
assumption is a value “translated into actual behaviour” (March & Olsen, 2004, p. 7), the 
“nonconfrontable and nondebatable” ethos that organizational members accept as the 
appropriate practices of the organization (Schein, 2010, p. 28).   Extremely difficult to change, 
a basic underlying assumption is doctrine that is tested, accepted and taught to new 
members of the organization as the way an organization operates and does business.  Only 
when the value is accepted as correct and appropriate does it become a basic underlying 
assumption.20 
 
Of course doctrine need not always be followed; there will always be a distance between 
theory and practice.  This typology and empirical analysis allows a determination of how 
great the distance is.  This typology of artifacts, values and basic underlying assumptions 
proves useful in determining culture as an explanatory variable.  Where artifacts can be 
observed and measured (e.g. observations of how a superior controls a subordinate), these 
are conditioned by the organization’s understood values (e.g. the doctrine of autonomy).  
Furthermore, the nature of the qualitative approach employed seeks to capture the basic 
underlying assumptions (e.g. the beliefs of what is an appropriate level of control).  What is 
important to draw from this typology is that organizational culture is not simply what is 
observed in a case, or an organization’s stated doctrine.  As Holmes observed, “Seldom is the 
difference between an organization’s external appearance and its inner reality more marked 
than in the case of the British Army.  It appears hierarchical, regimented and disciplined, but 
is often collegiate, tribal and comfortable” (2009, p. xii).   
 
In sum, organizational culture has been seen as a powerful factor to predict behaviour.  
When analyzing the degree an organization’s culture could cause nanomanagement, this 
thesis seeks to explore beyond the observable artifacts and values of both armies, and 
deduce the underlying assumptions of these two armies at war.  Table 3.1 diagrams the 
                                                          
20
 For example, a value is if an organization’s doctrine states that subordinates should be granted 
autonomy.  An artifact is if we can observe subordinates being granted autonomy.  A basic underlying 
assumption is whether actors assume the stated value to be correct, that it is assumed that 
subordinates should be granted autonomy.   
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typology and its application to the two dimensions—autonomy and the use of technology— 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
 Definition Autonomy Use of technology 
Artifacts Observed 
practices 
Recollections of 
superior-subordinate 
relationships 
Recollections of how 
technology was adopted, 
employed and its influence on 
autonomy 
 
Values The written rules 
of an 
organization 
Published doctrine of 
superior control and 
subordinate autonomy 
 
Published doctrine concerning 
technology adoption, and its 
influence on autonomy 
Basic 
underlying 
assumptions 
Practices deemed 
appropriate 
Recollections of 
whether 
control/autonomy was 
appropriate 
Recollections of whether 
technology allowed 
inappropriate monitoring and 
reductions in autonomy 
 
Table 3.1  Organizational culture typology applied to this thesis 
 
3.2 The doctrine of autonomy in the U.S. and British armies 
 
Having defined organizational culture and introduced a widely accepted typology for 
analyzing cultures, this section first discusses the variability of autonomy then assesses how 
autonomy varies as a value in the written doctrine of the U.S. and British armies. 
 
3.2.1 The variability of autonomy   
 
Subordinate autonomy varies across different organizational cultures.  In organizations of low 
subordinate autonomy, superiors expect and receive obedience, using rank and titles to 
rationalize a large difference in autonomy between high and low levels of a hierarchy 
(Hofstede, 2001).  In organizations of high subordinate autonomy, subordinates are expected 
to act with initiative (R. J. House, 2004, p. 513).  Low subordinate autonomy “may be favored 
in military-type organizations, even if the societal culture is of [high subordinate autonomy]” 
(R. J. House, 2004, p. 534).  Further whether the organization examined is professional or not 
also influences subordinate autonomy.  Unskilled workers tended to be found in 
organizations of low subordinate autonomy.  With more skills and education, professional 
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workers are typically found in organizational cultures of high subordinate autonomy 
(Hofstede, 2001).21  
 
In two studies that compared values of autonomy amongst nations, the U.S. and the U.K. 
were found to have a similar societal level of subordinate autonomy (Haire, Ghiselli, & Porter, 
1966; Hofstede, 1984; R. J. House, 2004).  Yet, studies comparing the U.S. and British armies 
noted distinct difference in beliefs about autonomy and suggested these different beliefs led 
to different approaches in war (Cassidy, 2005; Nagl, 2002).  A previous study comparing 
officers of the U.S. and British armies during the Kosovo conflict found differences in the 
amount of control exerted by superiors and the related amount of autonomy granted to 
subordinates (Sowers, 2005).  U.S. Army officers reported being highly controlled and lacking 
autonomy.22  British Army officers reported a low level of superior control and a high level of 
autonomy granted.  British Army officers often spoke of a doctrine of “mission command,” a 
stated value where superiors give subordinates a clear intent and then allow them the 
latitude to operate as they saw fit. While this command philosophy was a key difference 
between the U.S. and British armies, mission command began not in the British Army, but in 
the Prussian Army in the nineteenth century. 
 
3.2.2 Auftragstaktik and the value of autonomy 
 
Few events cause an organization to rethink its values, beliefs and rules more than a crushing 
defeat (March & Olsen, 2004).  Much of the U.S. and British armies’ current doctrine 
concerning autonomy draws from lessons learned from Napoleon’s decisive defeat of the 
Prussians in 1806 at Jena.  In the aftermath, Prussian military leaders concluded that 
commanders removed from the battlefield could not gain a clear picture of what was 
occurring at the front (Silva, 1989).  Those that had a clear picture of what was occurring—
the junior and mid-level officers at the front—were not granted enough autonomy to act on 
their own initiative.  Constrained by a rigid command structure and a bureaucratic 
Befehlstaktik (orders based tactics) junior leaders awaited orders; while they waited, they 
were defeated (C. E. White, 1989).  Seeing battle as invariably uncertain, the Prussians 
                                                          
21
 As further discussed in Chapter 4, as a profession the military culture seeks expertise over an area of 
abstract knowledge (A. Abbott, 1981; Hughes, 1965a; Huntington, 1957; Lynn, 1965b).  Once that 
knowledge is acquired, usually through specialized training, professionals defend this autonomy (A. D. 
Abbott, 1988; Lynn, 1965b).  This expectation of autonomy is a common attribute to the generic 
professional military organizational culture.   
22
 Many U.S. officers, while tightly controlled saw this control as appropriate, with many reporting 
favourably on national military superiors being closely involved in their day to day activities (Sowers, 
2005).   
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developed a concept called Auftragstaktik (mission-based tactics). Institutionalized by the 
Prussian Army in 1870, after years of experimentation, Auftragstaktik was observed by the 
British as a key source of Prussian, and later German, military effectiveness, characterized by 
wide autonomy in subordinates (Silva, 1989; Van Creveld, 2008). 
 
Auftragstaktik required not simply a change in superior-subordinate relationships but an 
entire reorganization of the Prussian military.  Auftragstaktik depended on autonomous 
subordinates, which requiring substantial investments in training and selection.  Once these 
subordinates were trained to take initiative and exercise their own judgements, superiors 
loosened their controls allowing subordinates the discretion to execute the mission and 
make decisions as they saw fit (Kolenda, 2000).  While empowering to junior officers, 
Auftragstaktik constrained senior leaders to act at their strategic level and to limit the 
specificity of their orders to subordinates (Silva, 1989). 
 
While Auftragstaktik ran counter to the centralized control of massed armies and trench 
warfare of World War I, its effectiveness was demonstrated in the opening days of World 
War II.  With the British Army’s rapid defeat and expulsion from France by Germany’s 
Blitzkrieg, the British Army was found “ill-prepared” due to a “rigidity of command and 
extant culture militated against developing independent thought” (Sheffield, 2010, pp. E-14).  
Like out of defeat at Jena a century before, out of defeat at Dunkirk, a new doctrine of 
autonomy was needed. 
 
3.2.3 British Army’s doctrine of autonomy—mission command 
 
Based on both Prussian Auftragstaktik, yet reflecting a broader British culture23, mission 
command is considered “the central pillar of Joint and Army doctrine” (U.K. Department of 
the Army, 2005, p. 115).  Mission command seeks to balance superior control with 
subordinate autonomy.  Mission command depends on trust and mutual understanding 
between superiors and subordinates. (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2008; 2009, pp. 3-2).  Not an 
ancillary reference in British military doctrine, mission command is the sine qua non of the 
                                                          
23
 King attributed the development of this style of command to the “strange structure” originating in 
the expeditionary nature of the nineteenth century British Army, and the lack of strong interventionist 
state (2011).  Further, King saw the roots of mission command in the broader British culture: “The 
British instinct for muddling through without an overarching strategy by which to impose centralized 
order and discipline, and for deferring to the local commander, seems to be a reflection not only of 
British military culture but also of British professional society more generally” (2011, p. 393). 
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British Army culture.24  In the updated British Army operations manual published in 
November 2010, mission command is elevated to one of two central ideas of the British 
Army’s “enduring philosophy for operations” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 1-3).  The 
British Army’s current doctrine of mission command has five essential elements:    
a. A commander gives his orders in a manner that ensures that his 
subordinates understand his intentions (intent), their own missions, and the 
context of those missions. 
b. Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why 
it is required. 
c. Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions. 
d. A commander uses the minimum level of control possible so as not to 
unnecessarily constrain his subordinates’ freedom of action. 
e. Subordinates then decide how best to achieve their missions. They have a 
fundamental responsibility to act in line with their commander’s intent (U.K. 
Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-11). 
 
Despite its current centrality to British Army culture, mission command was only relatively 
recently established in doctrine.  For much of its history of largely successful military activity, 
the British Army operated without formal doctrine (Nagl, 2005).  Instead, a semi-formal 
doctrine of unofficial writings, officer memoirs and best practices was shared (Sheffield, 
2010).  Prior to the formal development of doctrine, “To most officers there was no such 
thing as ‘doctrine’, only ‘pamphlets’ and they were, at best a basis for discussion, and for 
quoting in promotion exams” (Sheffield, 2010).  This lack of formal doctrine can be seen as 
also influencing British Army culture—without a formal written document prescribing 
behaviour subordinates were left largely to their own devices.  A strong value of subordinate 
autonomy, represented in widely dispersed units conducting operations as the environment 
dictated and the on-the-ground commander decided, was well inculcated prior to putting 
these terms to official paper (Sheffield, 2010).   
 
This informal tradition changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the British Army began 
to publish official doctrine or what was termed  “that what is taught” (U.K. Department of 
the Army, 1989, p. 3).25   Even this relatively late codification of values was done so with 
                                                          
24
 Not all commentators believe mission command should be so central to British Army culture.  Critics 
have called the British Army’s mission command “a laissez-faire command system” (A. King, 2011, p. 
390), stating that mission command “was not in any way intended to give subordinates free rein to do 
as they pleased and to structure campaigns in a manner of their own choosing” (A. King, 2011, p. 390). 
25
 Why a centuries old institution should suddenly seek to codify its values in written form deserves 
some discussion.  Sheffield argues that key British Army leaders recognized the inadequacy of the 
current strategy to counter the Soviet Union, a surge of doctrinal development in the U.S. following 
Vietnam, an increasing professionalization of the officer corps in terms of both their pre-service and 
during service education, and a political climate that made the battlefield use of nuclear weapons 
unacceptable (2010).  What Sheffield does not mention but will be later discussed in Chapter 7, was 
the dramatic rise of the risk management and external audit of government agencies that required a 
broad formalization of procedures and practices (Power, 1994). 
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caution.  Recognizing that formal doctrine was anathema to British Army culture, the Chief of 
the General Staff stated,  
“This does not mean that initiative needs to be restricted by the imposition 
of a set of rules…the doctrine it sets out will need to be interpreted 
intelligently and applied as circumstances require.  Such judgements call for 
professionalism” (U.K. Department of the Army, 1989, p. vii). 
 
3.2.4 U.S. Army’s doctrine of autonomy—mission command 
 
While the British Army’s adoption of doctrine cautiously began in the late 1980s, the U.S. 
Army has a far longer history of formal written doctrine.  The U.S. Army began publishing 
doctrine early in the twentieth century, decades before the British Army (Paprone, 2001).  
Informal publications and decentralized service regulations were replaced with formal 
doctrine approved, published and regularly updated by the Department of the Army.  In 
2011, official U.S. Army doctrine covered tens of thousands of pages in over 800 field 
manuals and documents (TRADOC, 2011).26   
 
Over decades, within this relatively long tradition of written doctrine numerous terms sought 
to identify and define superior control and subordinate autonomy.  “Mission command” 
appeared for the first time in official U.S. Army doctrine in 2003, elevated immediately to be 
“the command and control concept for the Army” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, p. 
vii).  Closely mirroring the British Army’s definition, “The fundamental basis of mission 
command is creating trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates” 
(U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 1-18) and emphasized four elements: a clear 
commander’s intent, the dependence on subordinates’ initiative, mission-based orders, and 
appropriate resource allocation (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003).  Field Manual (FM) 6-0 
further defined mission command as:  
“Mission command is the conduct of military operations through 
decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission 
accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate 
leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the 
commander’s intent to accomplish missions” (U.S. Department of the Army, 
2003, pp. 1-17).   
 
Since its adoption in 2003, mission command would be elevated in later publications to “the 
Army's preferred method for command” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2005, pp. 3-4; 2008, 
                                                          
26
 The formal nature of the U.S. Army’s approach to doctrine was further established in 1973 following 
the restructuring and rethinking post-Vietnam with the creation of the United States Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC).  TRADOC further formalized the process of updating doctrine; for 
example FM 101-5, dealing with command and staff autonomy and authority, was updated and 
republished seven times between 1940 and 1997 (Paprone, 2001).   
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pp. 3-1).  Later doctrine “mandated” subordinates be granted autonomy to “adapt and 
succeed despite the chaos of combat” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2005, pp. 3-8), and that 
a doctrine of mission command “restrains higher level commanders from micromanaging 
subordinates” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 3-6).  2008’s FM 3-0, Operations, the 
Army’s capstone doctrinal document is dominated by the term “mission command” (used 67 
times); the replaced 2001 version of FM 3-0 did not mention the term once (U.S. Department 
of the Army, 2001b).27   
 
3.2.5 Summary 
 
Through defeat, success and organizational changes, militaries adapt their doctrines, 
adjusting the appropriate level of superior control and subordinate autonomy.  Through the 
period of the case (2003-2008), both the U.S. and British armies espoused a nearly identical 
doctrine—mission command—a doctrine that guided superior control and subordinate 
autonomy.  Yet doctrine’s worth is relative to how well these values are inculcated.  First the 
British Army adopted a doctrine based on the Prussian Auftragstaktik, that recommended 
subordinates be granted broad autonomy.   Since the late 1980s, at the inception of the 
British Army’s move to formalized, written doctrine, mission command clarified superior 
control and subordinate autonomy.   The U.S. Army, with a relatively long tradition of 
formalized, written doctrine, only adopted mission command in 2003.  This relatively late 
adoption would mean that the British Army would be more likely to understand and follow 
mission command than the U.S. Army.  One would expect in organizations where mission 
command is doctrine to resist the temptation to tightly control subordinates.  Yet what 
occurs when technology increases the ability for superiors to control subordinates?   
 
3.3 The influence of technology on the doctrine of autonomy 
 
Organizational culture is seen to be resistant to change, but defeat is not the only method 
(Schein, 2009, p. 28).  Change can occur gradually and internally, with culture evolving as 
actors share information (Dawkins, 2006; Distin, 2005) or as a result of “structuration” as 
individuals change behaviour and communicate this change to others (Giddens, 1984).  Yet, 
powerful external forces may instigate a moment of change in the culture of an organization 
(Schein, 2009).  By first introducing how technology can initiate culture change broadly and 
                                                          
27
 The 2001 version of FM 3-0 replaced FM 100-5 “Operations” published in June 1993.  FM 100-5 also 
did not mention “mission command” (U.S. Department of the Army, 1993).   
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then analyzing how technology was thought to influence autonomy specifically, this section 
captures such a moment of change.  In both armies, as technology altered 
superior-subordinate relationships, new doctrine developed, manifested in the U.S.’s 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and the U.K.’s Network Enabled Capability (NEC).   
 
3.3.1 Cultural change and technology 
 
As seen in the development of mission command, change to organizational culture may 
begin with a disruption (e.g. defeat at Jena or Dunkirk) that threatens an organization’s 
continued importance or existence (Barnard, 1938; Giddens, 1984; Giddens & Pierson, 1998; 
Schein, 2009).  Technology adoption, especially technology that challenges established 
relationships has also been seen as a potent force of cultural change (R. J. House, 2004; 
Schein, 2009, p. 109).28  Military organizations, thought conservative by nature, are thought 
resistant to adopting technologies that alter superior-subordinate relationships (Farrell, 
2008, p. 783; P. Feaver & Kohn, 2001).  Yet access to resources, and not simply a cultural 
predisposition, may determine the overall disruptive effect of technology adoption.  As 
Figure 3.1 shows, in the past 20 years, the U.S. spent vastly more than the U.K. on its military, 
both in raw dollars (from 10 to 15 times more) and as a percentage of GDP.29   
                                                          
28
 Many have attempted to measure the speed and pace of technology adoption in different cultures.  
Based on anthropological change, this concept is known as the theory of the diffusion of innovations. 
Many of its principles, especially Ryan and Gross’s (1943) identification of a process were useful in the 
analysis.  For more on diffusion of innovations theory see (Rogers, 2003). 
29
 For example, in 2010, the U.S. spent approximately $700,000,000,000 on military expenditure.  The 
U.K. spent one twelfth this amount, or approximately $57,000,000,000 (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2011). 
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Figure 3.1  U.S. and U.K. military expenditures (1988-2008)30 
This difference of expenditure had an effect on the amount of technology that each army 
employed, especially information technology.  The relatively resource poor British Army was 
forced to develop principles of local command and autonomy; the resource rich U.S. Army, 
able to communicate with widely dispersed elements, developed a more centralized control 
(Nagl, 2005).  Consistent with Nagl’s findings, a previous study comparing senior officers of 
the U.S. and British armies in Kosovo, U.S. Army officers described high levels of technology 
adoption with constant communication between themselves and their U.S. Army superiors. 
Conversely, the British Army officers described low access to technology and intermittent 
and irregular communication with their British Army superiors (Sowers, 2005).   
 
Like most organizations in the 1990s, the U.S. and British armies felt the “virtual tidal wave of 
change” (Alberts, 1996, p. 1) of the information age, “a communication environment that is 
very different from before” (E. A. Cohen, 2004, p. 404; E. Cohen, 1996).  Technology was 
recognized as having a transformative effect “unlike any seen since the Napoleonic Age” 
(Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998), with the potential promise to lift the fog of war (Owens & 
Offley, 2000, p. 14) and liberate “the initiative of junior officers and non-commissioned 
officers to perform independently and synergistically”(Macgregor, 1997, p. 228).  Adopting 
these technologies would be more than just adding a new piece of equipment but would 
                                                          
30
 Source (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011). 
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require “a fundamental change in culture…we need to do more than redraw an organization 
chart; we also need to change what is valued and the way individuals think and behave” 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2003, pp. 180-181).  Each nation encapsulated these changes under a 
broad moniker—for the U.S., Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and for the U.K., Network 
Enabled Capability (NEC). 
 
3.3.2 U.S. Army’s Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 
 
The term NCW was first proposed by scholars in the late 1990s (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998).  
While no single, clear definition emerged, NCW referred collectively as the military’s 
response to the Information Age (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001a).  As the U.S. shifted to 
face the asymmetric threats in the post 9/11 world, NCW was dubbed “no less than the 
embodiment of DoD (Department of Defense) transformation” (2001a, pp. "12-11").  By 
2006, “achieving net-centricity” became one of ten objectives of the U.S. military (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006b, p. 59).   
 
While NCW promised to “change organizational roles and responsibilities” (2001a, pp. 5-1) 
and to “revolutionize military organizations and the approach to command and control” 
(Alberts, 2002, p. 40), the precise effect on superior-subordinate relationships was 
admittedly undetermined (Alberts, 2002, p. 9; Schrage, 2003, p. 8).   On the surface, NCW 
seemed supportive of the doctrine of mission command.  NCW required a clear and 
consistent understating of command intent, high quality information and shared situational 
awareness, competence at all levels of the force, and trust between subordinates, superiors 
and peers (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 27).  U.S. Army doctrine also predicted that NCW would 
enhance mission command:  
“The information that *digital information systems] make available allows 
commanders to know what their subordinates are doing faster and in more 
detail than previously. Commanders can use this information to revisualize 
the overall operation and take advantage of opportunities that results from 
their subordinates’ actions, in keeping with mission command” (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 1-20). 
 
The belief that NCW would enhance mission command was far from universal (Blaker, 2007, 
p. 48).  Scholars predicted that superiors, fearing the loss of control, would restrict 
information, producing “a revolution in the recentralization of command” (Gombert, Pung, 
O’Brien, & Peterson, 2004, p. 23; Schrage, 2003, p. 8).  Later critics of NCW used evidence 
from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars to conclude that NCW was actually slowing combat 
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operations warning that “*m+ilitary forces must abandon the dangerous and seductive 
illusion that technology can solve the problem” (McMaster, 2008, p. 26).  
 
3.3.3 British Army’s Network Enabled Capability (NEC) 
 
The relatively resource poor U.K. would watch and follow, where possible, the U.S. embrace 
of technology (U.K. Parliament Defence Committee, 2003, pp. Para 91, p. 32.).  The U.K. MoD 
dubbed this transformation Network Enabled Capability (NEC), defined as “[l]inking sensors, 
decision-makers and weapon systems so that information can be translated into 
synchronized and overwhelmingly rapid military effect” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 
196).  NEC was thought to be heavily influenced by NCW, yet the significant difference 
between the terms “centric” and “enabled” was seen as a result of resource constraints 
(Uttley, 2002) and a “cultural resistance” to any technology that infringed upon mission 
command (Farrell, 2008, p. 788; U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2004a, p. 4).   
 
Like in the U.S., U.K. military scholars split on how technology would change British Army 
culture.  Some believed NEC would centralize command (Jackson, 2005, p. 3).  Others 
postulated it could create maximum decentralization, with forces being able to rapidly 
respond to changing situations (Reid & Giffin, 2003). This uncertainty produced a “cautious 
welcome of NEC in Britain…in marked contrast to the U.S. enthusiasm for NCW” (Farrell, 
2008, p. 787).  Despite this lukewarm reception in practice, NEC was officially said to be “at 
the heart” of the MoD’s post 9/11 strategy (U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, 2004, p. 2.1) 
and was formally adopted into British Army doctrine when included in 2005’s Land 
Operations (U.K. Department of the Army, 2005, p. 35).   
 
The MoD saw that “NEC should be viewed as an enabler of Mission Command” yet warned 
that “some would see *NEC+, enabling the commander to over-control” (U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, 2005, p. 5).  The qualified acceptance of NEC can be seen reflected in British 
doctrine: 
“We envisage Mission Command relevant to the Information Age…although 
the U.K. believes that our command philosophy is robust, we perceive an 
urgent need-and the means-to change control mechanisms.  Better 
communication leads to the temptation to over-control…so the U.K. doctrine 
of Mission Command needs to endure” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 3).   
 
“*NEC has+ particular utility, conferring decisive advantage, through the 
timely provision and exploitation of information and intelligence, allowing 
effective decision-making and the agile synchronization of activity.  However, 
near-real time information flows, in ever increasing volumes and to wider 
audiences, offer both risk and opportunity. Effective information 
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management is required to ensure that an abundance of data does not 
inhibit or overload the commander’s decision-making capacity. Moreover, 
and notwithstanding advances in information technology, intuition, expertise 
and intellect, in shaping judgements and assessing perceptions, continue to 
have an essential role in successful information exploitation” (U.K. Ministry 
of Defence, 2008, pp. 4-11).  
 
Summary 
The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed two armies, each with a strong 
organizational culture, adapting to information technology.  While the technology was 
adopted, there was much confusion on how these technologies would influence superior 
control and subordinate autonomy.  While the doctrine of both armies stated that these 
technologies would enhance mission command, and therefore subordinate autonomy, 
scholars and military officers warned that these tools could be used to centralize control.   
 
The preceding discussion focused on one aspect of an organization’s culture—the written 
rules, or values.  The next section employs the empirical data from the case to capture the 
observable (the cultural artifacts of autonomy and technology) and the unobservable (the 
basic underlying assumptions as to whether technology was used appropriately). 
 
3.4 Empirical findings 
 
The values of both the U.S. and British armies are expressed in doctrine, highlighting an 
inherent conflict between superior control and subordinate autonomy.  As the development 
of Auftragstaktik and mission command demonstrated, doctrine may change as a result of 
defeat or disconfirmation of a stated value.  As the discussion of NCW and NEC showed, 
doctrine may also change as a result of new technologies.  Doctrine is not written in stone; 
nor is doctrine necessarily followed.   
 
From this foundation, in the interviews I sought to capture the difference between doctrine 
and observed practice, the artifacts of an organizations’ culture.  From these observations 
and recollections I sought to determine whether these artifacts were perceived as 
appropriate or not.  Those thought appropriate could be assumed to be a basic underlying 
assumption.  These baseline observations, and assessment of appropriateness, established a 
foundation of comparison.  The assessment of artifacts and basic underlying assumptions 
explain what these officers perceived as both the observed and appropriate amount of 
superior control and subordinate autonomy.   
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3.4.1 Artifacts of autonomy 
 
As outlined in Table 3.1, to assess artifacts of autonomy, I employed semi-structured 
interviews to understand relationships between superiors and subordinates.  I asked a series 
of questions first to gauge interactions with superiors such as “How did you spend a typical 
day in relation to communicating with superiors and subordinates?”  From these answers I 
could begin to assess the degree of subordinate autonomy and superior control.  I then 
followed up with questions concerning artifacts of autonomy such as “How would you assess 
the level of mission command?” or “How would you assess the degree of autonomy you 
were granted?”   
 
British officers 
A clear majority (23 of 31) of British officers stated that they were granted broad autonomy.   
Numerous officers expressed being told to “crack on” or to simply “get on with it” (U.K.-1; 
U.K.-5; U.K.-6; U.K.-20): 
“The commander *on the ground+ let me get on with it. And he told me what 
he wanted, he told me his intent, and then he let me get on with it.  [He was] 
exercising mission command to the full and let me crack on” (U.K.-5).  
 
“[There] tended to be a lot more freedom…to do pretty much what we 
wanted to do…We weren't really given any limits or constraints for what we 
were allowed to do and not allowed to do” (U.K.-16).  
 
For British Army officers, the term “mission command” was commonly understood and often 
referred to as a noun: 
“The U.K. does espouse mission command.  In my judgement I think we do 
actually exercise it, and in my experience we exercise it very well” (U.K.-17).   
 
“*Mission command] was spot on, as it should be” (U.K.-20).   
 
“Well actually we got quite a fair bit of mission command. I was given a task 
and we were told to get on with it. Mission command was definitely used” 
(U.K.-28).   
 
“Mission command is an absolute tenet of the British Army. We all practice 
and preach it the best we can” (U.K.-29).   
 
U.K. officers also reported exercising mission command with their subordinates:   
“Had I said [to my subordinates] go and do this in the exact way, what would 
I achieve by doing this?  I’d spend way far too much time than what it was 
worth” (U.K.-1).   
 
“To my subordinates, I think I gave them mission command, of course we all 
do don't we?” (U.K.-27).   
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A minority (8 of 31) of British officers reported that mission command was not practiced:   
“We were just very used to…off you go, you just do your thing, come back 
when it's done. [The commander] sort of micromanaged every last detail to 
what I believe was a detriment to the unit. We weren't allowed to make 
decisions” (U.K.-3).   
 
“The tightness of control was against mission command of understand the 
intent then crack on…If you fail, that is when higher gets involved.  But we 
hadn’t failed at that point” (U.K.-6).  
 
“The reason why mission command didn't work out there was just the desire 
to do it exactly the way they wanted to as opposed to allowing someone to 
have the flexibility to get on with the task” (U.K.-16). 
 
“There was at times little application of the concept of mission 
command…Higher formations were too frequently telling me how to do 
something, but not what they wanted to do” (U.K.-30).  
 
Scholars have noted a “generalship of poverty” in British Army culture, where resource 
restrictions required subordinates to take initiative (Sheffield, 2010, pp. E-21).  This lack of 
resources was noted as influencing mission command positively: 
“Communications weren't particularly reliable. So you ended up having to 
give a clear mission or task” (U.K.-12).  
 
“Mission command was very good…the fact that the company groups were 
dispersed, mission command had to work” (U.K.-19).   
 
“We were given the tasks and the resources that we needed for the 
definition of mission command and then largely left completely alone. It was 
almost forced by the station by the type of separation...we really were left to 
get on with it” (U.K.-17).   
 
“Because I was nowhere near [my superior], I was just left to get on with 
things” (U.K.-20).   
 
U.S. officers 
Few U.S. officers used the term “mission command” but many described a culture of 
autonomy consistent with the stated doctrine of mission command:   
“We had a lot of autonomy in terms of how we would execute our 
missions…*superiors+ allowed us to do what we do” (U.S.-18).  
 
“The command climate was what the Brits called mission command. What do 
we call it? I guess we don’t have a word for it” (U.S.-01).   
 
“I was very autonomous…we pretty much ran our own roost.  We pretty 
much answered just to our own bosses…I just had to fit into my 
commander's intent, and he was happy, and that was it” (U.S.-05).   
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“[My] commander was very commander-centric…[he] would never 
second-guess what I was doing” (U.S.-03).  
 
“To be completely honest with you…there was a hell of a lot of mission 
command” (U.S.-02).   
 
In a greater proportion than British officers, U.S. officers described exacting superior control, 
using the term “micromanaged” (U.S.-12; U.S.-14) to describe their relationship with their 
superior:  
“*The commander] was very involved with details. He would get involved 
with very much the mission specifics, how the operation would be 
conducted” (U.S.-07).   
 
“We were directed instead of empowered…*I would want superiors to+ tell 
me what my assets are and my key taskings…*Instead I would get+ ‘No, no, 
no, this is what you need to do’” (U.S.-20). 
 
Like British officers, U.S. officers saw separation, either through physical distance or lack of 
communication, between them and their superiors produced more autonomy:   
“*Physical separation] gave me a little bit more freedom of manoeuvre 
without anybody to direct me, check on me. I think the company that was 
collocated with the battalion headquarters had a harder time than I did. So [I 
had] a lot more freedom of manoeuvre to do what I felt I needed to do inside 
of my sector” (U.S.-03).   
 
”We remained pretty much autonomous because I was so far out that we did 
do our own thing” (U.S.-05).   
 
“It was good having the separation…a big plus that they didn't come and 
micromanage” (U.S.-07).  
 
“*Being collocated with command] hindered my autonomy somewhat because 
[the commander] was constantly up in the personal space of the company” 
(U.S.-16). 
 
 
3.4.2 Basic underlying assumptions of autonomy 
 
To assess basic underlying assumptions required assessing whether the artifacts of 
superior-subordinate relationships described above were seen as appropriate or “natural, 
rightful, expected and legitimate” (March & Olsen, 2004, p. 3). To that end, I asked a series of 
questions concerning the appropriateness of the level of control such as “Can you describe 
an example of what you would consider inappropriate monitoring by superiors?” 
 
British Officers 
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Those that identified artifacts that ran counter to mission command, nevertheless 
understood the tenets.  For the British, mission command was understood as a value but 
recognized that it was not always adhered to:   
“From a British perspective I think we talk a good talk. I think we aspire to 
have mission command, but there are very few examples that I can recall 
that the personalities in my experience have shown good mission command.  
And I include myself in that, as a person who hasn't shown good mission 
command because I've got this desire to get too stuck in the weeds and 
things, and try and play the tune my own way” (U.K.-16).   
 
“Oh, I think there is an understanding of mission command but I think there's 
a reluctance to practice it…and sometimes that manifests itself with 
second-guessing what people are doing. I've certainly experienced that” 
(U.K.-7).   
 
 
To assess underlying assumptions, I asked questions for examples of inappropriate 
monitoring.  The majority of British officers did not see inappropriate monitoring of their 
activities:   
“No…Not in my role.  They all pretty much left me to my own devices” (U.K.-4).   
 
“No. It was quite a well-oiled sort of set of procedures for the control 
mechanisms for the operation, and for observation” (U.K.-14).  
 
“No. I was left to my own devices. Just get on with it” (U.K.-20).   
 
Those officers with multiple deployments tended to observe increased and inappropriate use 
of technology, conflicting with their understanding of mission command: 
“If you are using [technology to monitor subordinates], I think that is wrong.  
It goes against our tenets of mission command” (U.K.-1).   
 
“[Less technology] would have given people like myself a bit more motivation 
to come up with clear direction…as opposed to the ability to pick up the 
phone and use an e-mail to change the direction as and when. I think we—at 
probably all levels including myself, clear direction wasn't given as to what 
we required of our subordinates…because you could give guidance at any 
time...when you manipulate through e-mail and telephone phone calls, then 
you are not really doing mission command” (U.K.-16).   
 
U.S. Officers 
Where the broad subordinate autonomy dictated by mission command seemed expected in 
the British Army, even those that used the term mission command often described a system 
of command very different than the doctrinal definition: 
“So he kind of let me do my thing and it was pretty nice…He was very mission 
orders type, and he was a focused guy. And he would send me exact 
instructions every day” (U.S.-06). 
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And while a handful of U.S. officers stated they did not see inappropriate monitoring (U.S.-
01; U.S.-15), many U.S. officers described the type of monitoring deemed inappropriate by 
British officers as an accepted, appropriate part of the U.S. Army’s culture of command:   
“My philosophy, what I believe it is, is simply we've grown up in an 
environment where you're supposed to influence the fight...So it's the 
American mentality of hard charging. I've got to make my lasting 
contribution. It's not a negative aspect or anything, it just is” (U.S.-12). 
 
“I don't know if it was inappropriate…sometimes the colonel would make his 
directives back down to the battalions to do this or do that…I don't know if 
I’d consider that inappropriate”  (U.S.-16). 
 
“The *monitoring+ was of a helpful nature.  If and when *superiors+ 
monitored it was to add to our awareness.  I didn't see it undermining my 
authority” (U.S.-20). 
 
3.4.3 Summary 
 
By assessing artifacts and basic underlying assumptions can one predict if an organization’s 
culture predisposes someone to nanomanage?  The evidence from the artifacts is mixed.  The 
British officers shared an assumption that mission command equated to autonomy.  Yet even 
having a well-shared understanding of what was appropriate autonomy did not guarantee it 
was practiced—only that it was inappropriate when it was not.  The British Army, with 
mission command firmly established in doctrine, assumed subordinates should be delegated 
broad autonomy.   
 
Conversely, the relatively late adoption of the doctrine of mission command in the U.S. Army 
was reflected in the U.S. responses.  U.S. Army officers rarely mentioned the term “mission 
command” and seemed to not have as clearly defined perspective on what was an 
appropriate superior-subordinate relationship.  So while the U.S. surveyed population 
operated in an organizational culture where mission command was a stated and emphasized 
value, enshrined in doctrine, granting subordinates broad autonomy was not inculcated as a 
basic underlying assumption. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter assessed whether certain organizational cultures may be more hard wired to 
nanomanage and exert more superior control.  It began by defining organizational culture 
and presenting an established typology useful to analyzing organizational culture.  It then 
demonstrated the similarities between the U.S. and British armies’ current doctrine regarding 
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autonomy.  Yet the development of this shared doctrine of autonomy differed; while the 
British Army’s use of doctrine is a recent development of the past 20 years, the British 
concept of mission command was well established prior to the period of study.  Conversely, 
for the U.S., with a long tradition of written doctrine, mission command was only recently 
(2003) enshrined in doctrine.   
 
To assess how autonomy was expressed within these two organizations, artifacts and basic 
underlying assumptions were presented.  The evidence here is mixed.  While British officers 
were generally more familiar with mission command and accepted this as a basic underlying 
assumption of what was expected of autonomy in Iraq, they did not report that mission 
command was always practiced.  U.S. officers rarely used the term mission command and 
seemed to lack a common understanding of what was an appropriate superior-subordinate 
relationship or expectation of autonomy.   
 
Through interpreting the words of the surveyed officers, I assessed why culture may 
influence superior-subordinate relationships.  It is evident in the discussion of NCW and NEC 
that both organizations grappled with the correct use of technologies that allowed increasing 
superior control even as their doctrine of mission command dictated the opposite—that 
subordinates should be granted autonomy.  Both armies’ doctrine largely saw these 
technologies as supporting mission command.  Yet, the initial analysis of artifacts and basic 
underlying assumptions of both armies’ officers revealed that these technologies were used 
in ways contrary to subordinate autonomy.  From this baseline, later chapters will explore 
the disruptive effect of technology in more detail. 
 
This brings up a question relevant to many professions, institutions and organizations—what 
is the value of doctrine?  Military success usually reinforces doctrine while defeat discredits 
it.  Yet the most recent transition of both armies towards a formal doctrine of mission 
command was not motivated by a clear defeat in the 1980s and 90s.  In this case, the findings 
here suggest that doctrinal changes may have limited impact when not sourced to a clear 
past failure.  In this example, doctrine is worth only the degree to which it is imbedded in the 
organization’s culture.  Words alone do not produce a basic underlying assumption, and a 
basic underlying assumption does not necessarily depend on words.  As cultural studies seek 
to understand behaviour, it is clear that the existence of a published set of values does not 
compel or restrict behaviour.   
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Based on the evidence, it would be too much to say that an organization’s culture should be 
considered a cause of nanomanagement.  Yet in the evolving doctrine of the British and U.S. 
armies, one can see how culture conditions whether an act, such as nanomanagement, is 
considered appropriate or not.  While organizational culture was presented as one of five 
factors, by presenting it first, this thesis sought to lay a foundation for comparing two 
organizations.  Each army shared a broad understanding of autonomy, expressed in written 
doctrine.  However, the officers differed in their inherent cultural tendencies to see 
nanomanagement normatively, as either good or bad.  These cultural predispositions will 
condition the remaining factors; therefore the presentation of organizational culture first 
should be seen as opening the analysis and informing the remaining discussion. 
 
Doctrine often cleanly states prosaic and aspirational values.  The execution of those values is 
often, as in this case, much messier.  This chapter saw two organizations aspiring towards 
mission command and granting subordinates wide autonomy.  The next chapter examines 
another one of these aspirational words—trust—a word that one might expect, in its 
absence, would cause nanomanagement.   To examine trust, I consider professions.  From 
athletes to doctors, plumbers to engineers, one finds a diverse set of work and workers that 
deem themselves ‘professions’ or ‘professional’.  Yet few organizations invest the time and 
resources in selecting, training and vetting their members—the ex ante controls that truly 
separate the professionals from the non-professionals.  The next chapter assesses whether 
professional organizations, largely built on superiors able to trust highly qualified 
subordinates, should be more resistant to nanomanagement. 
  
75 
 
 Ex ante control CHAPTER 4
 
The previous chapter introduced culture as the first overarching factor that could determine 
a cause of nanomanagement.  Establishing that a factor such as an organization’s traditions 
and doctrine could be a cause of nanomanagement is essential to understanding this 
chapter’s factor—the ex ante controls exhibited by professions.   
 
Professions traditionally invest resources in producing trusted subordinates.  New members 
may not simply be hired; aspiring professionals must go through rigorous screening, selection 
and training before being granted entry into a profession (A. Abbott, 1981; Carr-Saunders & 
Wilson, 1933; Greenwood, 1957; Lynn, 1965b).  They must learn a field of abstract 
knowledge and be tested in their ability to apply this knowledge to professional standards, 
without supervision.  Professions require that entrants prove that they can be trusted to be a 
military officer, a professor, a doctor or an attorney.  This training is a cost borne by both 
individuals (the professional) and organizations (the profession).  Professions ensure only the 
few, the trained, practice their craft. These ex ante controls distinguish professions from 
other organizations; instead of hiring a person off the street to immediately lead troops in 
combat, or to perform a surgery, or argue a case, professions exact a high cost before their 
professionals are trusted.   
 
To nanomanage a subordinate is not to trust a subordinate.  And to not trust a subordinate is 
not to be a profession.  Then could professions, that value trust, nanomanage?  In Chapter 4, 
I will argue whether a more professional, more trusting organization is more resistant to 
nanomanagement.   One would think so.  Why waste so many resources, and so much time in 
training, selecting and screening a worker if subordinates are just going to be tightly 
controlled upon entry?  The professional is trained to adhere to a code—standards dictated 
by medicine, law, the clergy or, in this study’s case, the military.  These costly measures seek 
to guarantee professional behaviour, all prior to granting membership in a profession.  In 
return for surviving the crucible of a profession’s selection and training, the professional is 
granted trust by his superiors.  This trust earned by joining a profession is not a binary switch; 
instead it is more like a dimmer switch.  While entry into the profession may establish an 
expectation of trust, individual characteristics such as the confidence of the superior and the 
competence of the subordinate, the assigned task, the perceived risk, the importance of the 
outcome may all condition exactly how much trust, and by extension autonomy, a 
subordinate is granted (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
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Chapter 4 examines the degree of trust observed in mid-level officers in Iraq— members of a 
profession by their rank, time of service and previous training and therefore with some 
expectation of trust.  However, the adoption of technology that allows superiors to 
nanomanage subordinates can destroy the trust central to professions.  Instead of expending 
resources in selecting, screening and training professionals, technology fundamentally 
changes the cost calculus of trusting, where superior ex post control becomes more cost 
effective.  This case provides an excellent lens to examine two professions that, by their very 
nature, should resist nanomanagement.  In answering “why nanomanagement?” could the 
answer simply be the more professional, the less nanomanagement?  The less professional, 
the more nanomanagement?  Does nanomanagement occur regardless of professional, ex 
ante training?  And if so, can subordinates still be considered professional if they are 
nanomanaged and no longer trusted?   
 
To address these questions, Section 4.1 defines professions and examines the army as a 
profession.  Section 4.2 discusses ex ante controls, why one would expect to see trust both of 
and within professions, and includes an analysis of the U.S. and British armies’ doctrine of 
trust.  Section 4.3 will then present empirical findings.  Section 4.4 will conclude, assessing 
whether nanomanagement portends the death of the military professional. 
 
4.1 Professions and trust 
 
O’Neill states that “every profession and every institution needs trust” (2002, pp. 3-4).  Yet 
what is a profession and why does it need trust?  This section defines professions, discusses 
how technology may influence professions and why the U.S. and British armies should be 
considered one of these unique organizations. 
 
4.1.1 Professions, technology and change 
 
The terms ‘profession’ and ‘professional’ have adopted a normative quality.  From street 
builders, to street sweepers, to street walkers, nearly every line of work claims some degree 
of ‘professionalism’.  This study focuses on the unique organizations that Weber saw as 
separate and distinct from other forms of work, specifically those that required attendance 
at “special schools” where an abstract area of knowledge is “given rational and systematic 
treatment” (1968, pp. 784-785).  Much of the twentieth century scholarship on professions 
identified the static characteristics that separated professions from non-professions (Carr-
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Saunders & Wilson, 1933), noted the processes by which a profession is developed over time 
(Lasswell & McDougal, 1943), and discussed how professions develop and defend a 
monopoly over a certain type of abstract knowledge (A. D. Abbott, 1988; M. S. Larson, 1977).   
 
This thesis understands a profession to be:  an exclusive group that is trusted and 
autonomous in its application of abstract knowledge, gained through specialized training.  
This definition emphasizes five characteristics commonly referred to in professional 
literature.  Exclusivity implies legitimacy and a clear distinction between members of the 
profession and the rest of society (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933; Goode, 1957; Greenwood, 
1957).  Exclusivity refers to an internal labour market—qualities of promotion, on-the-job 
training and difficulties in leaving or entering the organization are characteristics of a 
profession (Doeringer & Piore, 1971).  Autonomy is seen as one of the “essential attributes of 
the professional role” (Barber, 1965, p. 25) where “professionals differ from other workers in 
the degree of control that they exercise” (Freidson, 1984, p. 11).  Being trusted, both 
externally and internally, is a requirement of professions (Caplow, 1954; Freidson, 1973, 
1983; Wilensky, 1964).  The application of abstract knowledge implies that professions can 
best be understood in the work they perform (A. D. Abbott, 1988; Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 
1933; Mayer, et al., 1995, p. 717).  Specialized training refers to the requirement of the 
attendance and graduation from educational courses specific to the profession (Weber, 
1968) that establish appropriate professional behaviour (March & Olsen, 2004). This 
prolonged training “enables [professionals] to render a specialized service to the community” 
(Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933, p. 284). 
 
Defining a profession is not to suggest that professions, once established, are immutable 
objects.  Instead, they are in a constant state of flux, as forces threaten to encroach on their 
monopoly over abstract knowledge.  One of the most destructive forces that professions face 
is new technology, a force “opening and closing areas of work for professions” (A. D. Abbott, 
1988, p. 149).  The work of railroad dispatchers, telegraph operators, and others once 
thought as requiring specialized training and granted autonomy can be automated, 
protocolized and eventually eliminated by a technological change (O'Neill, 2002, p. 50).   
 
Technology can also destroy professions by subsuming autonomy (Farrell, 2008).  
Information technologies that automate tasks that once required judgement and application 
of abstract knowledge create the central “problem of professions” (Lynn, 1965a, p. xi).  
Further, technology promulgates rules and regulations that “define professional 
responsibilities with ever-greater precision”; each rule that limits a professional’s autonomy 
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may  diminish their trusted judgement (O'Neill, 2002, p. 7).  This quantification of effort, 
more fully developed in Chapter 7, can be seen as an encroachment on professional 
autonomy and judgement (A. D. Abbott, 1988, p. 149).  As O’Neill stated, “Plants don’t 
flourish when we pull them up too often to check how their roots are growing…professional 
life too may not flourish if we constantly uproot it to demonstrate that everything is 
transparent and trustworthy” (2002, p. 19).   
 
4.1.2 The army as profession 
 
Having defined a profession and discussed how technological change threatens professions 
this thesis turns to “the most fascinatingly rigid of professions” (A. D. Abbott, 1988, p. 130)—
the military.  The military has not always been considered a profession, or the army officer a 
professional.  In early twentieth century surveys of professions, the military was often 
excluded from being listed as a profession.  In Carr-Saunders and Wilson’s (1933) survey of 
professions in Britain, they examined 26 professions including dentists, mine managers and 
masseurs; yet they specifically excluded the army.  They noted the army’s omission because 
“the service which soldiers are trained to render is one which it is hoped they will never be 
called upon to perform” (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933, p. 3).31   
 
Following World War II and the establishment of permanent standing armies in both Britain 
and America, two American scholars reinvigorated the concept of the military as a 
profession.  Huntington began The Soldier and the State with the clear statement, “The 
modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional 
man” (1957, p. 7).  He saw the military fitting this study’s definition of professions, namely an 
exclusive group, with expertise in “the management of violence” (Lasswell & McDougal, 
1943, p. 208).  Likewise, Janowitz saw the military fitting the definition of a profession whose 
individual professional “as a result of prolonged training, acquires a skill which enables him to 
render specialize service” (1960, p. 5). 
 
Both Huntington and Janowitz saw the military profession as susceptible to change, facing 
the same external and internal pressures as other professions.32 In the decades following the 
                                                          
31
 When Carr-Saunders and Wilson omitted the army, the armies of both Britain and America were 
in-between wars, small in number and garrisoned for peace; this temporal quality contributed to their 
exclusion. 
32
 Huntington (1965) saw that post World War II, a technological revolution began that required a 
related organizational revolution, where deterrence required the maintenance of standing armies and 
a professionalized officer corps to command them.  Following Weber, Huntington noted that 
professionals operated within a large organization, “the officer corps is not only a professional body; it 
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initial exclusion of the military, late twentieth century studies of professions almost 
invariably included the military (A. D. Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1973, 1983, 1984; Lynn, 1965b; 
James Wilson, 2000) and a growing body of research examined the U.S. Army as a profession 
(Matthews, 2002; D. Snider, 2005; D. M. Snider, et al., 1999). 
 
Returning to this study’s definition, officers of both armies interviewed for this thesis should 
be understood as members of a profession.  In terms of exclusivity, both armies have set 
selection and screening criteria and rigid promotion schedules for their officers.  One cannot 
simply decide to be an army officer and be one the following day.33  In terms of the defence 
of autonomy over abstract knowledge, both the U.S. and British armies hold a near monopoly 
on the use of force in overseas land operations.  Yet both organizations have also needed to 
defend their autonomy against new threats and new technologies (D. M. Snider, et al., 2009; 
Van Creveld, 1989), most recently in the face of the ever-increasing use of private military 
contractors and other governmental agencies to manage violence (Avant, 2005; Uttley, 
2005).  In terms of specialized training, the officers of both armies receive lengthy training in 
order to receive their commission and officially join the profession.  Finally, in terms of the 
application of abstract knowledge, both the U.S. and British governments have entrusted 
their armies with the ‘management of violence’ during the Iraq War.  This trust, both from 
external bodies and within the profession is vital. 
 
4.2 The importance of trust to professions 
 
This section argues that trust—both of and within a profession—is vital to understanding 
how professions are controlled and what defines a professional.  After discussing this 
external and internal trust, this section will explore how trust is perceived in both the U.S. 
and British armies’ doctrine. 
 
4.2.1 External trust—the importance of trust of the profession 
 
In interorganizational control, the autonomy granted an organization is dependent on a 
variety of factors.  More important tasks receive more oversight (D. E. Lewis, 2003; Moe, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
is also a bureaucratic hierarchy” (1965, p. 133).  Janowitz (1960) noted that organizational change was 
also shifting the traditional lines of authority endemic to traditional, hierarchical militaries.   
33
 While in the nineteenth century, officers that could financially raise regiments were often granted 
commissions, this practice was abandoned as both armies adopted formalized training where an 
individual could only become an officer of senior rank by first receiving specialized training and then 
advancing through the ranks.  For a history of U.S. officer accession see (Coumbe, 2010). 
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1995).  Cultural norms can determine what is and is not an appropriate level of granted 
autonomy (March & Olsen, 2004).  Differences in the system of government may also 
determine how much autonomy an organization is granted, with wide variance between the 
U.S. system (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Moe, 1995) and European parliamentary structures 
(Van Thiel, 2004; Yesilkagit & Christensen, 2010).  The autonomy granted and defended, sui 
generis, by a profession requires some level of external trust by society “[s]ince the 
professional does profess, he asks that he be trusted” (Hughes, 1965b, p. 2).   
 
The military, entrusted with lethal force to protect a system of government, depends on a 
high degree of external trust, a trust that may vary.  Some have speculated that technology 
and a more legalistic environment (further discussed in Chapter 7) have increased the 
public’s expectations to assume largely costless, bloodless wars; when the military inevitably 
fails these irrational expectations, trust is lost (Coker, 2007; McCartney, 2010).  Others 
observed that the specific nature of the conflict, and whether the public supports it, as 
determining the level of external trust.  In unpopular wars, society trusts a military less.34 
Further, scandals reduce support potentially damaging societies trust of a profession 
(McCartney, 2010).   
 
The trust by elected bodies of the unelected military also varies between countries.  U.S. 
Army doctrine sees the Army as a “long-trusted institution” (U.S. Department of the Army, 
2005, pp. 1-1), yet also sees that trust varies “on how well [the U.S. Army] live up to Army 
values” (U.S. Department of the Army, 1999a, pp. 2-2).  While most U.S. institutions have 
declined in external trust, according to U.S. Gallup poll, confidence in the military has 
gradually increased and it has continuously ranked number one or two of trusted U.S. 
institutions (Saad, 2009).35    
 
While British Army doctrine also speaks of the importance of external trust, in the U.K., the 
military is not as trusted as in America.  A 2008 IPSOS-Mori poll asked British citizens, “Which 
of these organizations do you trust the most?”  In every institution, the British were more 
trusting than Americans.  The one exception is that British citizens trusted their military 
                                                          
34
 Where the Falklands War and operations in Northern Ireland received a majority of support, as of 
2009 only 20% of the British public supported the war in Iraq (McCartney, 2010). 
35
 In 1955, in a survey of U.S. professions, the military was ranked seventh in terms of trusted 
professions, behind doctors, lawyers and the ministry (Huntington, 1957).  Numerous scholars have 
noted that while trust between U.S. society and its military has increased, the all volunteer force has 
produced a “gap” between civil and military societies, with military officers far more conservative than 
society as a whole (P. Feaver & Kohn, 2001). 
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significantly less than Americans.  Figure 4.1 compares the U.S. Gallup poll with the U.K. 
IPSOS-Mori poll.  
 
Figure 4.1  Relative trust in institutions (U.S. vs. U.K.) in 200836 
The difference in trust has been noted by British officers who see America’s civil-military 
relations as a preferable model to their own (McCartney, 2010).  Why do British citizens trust 
their military less?  This declining trust has provoked a broad discussion in Britain.  British 
Army doctrine speaks of a military covenant between the nation, the service and each 
individual soldier.  If soldiers or the British Army do not meet the terms of the covenant, and 
perform unprofessionally, it is likely “to cause goodwill and trust to be withdrawn” (U.K. 
Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 2-15).  With the covenant broken, the trust necessary for a 
profession ceases to exist.  One scholar captured the declining trust of the military in Britain: 
“The capacity of the military chain of command to control its professional 
space is weaker than it was in the past, as a result of the development of law, 
individual and societal demands, and the actions of service personnel 
themselves. This has left British military commanders as ‘weakened 
gatekeepers’, no longer capable of the sort of self-regulation that operated 
in the past; without recognizing change, they will no longer be able to uphold 
their side of the military covenant” (Forster, 2006, p. 1054). 
 
The influence of the external environment on nanomanagement will be more fully explored 
in Chapter 7.  However, this intraorganizational study focuses far less on the question that 
fixates many civil-military studies—how much autonomy should be granted to the military.  
                                                          
36
 Source (IPSOS-Mori, 2008). 
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Instead, this study focuses on a question comparatively ignored—the degree of autonomy 
granted within the military.  
 
4.2.2 Internal trust—the importance of trust within a profession 
 
Superiors, vested with power and authority, yet limited in specific resources (e.g. time, 
attention, specialization), entrust subordinates to perform delegated tasks.  The superior, 
seeking compliant subordinates, can emplace subordinate controls prior to, or ex ante, the 
delegation.  These ex ante controls (e.g. selection, schools and training) help guide a 
professional’s activity (Mayer, et al., 1995, p. 719; Wittlin, 1965) and provide superiors 
confidence that the subordinate will perform the assigned task (Williamson, 1993).37  Once 
selected and trained, the professional is granted discretionary autonomy to determine the 
manner of their work within a specific field of abstract knowledge (A. D. Abbott, 1988, p. 8) .  
This autonomy grants professions freedom and protection to “try new things, to adapt, and 
to be creative” (Radin, 2006, p. 238).  By establishing selection and screening criteria, 
investing in schools that inculcate professional values and codes, and aligning the 
preferences of superiors with subordinates, ex ante controls dominate professional 
organizations.   
 
For one word most distinguishes the superior-subordinate relationship between professional 
and non-professional work—trust (James Wilson, 2000).  The more professional the 
subordinate, the more a superior should be able to trust them.  Where the non-professional 
subordinate is highly supervised, the professional subordinate faces restrictive selection and 
intense education, but once hired, is trusted to their methods (James Wilson, 2000, p. 149).   
 
Yet the most stringent ex ante controls are not the only tool available to the superior to 
guarantee subordinate behaviour.  Assuming that subordinates will be “self-interest seeking 
with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) a superior must constantly assess the degree of trust 
emplaced in a subordinate.  The superior, seeking compliance may then choose to emplace 
                                                          
37
 While professions invest heavily in ex ante control, codifying their rules and regulations in doctrine, 
this should not be considered “deck stacking,” where the standards and conduct of subordinates are 
determined prior to delegation and are manifested in written instructions and procedures (Epstein & 
O’Halloran, 1994; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987, 1989; Potoski, 1999).  Deck stacking is an ex 
ante form of control that external actors employ when collectively creating institutions and policies.  
Its main purpose is to ensure that future changes to superiors (through elections of policy preference 
changes) will be unable to affect bureaucratic decision making, defining elaborate procedures that are 
cumbersome to change (McCubbins, et al., 1987).  Deck stacking is interorganizational control in 
environments where multiple external actors seek to modify a single actor’s policy.  As this thesis 
focuses on intraorganizational control, deck stacking is less applicable. 
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ex post controls, monitoring mechanisms to ensure subordinates are working and not 
shirking, the subject of Chapter 5 (Brehm & Gates, 1997).  The balance between ex ante and 
ex post will depend on “the degree of trust” within the organization (Fukuyama, 1995, pp. 
26-27).    
 
The experience of both superior and subordinate also complicates the issue within a 
professional organization.  As professional superiors almost exclusively are promoted from 
within, they have first-hand experience in the tasks they entrust their subordinates to do 
(Freidson, 1984). Likewise, when the task is outside the typical ability of the subordinate’s 
experience, the superior’s willingness to entrust subordinates diminishes.  The variability of a 
subordinate’s experience contributes to the superior’s likelihood to trust (Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992; Williamson, 1993).   
 
Trusting internally is seen as a cost-effective method of control (Bromiley & Cummings, 1992; 
Dore, 1983; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Le Grand, 2003).  The more trust, the less cost to superiors 
seeking to control subordinates (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 27).  This cost calculus inherent to all 
trust, balances the desire to maintain subordinate accountability against the superior’s cost 
to control subordinates (Deutsch, 1958; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Luhmann, Burns, & 
Poggi, 1979, p. 24; Mayer, et al., 1995).  If constrained by time and resources, superiors may 
be left with no other option but to trust subordinates (Bromiley & Cummings, 1992).  If the 
costs of monitoring an activity are high, the superior may be forced to either outsource this 
monitoring or depend more heavily on ex ante controls.  Yet if the costs of monitoring 
decrease, the superior need not repose as much trust in the subordinate (Gambetta, 1988, p. 
218).  If resource constraints provide only one opportunity a week to communicate with a 
subordinate, the superior will need to trust that subordinate more.  If technologies allow for 
daily communication, less trust is needed or offered.  And by extension, if technologies allow 
for real-time communication, at the whim and discretion of the superior, even less trust may 
be needed.   
 
External trust provides organizational level autonomy.  Internal trust provides individual level 
autonomy.  Trust, both internally and externally, is vital to professions; therefore it is not 
surprising that trust is mentioned often in military doctrine. 
 
4.2.3 The doctrine of trust in the British and U.S. armies 
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Both the doctrines of the U.S. and British armies’ see trust as one of the “cornerstones of 
leadership” (U.K. Department of the Army, 1995, pp. 0218-0220; U.S. Department of the 
Army, 2003, pp. 2-10), a “key attribute in the human dimension of combat leadership” (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2001b, pp. 4-8), a “vital constituent of the maintenance of morale, 
and so ultimately, of victory” (U.K. Department of the Army, 1995, pp. 0218-0220) and a 
“prerequisite of command at all levels” (U.K. Department of the Army, 1995, pp. 0218-0220; 
U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-14).  The doctrine of these two armies includes four 
common characteristics of trust. 
 
First, for these two armies, trust is needed for mission command to work.  U.S. Army doctrine 
sees trust as “essential to successful mission command” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, 
pp. 2-10) and that “[m]ission command requires an environment of trust” (U.S. Department 
of the Army, 2008, pp. 3-6).  Likewise British Army doctrine states that mission command 
“requires the development of trust and mutual understanding between commanders and 
subordinates throughout the chain of command” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-12) 
and “for Mission Command to function effectively, a superior needs to have trust not only of, 
but also in his subordinates” (U.K. Department of the Army, 1995, pp. 0218-0220; 2005, p. 
120).  Trust must be bi-directional: 
“To function effectively, commanders must trust their subordinates, and 
subordinates must trust their commander…They will also be more willing to 
encourage initiative by their own subordinates if they have learned to trust 
that their higher commander will accept and support the outcome” (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 2-10).  
 
Second, both armies’ doctrine see that trust is variable (U.K. Department of the Army, 1995, 
pp. 0218-0220; U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-14; U.S. Department of the Army, 
1999a, pp. 1-5; 2001b, pp. 4-8; 2003, pp. 2-10).  Third, both armies’ doctrine see personal 
qualities as essential to trust, naming three common qualities “personal example, integrity, 
professional competence” (U.K. Department of the Army, 1995, pp. 0218-0220; 2005, p. 119; 
U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-14; U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 2-10).38  
Both armies emphasize shared experience as vital for trust: 
“During these shared experiences, the interaction of the commander, 
subordinates, and soldiers through communicating up as well as down, 
reinforces trust” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 2-10).  
 
“Cohesion is tightened by shared experience. Shared success develops a 
team’s confidence and shared adversity usually enhances group 
                                                          
38
 Interestingly, the 2010 version of the British Army’s “Operations” manual added a fourth 
characteristic of “attention to detail” as engendering trust (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-14).   
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determination and awareness, both of which build trust” (U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, 2010a, pp. 2-15). 
 
Fourth, trust is seen as vital to the risk taking nature of the military.  U.S. Army doctrine notes 
the importance of trust when taking risks and accepting subordinate mistakes (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 1999a, pp. 6-23).  British Army doctrine goes further, imploring 
leaders to trust subordinates especially when they make mistakes.  British doctrine dictates 
that superiors must develop a: 
“*T+olerance of well-intentioned mistakes. If a subordinate cannot trust his 
superior to support him in such circumstances, the bond of trust will be 
eroded; the subordinate will not act on his own initiative; and the moral 
fabric of Mission Command will be destroyed” (U.K. Department of the Army, 
2005, p. 119).   
 
Trust is clearly vital for superior-subordinate relationships in the military.  So would 
technology support or undermine trust?  Much like Chapter 3’s discussion of autonomy, in 
the U.S. NCW technologies were thought to “foster trust and mutual understanding” by 
enabling “commanders and subordinates at distant locations to receive and participate in 
information exchanges” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 4-17).  The U.K.’s doctrine 
also stated NEC technologies would “lead to better situation awareness across the board, 
facilitating improved decision making” (U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, 2004, p. 5).  Yet 
concerns of how NEC would influence trust were noted.  Where before superiors had to 
trust, now they could monitor and control (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 9).   
 
4.2.4 Summary 
 
External trust is vital to professions as organizations.  Without external trust, professions may 
lose the autonomy they seek to defend.  Professions therefore expend resources training, 
selecting and screening their members.  Yet internal trust is also essential to professionals as 
individual actors.  Without a trusting superior, a professional loses the autonomy they need 
to perform their assigned tasks.  Without trust, the costly ex ante controls lose their value 
and professional work becomes scrutinized and monitored.  
 
Trust is clearly variable and depends on a variety of factors.  The doctrine of both armies 
speaks to the importance of trust, that it varies, that it depends on experience, and that it is 
vital to the risk taking nature of the military.  The empirical findings will now present how 
two trusted institutions, whose doctrine speaks to the value of trust, either adhered to or 
abandoned these tenets when powerful tools of control were placed in superiors’ hands. 
86 
 
 
4.3 Empirical findings 
 
Having defined professions and discussed the function of ex ante controls, this section 
presents empirical findings concerning trust.  Scholars have sought to model, measure and 
define trust, attempting to integrate factors as diverse (and difficult to measure) as the 
trustee’s characteristics, the trustor’s propensity to trust, perceived risks, environmental 
factors and historical relationships between trustee and trustor (Butler, 1991; Johnson-
George & Swap, 1982; Kruglanski, 1970; Larzelere & Huston, August 1980; Mayer, et al., 
1995).  That no one model, measure or definition dominates the literature speaks to the 
difficulty of operationalizing trust.  Given this challenge, I sought to determine trust in the 
eye of the beholder—the surveyed officers.  Whether they perceived, or felt, or gave trust 
would be for them to determine.   By assessing professionals, one could expect to find 
perceived trust between superiors and subordinates.  When trust was not reported, I sought 
to determine if technology that allowed more constant monitoring, or other factors, 
influenced the lack of trust.  In structuring the interviews, I assessed ex ante controls through 
a series of questions.  Were officers trusted by superiors?  Did officers trust their 
subordinates?  Did experience influence trust?  How did technology influence trust? 
 
4.3.1 Were officers trusted by superiors? 
 
I asked respondents how they would assess the level of trust between themselves and their 
superiors.   
 
U.S. officers 
A large majority of U.S. officers that did respond (13 of 17) stated they were trusted by their 
superiors.   
“[My superior] trusted me, and he trusted me more than he did some of the 
other commanders, so he would let me do basically what needed to be 
done…He gave me whatever I asked for and just very vague guidance here's 
what I want you to do. Do good things for America” (U.S.-06).  
 
“[My superior] just understood and trusted what I was doing, you know?” 
(U.S.-03).  
 
“What I've seen, at the *1UP] level there seems to be a lot of trust in the 
[1DN] commanders from what I saw. I don't think I've ever seen a [1UP] 
commander who did not trust all the way down to the [1DN] level, and they 
really gave them a lot of leeway and responsibility” (U.S.-11).  
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“About one-third trust in the company commanders…about two-thirds of the 
battalion commanders that I've seen…really start getting into more 
micromanaging and not really trusting the company commanders in 
second-guessing and trying to control [subordinates], how they fought, or 
what they did” (U.S.-11).  
 
U.S. officers changed positions frequently leading them to serve under numerous bosses, 
allowing an assessment of how the personality of the superior influenced trust, holding other 
factors broadly constant (Strickland, 1958).  Simply, some superiors trusted and others didn’t.  
Personality seemed to contribute to this variability of trust: 
“It had a lot to do with personality.  That guy didn’t trust anyone” (U.S.-18). 
 
“With both of [the two superiors], I think even with the one who was an 
ass…both trusted me implicitly. Even though I had my issues with the initial 
one, everybody has a different personality type” (U.S.-01).  
 
“*Trust+ depends on which commander…A lot of the personalities were a 
little bit different. The first commander was much more of a micromanager 
than the second” (U.S.-07). 
 
“The new task force commander was a breath of fresh air…Complete trust in 
the subordinates” (U.S.-06). 
 
“It falls back down on the unit commander himself.  I’ve been pretty 
impressed with the Army in the last four years.  I worked for seven 
commanders they all seem pretty relaxed not the micromanaging type” 
(U.S.-20).   
 
British officers 
For the British officers, a large majority (21 of 29) stated they were trusted by their superiors.  
Again, trust seemed to be understood as related to autonomy. 
“Once *superiors+ had allocated a task, then they would pretty much trust, 
and I was trusted to get on with it” (U.K.-8). 
 
“I was completely *trusted+. [Superiors] realized that they had to leave us to 
get on with it really” (U.K.-3). 
 
“I would say *trust+ was very good” (U.K.-15). 
 
“The thing with the team itself the trust was pretty water-tight…we had a 
pretty robust trust relationship, and we were pretty open with each other 
and pretty straightforward, and pretty frank” (U.K.-18). 
 
“I am not aware [in my unit] of any point where any officer, senior NCO or 
commander of any rank was pulled up for doing something that would be 
considered untrustworthy or put into a position where he would not be 
trusted in the future” (U.K.-19). 
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For British officers, trust also varied by superior, conditioned by their personality and the 
amount of time available to the superior to monitor his subordinates:  
“[Trust] is quite a hard concept to put your finger on.  I believe [superiors] 
had trust that we were competent, but I just feel that they wanted to get 
involved in order to ensure that it was done in exactly the manner they 
wanted to” (U.K.-16). 
 
“I don't know if it was a lack of trust…It was certainly a reluctance to just 
trust our ability to get on with the job”  (U.K.-23). 
 
“What came down from the commanding officer to us was although yes, we 
were more than competent to go ahead and do our job, he would always 
want to keep up on us and know what we were doing, as we would probably 
want to do with the subunits” (U.K.-2).   
 
“I didn't get the impression that I was being left alone because I was 
completely trusted. I got the impression I was being left alone because [the 
superior+ had other stuff to do” (U.K.-27). 
 
“I think it was probably a competency thing. [Superiors] believed they were 
more competent, as opposed to trusting us to get on with the job” (U.K.-4).  
 
“There was a lack of trust *a feeling+ I need to eyeball that individual, I need 
to bring them in, because I need to make sure of what they're doing is going 
to make me look good, and therefore it’s a tighter control” (U.K.-6). 
 
4.3.2 Did officers trust their subordinates? 
 
Officers of both armies reported a high degree of trust between themselves and their 
subordinates. 
 
U.S. officers 
For the U.S., a large majority (15 of 17) stated they trusted their subordinates.  The 
experience of their subordinates influenced trust: 
“I would trust *my subordinates] implicitly…They deserve it.  When the 
platoon leaders had done 2-3 deployments, hundreds of missions, [they] get 
pretty good.  We had a fair amount of screening and selection, and fairly 
robust training” (U.S.-18). 
 
“I had to trust my senior NCOs…there was enough faith, competence and 
trust in my subordinate units…you developed that confidence.  These were 
guys you can trust” (U.S.-20). 
 
“*My+ platoon leader I trusted…probably in hindsight he was probably too 
young to be trusted like that. Who knows?  It went well and no one got hurt” 
(U.S.-12). 
 
British officers 
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An even larger majority of British officers (23 of 26) stated they trusted their subordinates.  
These officers mentioned a trust in the training and experience of their subordinates. 
“I trusted the *subordinates+ to fight the battle” (U.K.-30). 
 
“We have to trust when you give them an instruction they're going to carry it 
out (U.K.-24).   
 
“I've been under fire, I've seen how blokes perform under fire, and I think I 
trust that and let [my subordinates+ get on with it” (U.K.-7). 
 
“If you are going to give someone two stripes on their own, as a full corporal, 
then you are recognizing that he is a trustworthy character” (U.K.-26).39 
 
4.3.3 Did experience influence trust? 
 
By passing the ex ante hiring, vetting and training, each officer can be assumed to have a 
baseline experience.  The average officer of the surveyed group was in their mid thirties 
(U.S.—37 years, U.K.—33 years) with a length of service well over a decade (U.S.—15 years, 
U.K.—14 years) and with a mean of some level of graduate education.  These characteristics 
were rarely mentioned in the substantive portion of the interview.  What was mentioned was 
the experience of the surveyed officer in the specific position prior to deploying (the average 
for U.S.—7 months, U.K.—5 months) and whether the officer had served with their superiors 
and subordinates prior to deploying. Those officers with more experience in the specific job, 
and shared experiences with superiors generally reported being trusted: 
 
U.S. officers 
“If *my superior+ didn't trust me he wouldn't have kept me in charge…trust 
between the commander and I was key.  I see it as, I was [in the unit] for a 
three year stint, I was part of his team the whole time... [The commander 
would+ trust in his subordinates, after he’d seen a couple hundred missions” 
(U.S.-19). 
 
“Trust, certainly *prevented tight superior control]. Experience, definitely 
[prevented tight superior control+” (U.S.-01).  
 
“*We had+ a lot more [trust]…We had basically been as a group, a coherent 
group for almost two years before deployment, and the commander had 
been in the group for two years” (U.S.-08). 
 
British officers 
“*I was trusted+ because I knew how this [1UP] commanding officer ticked, 
and I served alongside the [1UP second in charge] as well in the past” (U.K.-
26). 
 
                                                          
39
 ‘Two stripes’ refers to the physical description of the insignia worn to indicate the rank of corporal. 
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“[1UP] had been my regimental commander for the previous eight 
months…So he knew me very well, and I knew him very well” (U.K.-27). 
 
“I was trusted more on the second tour, cause I had already deployed out 
there…I had nine years literally on the front line” (U.K.-5). 
 
“But *trust was good+ because we had trained as a unit together, we formed 
quite a strong bond” (U.K.-11).   
 
“We had a pretty good working relationship with [1UP] anyway, and we 
trusted each other” (U.K.-23). 
 
4.3.4 How did technology influence trust? 
 
The U.S. and British armies’ doctrine speculated that information technology would enhance 
trust and mutual understanding.  I sought to determine how trust was affected when 
technology that allowed greater superior control was introduced.   
 
U.S. officers 
As more technology entered the theatre, U.S. officers noted that trust diminished: 
“[Technology] delays the decision to trust or not trust the guy…We are 
steering away from trusting the boots on the ground and pulling back and 
trusting what tech tells us.  It got to the point where commanders were 
believing the different side of the story from the guy on the ground.  There is 
an overreliance on technology to tell us what to trust” (U.S.-21). 
 
With new monitoring technologies employed, U.S. officers noted how decisions once made 
at their level could made at a higher level: 
“[On the first tour] I was pretty much left to my own devices completely.  I 
had no electricity.  I had only an FM [radio] communication with my chain of 
command, and they were twenty kilometres away…[On my second 
deployment+ with all of the IT…people were sending e-mails from, like, one 
office next door to another office next door…So the trust level just was gone” 
(U.S.-10).  
 
“[Technology+ keeps you honest…If somebody says, yeah, I've got a patrol 
out there, you can look at the screen and say really? Because on the screen, I 
don't see anything.   *Then they’d say+ I mean, oh, they're about to leave 
right now” (U.S.-03). 
 
Officers with more recent deployments reflected that monitoring tools were emplaced and 
experience increased in the appropriate use of these tools.  As time passed, more officers 
became familiar with new technology and adopted practices that seemed to foster more, not 
less, trust: 
“In all directions, the communication facilitates a better level of trust” (U.S.-
19). 
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“Now once [superiors] trust, it is a stronger level of trust then what I saw in 
the past…In the past there was always that level of not knowing.  Now they 
know exactly what I am doing…*technology+ builds a level of trust” (U.S.-21).   
 
“*With technology+ I understand what *subordinates+ are doing…That makes 
trust, faith and confidence even more and more critical, and make us a 
better organization” (U.S.-20). 
 
British officers 
British officers with multiple deployments shared a perspective on how trust was influenced 
over time, invariably towards less trust: 
“If you have a group of individuals who get along and trust each other, it is a 
good environment to do a good job.  The second tour there wasn't as much 
trust.  It led to a more oppressive dominating, top down environment.  It was 
business…the micromanagement showed itself early on…Do you trust me to 
do it? Then go away.  There was much more mistrust the second time” (U.K.-
1).   
 
For the British Army, the invasion phase, where units were widely dispersed, was 
characterized as a phase with very little monitoring and a broad degree of trust: 
“Communication was non-existent in the early days, and so I had to let it go 
on trust. [Subordinates] had their mission and they executed mission 
command” (U.K.-5). 
 
“We didn't have the resources to try to monitor our guys. We had to trust 
when you give them an instruction they're going to carry it out…they're 
expected to crack on” (U.K.-24). 
 
“The war-fighting was exactly as expected. I was given total trust from my 
commander. I got exactly the orders I was expected to get…there was no 
micromanagement in that first phase” (U.K.-21). 
 
However, one officer noted how these tools provide a temptation not to trust: 
“The difference between effective use and ineffective use of these 
[technologies] is trust and confidence upwards and downwards, but 
principally downwards. Also probably trust and confidence in one's own self 
as a commander” (U.K.-25). 
 
British Army officers mentioned that the trust of the technology influenced how they 
were employed: 
“If you can trust the equipment, it would have made life a lot easier seeing 
where people were” (U.K.-26). 
 
“The other thing is the human factor…you don’t want to press the fire button 
because you don’t trust the technology as opposed to a voice shouting ‘fire!’, 
then they’ll fire.   And the same goes for the voice orders. You've got 
somebody screaming on the radio, you get that sense of urgency where if it's 
just another e-mail…then you don’t have that” (U.K.-13). 
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The last quote brings up a subject that will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 7—
whether technology produces a bias for quantitative measures over qualitative judgement.  
Early studies of information technologies suggested that being able to monitor subordinates, 
without their consent, awareness or participation, depersonalizes the interaction, replacing 
previously formed trust with quantifiable data (Kruglanski & Cohen, 1973; Strickland, 1958; 
Zuboff, 1988).   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
“When *technology+ is used for good, it'll be good.  And when you use it for 
evil I'm sure it will be bad” (U.S.-03). 
 
The primary aim of this chapter was to assess whether superiors predisposed to trust their 
subordinates would be more resistant to nanomanagement.  This chapter defined a 
profession, a definition that characterizes the U.S. and British armies.  This chapter then 
explored whether being a member of a profession would reduce the likelihood of 
nanomanagement.  External trust was introduced as vital to professions, and internal trust, 
or trust by superiors was seen as essential to professionals.  By examining the doctrine of the 
U.S. and British armies, this chapter highlighted the importance of trust to both of these 
militaries.  Using the doctrinal framework of trust, this chapter then examined whether 
officers were trusted by their superiors, whether they trusted their subordinates, how 
experience influenced trust and finally how technology affected trust. 
 
I anticipated some variation between national cultures.  With the rich history of mission 
command inculcated into the British Army’s culture, I expected a greater degree of trust to 
be reported amongst British officers.  However, I did not observe a broad difference between 
U.S. and British armies’ officers; both claimed to be trusted and to trust their subordinates.  
Factors such as physical separation, the personality of their superiors, a culture of 
action-orientation, and the presence of monitoring technology all contributed to these 
mid-level officers’ perceptions of trust.  The presence, or absence, of trust should not be 
considered a cause of nanomanagement.  Just as nanomanagement may occur in 
organizational cultures that value subordinate autonomy, nanomanagement may occur in 
professions that prefer to employ ex ante control. 
 
Yet was there ever a preference for ex ante controls, or simply a tolerance of trust as an 
imperfect tool of control in the absence of cost effective ex post monitoring?  As 
industrialized militaries grew in size and structure, generals became more removed from the 
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fight, more constrained by time, and less able to monitor the real-time output of their 
subordinates.  A thick fog of war rolled in, obscuring the subordinate, leaving the most 
untrusting general few options but to trust their subordinates.  Modern professions were 
born out of this separation between superior and subordinate.  Military academies were 
founded, officer training enhanced, and the modern professionalization of the military 
began. Superiors simply had to trust more in their ex ante controls in large part due to an 
inability to monitor ex post.  With each new technology that reduces the information gap 
between superior and subordinate, the preference for ex ante shifts toward ex post controls, 
weakening the professional’s position.   
 
Does nanomanagement then mean the death of professions?  Nanomanagement indeed 
threatens the trust that is the sine qua non of professions.   However, saying 
nanomanagement means the death of professions would be a step too far too soon.  
Nanomanagement certainly puts the professional in a more fragile position.  Yet a new 
technology’s presence does not determine whether a superior should trust; a superior’s use 
of technology “guided by human design and needs” determines whether a subordinate is 
trusted more or less (Coker, 2008, p. 145).  Technology does not nanomanage people; people 
nanomanage people.  
 
This variability was seen in the evidence.  Not only did personality and experience seem to 
dictate trust, as the technology became more familiar, many U.S. officers reported that the 
technology further enhanced trust.   If this evolution holds true, I would expect to see British 
Army officers claiming that trust improved as more officers had more experience employing 
these tools. While these technologies are initially disruptive and stretch the organization, 
professional superior-subordinate relationships tend to bounce back to near their original 
form. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 assessed two potential causes of nanomanagement that established 
baseline understandings and expectations of autonomy and control.  In Chapter 5, I begin to 
focus more on its effects.  In an era of increasing adoption of technology, a proliferation of 
tools allows the superior real-time observation of the subordinate regardless of the physical 
distance that separates the two actors.  Tools now fielded transmit data in ever increasing 
quantities, at ever increasing speeds, to ever more distant superiors at little to no cost to the 
subordinate.  To assess the effects of nanomanagement, the next chapter examines how 
information technologies change the basic cost calculus towards ex post monitoring.     
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 Ex post control CHAPTER 5
 
Previous chapters largely focused on explaining why an organization’s culture and 
predisposition towards ex ante controls might inhibit or cause nanomanagement.  Neither 
factor prevented nanomanagement—it may occur in organizations, despite organizational 
cultures that value subordinate autonomy.  Nanomanagement may also occur in professions, 
despite these organizations expending resources to establish ex ante controls to select and 
train subordinates so that they could be trusted.    
 
This chapter examines the effect of nanomanagement as it reduces and potentially reverses 
the information asymmetry between subordinates and superiors.  Low-level subordinates 
know more about themselves (i.e. where they are, what they are doing and whether they are 
accomplishing delegated tasks) than superiors do (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991).  The 
separation between superiors and these street-level subordinates allow these low-level 
actors discretion, interpreting guidance as they see fit (Lipsky, 1980).  Subordinates seek to 
maintain this information asymmetry; superiors seek to overcome it.  To overcome this 
information asymmetry, superiors may emplace ex post controls (Brehm & Gates, 1997; 
McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985) and closely monitor their 
subordinates.  In the past, perfect control over widely dispersed subordinates may have been 
desired, was in some cases impossible, but in all cases was costly such that superiors cannot 
“perfectly and costlessly monitor” their subordinates (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991a, pp. 2-3).  
Technology has changed the costs calculus for ex post controls.  The cost of ex ante controls 
is largely fixed; technology may make screening candidates easier but has largely not reduced 
the cost, both temporal and financial, of professional schools.  However, ex post control costs 
vary, with technology dramatically reducing the cost of information.  With modern 
technology, superiors can simply know more for less.   
 
What is the effect of lowering and sometimes eliminating the costs traditionally associated 
with ex post control?  Could technologies not just eliminate the information asymmetry but 
reverse it so that superiors could know more about subordinates than the subordinates know 
themselves?  This chapter examines how reductions in the cost of ex post control influence 
superior-subordinate relationships.  With the proliferation of tools that enable the most 
senior superior to monitor the most distant and junior subordinate, the period of study 
(2003-2008) captured a dramatic and rapid fielding of information technology onto the 
battlefield.  In both armies, superiors employed many more technological tools to exert ex 
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post control in 2008 than they did in 2003.  Yet during the period of study, the resource rich 
U.S. Army fielded technologies at a much more accelerated pace than the relatively resource 
poor British Army.  To assess how the cost of ex post control influences superior-subordinate 
relationships, this case provides both comparative within an organization and between two 
organizations.  
 
Section 5.1 discusses ex post control, using transaction costs theory to frame how 
technologies influence these costs of control.  Section 5.2 expands past the classic choice of 
police patrols and fire alarms and proposes a new typology of control, reflecting the tools 
superiors use today to control subordinates—trackers, drones and long screwdrivers.  Section 
5.3 will present empirical findings from the interviews.  Section 5.4 will conclude. 
 
5.1 Intraorganizational control: transaction costs, ex post monitoring 
 
This section introduces the transaction costs associated with ex post controls as one 
organization controls another (interorganizational control).  Superior organizations have 
been seen to prefer fire alarms, where the cost of control is shifted to other actors, instead of 
police patrols, where the superior organization bears these costs.  However, the stable 
preference for fire alarms should be reconsidered when examining control inside an 
organization (intraorganizational control).  
 
5.1.1 Ex post interorganizational control: police patrols and fire alarms  
 
How much autonomy should a superior grant a subordinate?  While a superior may be 
tempted to closely monitor all subordinates, control generates transaction costs for both 
superior and subordinate (Coase, 1937; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1975, 2007) as they expend 
resources to overcome the information asymmetries endemic to delegation (Cordella, 2006, 
p. 196).  For the superior, time spent collecting and analyzing subordinate information is time 
spent away from the superior’s other tasks.  For the subordinate, time and resources spent 
answering the information demands of superiors is time spent away from the delegated task.  
Where the cost of ex ante controls are largely fixed and expended prior to delegation, ex post 
control costs fluctuate depending on how tightly a superior seeks to control a subordinate.  
 
Superiors prefer the more cost efficient manner of oversight.  In an interorganizational study 
of how Congress controlled bureaucracies, McCubbins and Schwartz  proposed two options 
through which superiors seek to control subordinates while minimizing transaction costs:  
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police patrols and fire alarms (1984).  ‘Police patrols’ are when the superior retains the 
responsibility for the monitoring, expending his resources to watch, investigate and record 
subordinate activities.  The superior may also depend on external parties to act as ‘fire 
alarms’ to alert the superior when subordinates act outside of their mandate.  By 
empowering external parties (e.g. media, interest groups, etc.) to serve as fire alarms and 
notify the superior of deviant behaviour, the superior is freed from spending their own 
resources on control (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).40  Further, superiors may seek to 
incentivize low-level actors within organizations to serve as ‘whistle blowers’, to expose 
activities that the senior levels of these monitored organizations may seek to obscure (Near 
& Miceli, 1995). 
 
When deciding between police patrols and fire alarms the benefit of additional control is 
weighed against the transaction costs (Lupia & McCubbins, 1994).  As the collection, 
transmission, storage and analysis of information has long been seen as the primary source 
of transaction costs (Machlup, 1962; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991a, p. 11), superiors should “do 
the best they can” to reduce the cost of information and to create an environment of 
“costless information flow” (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1991a, p. 3).  Compared to just 20 years ago, 
superiors today have many more tools to create that costless information flow (Ciborra, 
1993; Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987; Wigand, Picot, & Reichwald, 1997).  Technology has 
decreased the cost of information analysis (Granstrand, 1999), transmission (Ciborra, 1993), 
collection (Castells, 2000; David & Foray, 2002) and storage (Barbosa & Friere, 2010).  As 
technology has been adopted, the cost of ex post monitoring of subordinates by superiors 
has been reduced.  So does the long held preference for fire alarms over police patrols still 
hold?  The preference is changing, especially when one looks at control inside an 
organization. 
 
5.1.2 Ex post intraorganizational control 
 
Can interorganizational control explain control within an organization?  Brehm and Gates 
argue that in order to understand interorganizational control, one must first understand 
                                                          
40
 Outsourcing monitoring to third party fire alarms or internal whistle blowers may produce additional 
costs.  These third parties possess their own interests with little predicating that these interests must 
seamlessly fall in line with the superior’s.  This allows for another layer of information asymmetry 
where the true actions of the subordinate are filtered through the middleman’s interests.  This 
increases the chance for false alarms (when the subordinate’s actions are in conflict with the 
middleman yet not in conflict with the superior) and failed alarms (when the subordinate’s actions are 
in line with the middleman yet in conflict with the superior) (Lupia & McCubbins, 1994, pp. 97-98).   
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superior-subordinate relationships within an organization, what they term 
intraorganizational control (1997, p. 3).  Costs are calculated differently when looking at 
control within an organization.   
 
When analyzing control between different organizations, when the superior organization can 
distance itself from an exposed deviant subordinate, a fire alarm preference is 
understandable.  However, where the superior shares the same organization as the 
subordinate, additional costs associated with fire alarms must be considered.  Instead of an 
alarm ringing in the fire house, in intraorganizational control, third party notification of 
subordinate misbehaviour is more closely analogous to an air raid siren blown after a house 
has burned to the ground.  Instead of only the firemen being notified of a burning house, the 
entire community is alerted.  The loss of the house is not the only cost; that the firemen did 
not respond in time is another concern.  In interorganizational monitoring, when third parties 
expose subordinate shirking, the superiors do not share blame for this behaviour, and are 
judged largely on whether their response was appropriate or not.  This same logic applies to 
whistle blowers; where it might make sense to incentivize whistle blowers when seeking 
interorganizational control, there is less incentive in intraorganizational control.41 When 
assessing intraorganizational control, fire alarms cost more.  
 
These additional costs profoundly affect professions.  If the media runs a story about abuse 
of prisoners by prison guards, an elected body may deflect this criticism, stating that the 
guards were part of a different organization.  However, if the media reports abuses of 
prisoners in a military jail, military superiors may not deflect blame so easily; the reputation 
of the entire military organization is diminished.  Members of a common profession, the 
senior military superiors may blame deviant actions, but subordinate misbehaviour reflects 
and impacts across the entire organization, including the superior.  As mentioned in Chapter 
4, professions depend on external trust.  In turn they are granted what they so desperately 
seek to defend—autonomy.  With professions in perpetual competition, living, growing and 
                                                          
41
 In intraorganizational control, especially in professions, a dependence on whistle blowers is highly 
problematic.  First, it is unlikely to happen.  In the military, officer promotions are heavily dependent 
on their superiors’ ratings; blowing a whistle is not good for an officer’s career.  Second, there is a 
danger that their whistle may be heard outside the organization, damaging the profession’s 
reputation.  In the military context, one must look no further than the recent U.S. and British armies’ 
scandals concerning torture and medical treatment of their wounded (Borger, Harding, Hall, & 
Urqhuart, 2004; Priest & Hull, 2007; Temko & Townsend, 2007).  In these cases, internal whistle 
blowers had already sounded alarms, yet meaningful reform was not instituted.  That that these 
scandals were eventually exposed by third parties (media) fire alarms, meant that the military faced 
broad external investigations, firing and demotion of senior military officials and increased oversight.  
There is some speculation that prosecutions of soldiers are done quietly to avoid damage to the 
military’s reputation (T. Edmunds & Forster, 2007, p. 74).   
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dying based on how well they are trusted, a third party fire alarm provides fuel for 
competitors who seek to encroach on the profession’s domain (A. D. Abbott, 1988).   
 
For intraorganizational control, not only does the cost calculus surrounding fire alarm 
preference change, but police patrols also must be assessed differently.  Police patrols simply 
cost less inside an organization.42  Monitoring of a familiar organization comes at less cost to 
the superior than monitoring some foreign or alien organization.  Just as police that grew up 
in the neighbourhood they now patrol know the people, the personalities, the slang and the 
areas of likely trouble, they can patrol at lower cost than a policeman from a different town.  
Further, these hometown police possess incentives to keep the neighbourhood under order 
and do not want other cops or agencies interfering.  
 
5.1.3 Summary 
 
The classic challenge of superior control is to reduce the information asymmetry between 
themselves and their subordinates at the lowest cost.  Police patrols and fire alarms present 
two options for superiors.  For interorganizational control, fire alarms are seen as preferred 
to costly police patrols.  Yet this preference may shift when one examines control within 
organizations, especially professions.  If the total cost of a police patrol or fire alarm includes 
the cost of external sanction, the traditional preference for fire alarms must be reconsidered.  
When the cost of external sanction is high, especially in professions, intraorganizational 
police patrols, albeit still costly, may be preferred.   
 
What if the cost of a police patrol fell to zero?  What if information asymmetry could not just 
be reduced, but reversed, with superiors knowing more about subordinates than 
subordinates know of themselves?  Modern technology that enables nanomanagement 
promises and, in some cases, delivers this.  The next section updates police patrols for the 
contemporary age. 
 
                                                          
42
 Police patrols have long been a feature of control within the military.  U.S. doctrine has 
recommended a technique used by Napoleon, a principle called the “directed telescope” of enlisting a 
small group of trusted officers that could move freely throughout the battlefield to observe specific 
events and report back directly to the commander (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 3-23).  This 
technique “remains a valid technique, even with the advent of modern *technology+” (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 3-24) and is being employed in Afghanistan by General Petraeus 
(Teague, 2011).  U.S. Army doctrine also recommends ‘staff visits’, where commanders are 
encouraged to leave their own headquarters and visit subordinate elements (U.S. Department of the 
Army, 2003, pp. 3-23).  A classic form of police patrols, these visits place large costs on both the 
superior and subordinate hosting unit. 
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5.2 Police patrols updated: trackers, drones and long screwdrivers 
 
In developing police patrols and fire alarms, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) employed 
metaphors common to the security services of their day.  This typology is still useful for 
understanding control between organizations, but has more limited utility in explaining the 
costs and benefits of control within an organization.  To understand contemporary 
intraorganizational control the effect of technology on ex post costs must be assessed.  Since 
cost is the main determinate of superiors preferring fire alarms over police patrols, this 
section introduces and examines three sub-categories of police patrols—trackers, drones and 
long screwdrivers—that exhibit cost savings over traditional police patrols. 
 
Each of these sub-categories allows greater superior control by reducing and reordering the 
cost structure.  One expects superiors to pursue and employ technology that allows them, at 
lower cost, to overcome information asymmetry.  It is safe to also assume that if, at lower 
cost, superiors can better know where their subordinates currently are, what their 
subordinates are currently doing and whether their subordinates are accomplishing the 
delegated task to the standard prescribed, they will.  Yet these tools may also decrease 
transaction costs for subordinates.   
 
5.2.1 Trackers   
 
A tracker is a tool that automatically communicates information about subordinates to 
superiors, at little to no cost to the subordinate.  Superiors can install trackers on all 
subordinates, leading to constant, real-time reporting of subordinate positions and actions.  
Trackers create a one-way communication of previously hidden information about the 
subordinate to the superior.  A global positioning systems (GPS) sensor that relays a 
subordinate’s position, a camera on a computer (or helmet) that relays the work currently 
being performed by a subordinate—these are trackers.  
 
Superiors will employ trackers widely.  The superior saves costs by not having to ask the 
subordinate their location; they are provided information previously known only to the 
subordinate without having to actively request it.  Furthermore, trackers reduce to zero the 
chances of false information or inaccurate reporting from subordinates.   
 
Trackers are largely unobtrusive and costless to the subordinate.  For the subordinate, a 
tracker actually saves costs in that the subordinate no longer needs to communicate his 
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location or activity to the superior—the tracker does so automatically.  As the tracker 
communicates information known to the subordinate, but unknown to the superior, a 
tracker reduces but does not reverse information asymmetry.  Trackers show superiors a 
subordinate’s exact location or current activities.  One may assume the subordinates already 
know their location, what they are seeing and what they are doing.  With trackers, superiors 
now know this information, in real-time.   
 
Trackers are powerful regardless of whether they are being actively monitored.  This 
panoptical form of observation, where the subordinate does not know whether they are 
being actively monitored by a superior, may produce the control desired by the superior at 
no cost.43  Knowing that the superior knows their location may produce a Hawthorne effect 
(Landsberger, 1958; Roethlisberger, Dickson, & Western electric company, 1934), modifying 
subordinate behaviour away from shirking simply by observation.  It is expected that some 
subordinates will see trackers coming at a cost to their autonomy, even as they save the 
subordinates the transaction costs of answering information requests from above. 
 
As with most technology adoption, there is an initial cost of purchasing and fielding tracker 
technology.  As both superiors and subordinates employ these trackers, one should expect to 
see new rules form as a logic of appropriate use of these technologies eventually emerge 
(March & Olsen, 2004).  Yet overall, as trackers reduce subordinate reporting while 
increasing superior knowledge, both superior and subordinate should see trackers largely as 
a net benefit. 
 
5.2.2 Drones 
 
To monitor what their subordinates are currently doing, a drone is a tool that enables a 
superior to actively monitor and record a subordinate’s actions.  Like trackers, drones create a 
one-way communication of information about, but not from, the subordinate to the superior.  
Unlike trackers, which merely reveal information known to the subordinate but hidden from 
the superior, drones provide the superior information about the subordinate’s activities that 
the subordinate both knows and does not know.  UAVs that provide a bird’s eye view of 
subordinate action, cameras that show superiors information both known and unknown to 
subordinates—these are drones. 
 
                                                          
43
 The Panopticon prison was envisioned by Jeremy Bentham in 1787.  He sought to save costs in 
prison design by designing a structure such that prisoners could be watched at all times.  It was more 
fully described by Foucault (Bentham & Bozovic, 1995; 1977). 
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Drones dramatically reduce costs to the superior; therefore one expects to see them widely 
fielded by superiors.  Drones allow superiors to gain access to previously unavailable 
information about the real-time activities of their subordinates.  In some cases, superiors 
would have needed to risk their life to obtain this information; with drones, they may 
virtually fly to the scene of action, without risk.  A drone removes many of the costs of 
traditional police patrols.  From the comfort and safety of a removed location, a drone 
provides superiors a real-time ability to see what subordinates are doing. 
 
What makes drones most powerful is their ability to reverse information asymmetry.  A 
drone transmits information about the subordinate that is both known and unknown to the 
subordinate.  Superiors watching a UAV feed may observe information known to 
subordinates (e.g. where their truck is parked, what building was just entered).  Yet with 
drones, superiors may also observe information unknown to the subordinate (e.g. that two 
people are on the roof of the building just entered). 
 
Drones allow the superiors to focus their monitoring attention on a single event or actor, 
seeing a level of detail long restricted by the physical distance separating superior from 
subordinate.  Yet that clarity comes at a cost.  Like peering through a telescope, drones 
transfix the superior’s attention to a small field of vision, to the exclusion of everything else 
occurring.  The time spent directly monitoring the drone’s feed are new costs incurred by the 
superior.  Furthermore, drones do not just bring the attention of a superior to a low level; 
they also constrain the superior’s level of analysis and actions.  If a superior is focused on 
monitoring the subordinate’s current actions, they expend time and attention away from the 
superior’s tasks. 
 
Like trackers, one should expect superiors to speak of costs of purchasing and fielding drone 
technology and subordinates speaking of costs of learning and understanding a new 
technology.  Like trackers, drones do not present immediate transaction costs to the 
subordinate.  For subordinates, with drones employed, this will reduce the need to report to 
superiors what superiors can now see with drones.  Yet unlike trackers, a drone may reverse 
the information asymmetry.  With superiors knowing more about what a subordinate is 
doing than the subordinate knows, subordinates will see drones as a significant cost to their 
autonomy.   
 
5.2.3 Long screwdrivers 
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Finally, to determine whether their subordinates are accomplishing the delegated task to the 
standard prescribed, a long screwdriver is a tool that allows a superior to both request and 
receive previously unavailable information, and to direct action at a distance and speed 
previously impossible.  Differing from trackers and drones, which may reduce costs for both 
superiors and subordinates, long screwdrivers only increase costs to subordinates by 
compelling the production of information in increasing quantity, quality and speed.44  Where 
trackers and drones may reduce reporting, long screwdrivers increase it.   Trackers and 
drones are tools that superiors use to gather information on subordinates; long screwdrivers 
are tools that superiors use to control subordinates.  Long screwdrivers allow superiors to 
connect to, lever and torque subordinates at great distance.  The suite of tools that connect 
superiors to subordinates—email, smartphones, video teleconferencing, instant messaging, 
bandwidth and satellite communications—these are long screwdrivers. 
 
For the superior, long screwdrivers allow them to request and receive information about the 
progress and current status of delegated tasks, previously unavailable due to physical 
separation and communication limitations.45  Long screwdrivers widen and lengthen the pipe 
of information connecting superior to subordinate. When connectivity expands, there is a 
greater demand for detail.  As more information can be requested, more information will be 
requested, in increasing quantity, quality and speed.  Like trackers and drones, long 
screwdrivers can be understood as decreasing the discretionary space and autonomy of the 
subordinate.  This increases the costs to the subordinate in that they now must dedicate 
more time and effort to fulfil the information demands of the superior.  Unlike trackers and 
drones, long screwdrivers enable two-way communication, providing superiors an iterative 
tool for immediate and distant control. 
 
With long screwdrivers more of the subordinate’s time will be dedicated to answering the 
increasing requests for information from now connected superiors.  Their actions will be 
                                                          
44
 Describing the evacuation of American forces from Saigon, Admiral Metcalf coined the phrase, ’six 
thousand mile screwdriver’—the minute direction of the day-to-day operations of a field commander 
by higher and remote authority” (Metcalf, 1986, p. 278).  As our definition focuses less on physical 
separation, we adopt the term ‘long screwdriver’.  Further, this term is popularized in British military 
writings “*T+he British military is also acutely aware that by offering senior commanders a clearer 
picture of what is happening…networking may tempt them to take out the ‘long screwdriver’ and 
direct operations on the ground” (Farrell, 2008, p. 788). 
45
 While this chapter focuses on how long screwdrivers should be understood as a sub-category of ex 
post police patrols, in this sense they can also be a variant of ex ante deck stacking.  As Chapter 4 
explained, deck stacking sought to control subordinate behaviour ex ante by specifying clear 
procedures, mandatory reports and other controls that would guide the subordinate once delegated a 
task.  But once a deck is stacked and dealt, the subordinates would play the hand.  With long 
screwdrivers, superiors can alter the hand while it is being played, in real-time. 
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more tightly controlled.  For superiors, one should expect to see more control of subordinate 
activity at a level previously unavailable and additional costs incurred processing the new 
abundance of data. 
 
5.2.4 Summary 
 
Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers are an overdue update to understanding 
contemporary ex post intraorganizational control.  While a superior may still choose to 
conduct a costly traditional police patrol, these tools allow superiors to know where their 
subordinates currently are, what their subordinates are currently doing and whether their 
subordinates are accomplishing the delegated task to the standard prescribed at far less cost.  
While one should expect to see a variability of costs, in their entirety these control 
mechanisms should be seen as steps towards placing increasing control back into the hands 
of distant superiors at the cost to the subordinate’s time and autonomy.  With these tools 
more is observed and less is obscured.   
 
These technological tools are not abstract theoretical concepts, but are currently employed.  
While these metaphors originate on the battlefield, they are analogous to tools used to 
control other professions.  Enabled by new technology, and seen as more cost effective than 
traditional police patrols, they reflect how internal superiors may now control their 
subordinates.46  The real world influence of their employment will be analysed in the words 
and responses of the mid-level officers who act as both superiors and subordinates, both 
empowered and controlled by trackers, drones and long screwdrivers. 
 
5.3 Empirical findings 
 
This empirical section explores the sub-categories of trackers, drones and long screwdrivers.  
Each of these sub-categories was observed in Iraq from 2003 to 2008.  Trackers manifested in 
technologies that leveraged GPS to allow superiors to constantly know where their most 
junior subordinates were.  Drones were employed in the form of UAVs that allowed superiors 
                                                          
46
 These tools generally empower superiors, providing greater tools to observe and control 
subordinates.  But they may also empower subordinates, enabling ‘sousveillance’ or the recording and 
monitoring of events from below, as opposed to traditional surveillance or the recording of events 
from above (Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 2003).  Where in the past, the lowest levels in a hierarchy may 
have suffered mid-level malfeasance, now that they too can record their actions and their immediate 
superior’s actions, orders, and directives.  I expect these tools to occasionally empower low-level 
subordinates.  Chapter 6 will explore how these tools affect different actors, at different levels of the 
hierarchy. 
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to actively monitor and record specific events in their organization.  Long screwdrivers 
encompassed a broad suite of tools—from computers, to email, to networks—that allowed a 
superior to both request increasing quantity and quality of information at greater speed, and 
then direct action at greater distances.   
 
Before presenting the empirical evidence for each respective sub-category, this section will 
discuss the expanding capability of these technologies as employed, albeit at different rates, 
by both armies in Iraq.  Then, in order to capture how the increased use of these tools 
influenced superior-subordinate relationships, empirical evidence relating to each 
sub-category will be presented.  Each interview asked the surveyed officers how they 
interacted with their superiors and subordinates, and specifically what technology was 
available and employed.  Some officers (mostly U.S.) saw trackers, drones and long 
screwdrivers employed; some officers (mostly British) saw none.  Based upon their answers 
to these initial questions, I could then probe these interactions with technology, exploring 
the officer’s perceptions of costs and benefits.   
 
5.3.1 Trackers  
 
A tracker is a tool that automatically communicates information about subordinates to 
superiors, at little to no cost to the subordinate.   Since the dawn of warfare, superiors have 
long sought to know their subordinate’s location.  This knowledge could determine victory or 
defeat; therefore the pursuit of this knowledge could consume much of a superior’s time and 
attention.  Standard operating procedures (SOPs), mandatory reports and drills were 
established to have subordinate leaders report their position and disposition of their forces 
at set intervals.  Subordinates, even through the late twentieth century, would often have to 
stop movement, pull out a map, use land navigation skills, establish communications and 
take the time to report their position—costly propositions in the middle of war.  In the days 
before deployment of GPS, this would produce the inevitable errors of inaccurate reporting, 
plus the potential costs of transmission of grid coordinates and locations across an unsecure 
radio net.  Fielded at dramatically different rates, the FBCB2 (U.S.) and Bowman (U.K.) 
systems seemed to solve this age old problem.   
 
U.S. trackers—FBCB2: Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 
The U.S. Army’s Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), is a digital command 
and control system.  Using GPS transponders, FBCB2 continuously transmits its location via 
radio or satellite transmission (U.S. Office of Force Transformation, 2005).  The key interface 
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is a vehicle mounted touch screen (Figure 5.1) that can display imagery, operational graphics 
or maps (Figure 5.2).  Additionally, the FBCB2 can transmit text messages and reports 
through existing FM and satellite radios.  Each vehicle’s location is represented by an icon on 
a screen, which is constantly tracked and updated (Dunn, 2003).  Users of FBCB2 not only see 
their own location, but feasibly the location of all other FBCB2 systems. 
 
 
Figure 5.1  FBCB2 mounted in a U.S. Army vehicle47 
                                                          
47
 Source (U.S. Army PEO C3T, 2009). 
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Figure 5.2  FBCB2 screen48 
The Iraq War would be the first large scale test of this tracking technology (Dunn, 2003; U.S. 
Office of Force Transformation, 2005).  In 2002, during the preparation for the Iraq invasion 
FBCB2 production was increased and rapidly fielded.  The U.S. Army fielded 1,242 of these 
systems prior to the invasion. The British Army did not have a comparable capability; they 
decided to lease and install 47 FBCB2s in select British combat vehicles (U.S. Office of Force 
Transformation, 2005).  Following the invasion phase and what was seen as a successful 
fielding, FBCB2 systems were installed in more vehicles.  As of 2007, 11,000 FBCB2 systems 
were fielded in Iraq, in every other vehicle (St. Claire, 2011).  As of 2010, the U.S. Army had 
fielded more than 72,000 FBCB2 systems worldwide with the objective of 105,000 systems 
fielded by December 2012 (Deagle.com, 2011; St. Claire, 2011; U.K. Quality Assurance 
Agency, 2009).   
 
British trackers—Bowman 
The U.K.’s version of the FBCB2 is the Bowman system, a long promised update to the 
1940s-era Clansman radio system.  The Bowman provides for secure voice and data and is 
mounted in vehicles; while initially intended to also include the FBCB2 ability to track 
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 Source (Weaver, 2001).  
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vehicles, the early version simply provided a new, more secure radio.  Figure 5.3 shows the 
Bowman mounted in a British Army vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 5.3  Bowman mounted in a British Army vehicle49 
 
In 2002, General Dynamics U.K. was awarded the £2.4 billion contract to develop the 
Bowman for the British Army (U.K. National Audit Office, 2006).  Despite numerous 
contracting and manufacturing delays, the first unit with the Bowman system installed 
deployed to Iraq in April 2005, although without a tracking capability similar to FBCB2 
(Pfeifer, 2005).  As of January 2006, 4,079 vehicles had been installed with Bowman, 
approximately 25% of what was projected in 2002 (U.K. National Audit Office, 2006, p. 31).  
In 2006, an additional £121 million of funding was allocated to “overcome technical 
difficulties” to accelerate the fielding of Bowman’s tracking capability (U.K. National Audit 
Office, 2006, p. 3).  While lauded by superior officers (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2006), as of 
2008, the Bowman system was still being broadly critiqued for its limitations, specifically 
battery use and not having the ability to track forces like the FBCB2 (Page, 2008).  Although 
the program initially intended to install Bowman in “almost all moving equipment in the 
Armed Forces” (Pfeifer, 2005), budget cutbacks put the full implementation of Bowman in 
jeopardy (Ackerman, 2009). 
 
In sum, during the period of study, the U.S. Army rapidly adopted and fielded tracker 
technology (FBCB2) in tens of thousands of vehicles in Iraq.  Conversely, the British Army 
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 Source (General Dynamics-UK, 2011). 
108 
 
initially fielded radio systems (Bowman) that did not provide tracker capability.  I expected 
primarily only U.S. officers to express opinions about the cost and benefits of trackers. 
 
Benefits of trackers 
U.S. officers reported trackers saved them time.  With the FBCB2, they could look on the 
screen and known where their subordinates were; their superiors could do the same.  This 
reduced radio traffic to both subordinates (St. Claire, 2011; U.K.-11; U.S.-03; U.S.-09) and 
superiors (U.S.-03; U.S.-19):  
“[With FBCB2] you are silent, no radio traffic but you know exactly where 
everything is…Without it, there would be significantly more radio traffic but 
not significantly more situational awareness” (U.S.-20).   
 
“Now it is almost too quiet on the radio” (U.S.-18).   
 
“There is an art and the science of war; the science is where am I?...*With 
FBCB2] you always know where you are...it allows the units on the ground to 
focus on the art of war” (U.S.-09). 
 
U.S. officers mentioned the benefits of trackers specifically knowing the locations of adjacent 
units (U.S.-05; U.S.-21), the increased ability to coordinate and collaborate (U.S.-08; U.S.-14), 
and the increased speed of operations  (U.S.-08; U.S.-09).  U.S. officers stated that FBCB2 
made units “three times more lethal” (U.S.-20) and prevented fratricide (U.S.-15; U.S.-20).   
Few officers saw trackers as a reduction in their autonomy.  Instead, as they were able to use 
this technology to gain previously hidden information about themselves and others (the 
location and identification of adjacent, superior and subordinate units), trackers were largely 
seen as a net benefit.   
 
Trackers were generally seen by U.S. officers as decreasing transaction costs in terms of the 
amount of time needed to discover where their subordinates where:  
“As a company commander, [FBCB2] gave me a lot of flexibility…I could look 
at the FBCB2, get a general idea of where [my subordinates] were or what 
the situation was…Once I got [subordinates] to give me a report, then I could 
just sit back and watch” (U.S.-03). 
 
“I was willing to take a lot more risks with the [FBCB2].  I could be a little 
more hands off.  I could see what *subordinates+ were doing…I could conduct 
multiple missions simultaneously.  You asked less, but more pointed 
questions” (U.S.-21). 
 
An officer reported an increased dependency on this technology over time:   
“During the first deployment it didn't really have that much of an impact 
other than I could visually see where the soldiers were on FBCB2…And the 
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second deployment, without [FBCB2] the job that I was doing…would have 
been almost impossible” (U.S.-16). 
 
Costs of trackers 
As expected, a transaction cost was associated with the time needed to train and maintain 
these new technologies:   
“In the kids nowadays, they're not really as good at the basics, but they can 
operate the FBCB2 and all that other computer stuff a hell of a lot better 
than I can.  But they can't tell you how to lead in an ambush.(U.S.-06). 
 
“My lieutenant would sit there and stare at *FBCB2+ as opposed to looking at 
the environment. I wanted my leaders to be able to lead, and not lead from a 
computer screen…they were staring at the screen and watching icons move 
around like a Nintendo…they could have had an insurgent walk up on them 
with a pistol but they'd still be staring at the screen” (U.S.-10). 
 
“So we had [FBCB2] in the vehicles but we couldn't get the support to keep 
them running or keep them operational, or teach anybody to use them or 
anything. So in reality they were electronic lumps in the middle of the 
[vehicle]” (U.S.-10).  
 
“No one was trained on *FBCB2+.  One day some tech guys showed up and 
said this is a box and here is this screen” (U.S.-18).   
 
Only one U.S. officer mentioned an anecdote that indicated trackers were used by superiors 
to control subordinates: 
“We were on a checkpoint once…and a convoy had been hit.  Some of the 
convoy had come to our checkpoint and said hey, we need assistance…I just 
gave a word to my soldiers to go…Within a minute *of moving 3UP+ called.  
‘Why are your men moving from the checkpoint? [I said] I've got people in 
contact I'm trying to move to them and assist.  They said no, you will not. 
Move back to your checkpoint…I wanted to *unplug my FBCB2+…a couple of 
my [senior enlisted soldiers] were just going to do the whole F you thing and 
go….it was very frustrating” (U.S.-10). 
 
Summary 
As expected, trackers dramatically reduced the costs associated with superiors knowing 
where their subordinates are.  Trackers were not seen by subordinates as an overbearing 
amount of control.  That a subordinate would accept any additional surveillance and 
observation may seem puzzling to some.  Why trackers were accepted seemed to be related 
to the additional information provided to the subordinate that was being tracked (e.g. when 
the subordinate could ‘see’ adjacent units), while reducing the costs of reporting information 
on location and position.  As FBCB2 was installed, viewed and controlled at the lower officer 
levels, this technology provided an enormous benefit, and additional information, at little to 
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no cost.  Only one officer saw a superior’s monitoring of a tracker as negatively hindering his 
autonomy.  The costs were dramatically different when the officers spoke of drones. 
 
5.3.2 Drones 
 
A drone is a tool that enables a superior to actively monitor and record a subordinate’s 
actions.  In Iraq, the use of drones is best represented by the UAV.  The UAV is a remotely 
piloted aircraft and can be used for reconnaissance and, when armed, attack missions.  UAVs 
are equipped with an array of cameras and sensors that can record live footage and transmit 
this through satellite communications to remote video terminals. 
 
 
Figure 5.4  Predator drone firing missile50 
 
From 2003 to 2008, the use of U.S. UAVs in Iraq increased across a wide variety of measures 
(e.g. number of airframes, amount of video recorded, number of hours flown).51  This 
                                                          
50
 Source (Anonymous, 2011). 
51
 From October 2001 to October 2006, UAVs flew over 400,000 flight hours in support of operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007b); in the first 10 months of 2007, UAVs 
logged almost as many hours as the first five years (300,000 flight hours)(Drew, 2010).  The number of 
UAVs in combat rose from 1000 in 2006 to 1350 by the end of 2007 (Osborn).  2007 also saw a fivefold 
increase in the number of video terminals that could display real-time image feeds from UAVs .  
Overall, since 9/11, the amount of intelligence gathered by UAVs and other sensors rose over 1,600 
percent (Shanker & Richtel, 2011).  UAVs also increased in the amount of quantity of information that 
each airframe captured.  In the winter of 2010-2011, the Air Force’s deployed Gorgon Stare, a drone 
that can send up to 65 different images to different observers, with which, the general in charge of 
implementing this new sensor stated, “we can see everything” (Whitlock, 2011). 
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increase was reflected in the surveyed officer responses.  Less than 50% of the officers that 
deployed between 2003-2005 had access to UAVs (“I never had UAV support *in 2004+” (U.S.-
03)).  Yet in the 2006-2008 period, not only were these mid-level officers increasingly 
watched by superiors, they could watch their subordinates, “*In 2006+…we always had an 
[UAV](U.S.-03), “We could watch all *subordinate operations+” (U.S.-01; U.S.-07),  “100% of 
operations were monitored by UAVs…we had about six or seven huge plasmas” (U.S.-18).  
Figure 5.4 shows a sample screen shot; images like these were often projected or shown in 
U.S. Army command posts throughout Iraq. 
 
 
Figure 5.5  Sample screen shot from a UAV video terminal52 
 
Like the tracker technology gap, the British Army fielded UAVs later, in smaller numbers, at 
lower quality.53  Upon the invasion, the U.K.’s sole operational and unarmed UAV, was 
described by the U.K.’s Ministry of Defence as “not one, but several generations behind [U.S. 
UAVs]” (U.K. Parliament Defence Committee, 2003, pp. para 111, p. 141).  A U.K. officer 
confirmed this, “It's like watching a black and white TV in the 1920s” (U.K.-19).  As one U.K. 
officer noted, “They *UAVs+ were new to us. They were not new to *the U.S.+” (U.K.-25).   
 
This line of questioning sought to capture the diversity of perspectives concerning the use of 
these tools in Iraq—some had them, some didn’t, some used them to watch others, some 
                                                          
52
 Source (Anonymous, 2003). 
53
 Like the FBCB2, the British Army purchased American equipment to fill the gap, purchasing two 
UAVs in 2006.  This external need was slated to be replaced by the U.K.’s own UAV, the Watchkeeper.  
In July 2002, the Ministry of Defence added £50 million to move its service date forward by two years 
(to 2005) (U.K. Parliament Defence Committee, 2003, pp. para 109, p. 140).  Beset with delays, the 
Watchkeeper entered limited service in 2011.   
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were watched.  Those that were in company command positions provided perspectives of 
those being watched.  Those who served in battalion and higher staff positions provided 
perspectives of those doing the watching.  Many of the officers that served multiple 
deployments provided a perspective on the gradual increase of drones, and also often 
provided the perspective of both watcher and watched.  The costs and benefits for these two 
broadly defined groups differed considerably. 
 
Benefits of drones 
For those watching, drones were thought to provide a large tactical advantage over the 
enemy.  Officers spoke of how drones allowed them to react in greater speed (U.S.-18), 
increasing situational awareness (U.K.-14), “add*ing+ significant tactical value” to 
subordinates (U.K.-29), all while reducing the costs of knowing what subordinates were doing 
(U.S.-17).  
“*Drones provide+ a very useful way of watching what was going on, on the 
ground…If something happened we were able to react quicker *when 
watching a UAV+” (U.K.-19). 
 
Being able to watch the feed seemed directly correlated to whether drones were perceived 
in a positive light.  U.S. Army officers that had access to the feed described drones in positive 
terms running from mild praise “nice to have” (U.S.-15), to glowing praise, ”invaluable 
clearly…the idea behind them is proven and sound” (U.S.-01), “an awesome asset” (U.S.-06).  
Some British Army officers noted the influence of UAVs on operations: “Markedly” (U.K.-25), 
“Fantastic. A real battle winner” (U.K.-7).   
 
Drones allowed superiors a new perspective of subordinate activity.  Officers of both armies 
reported the real-time images from drones were broadly accessible, from large plasma 
screens mounted in command posts (U.S.-11) (“Pretty much everyone that could get into the 
TOC [tactical operations centre+ was watching it…There were probably about routinely forty 
people in there” (U.K.-7)), to small windows that could be pulled up on personal computers 
(U.K.-30).  The drone feeds could be “watched back in the U.K.” (U.K.-14) and “the Pentagon” 
(U.K.-31).  Observed officers who could also see the feeds and control the drones were more 
likely to see drones as positive (U.S.-01; U.S.-03; U.S.-06; U.S.-09).   
 
Costs of drones 
Overwhelmingly, both U.S. and British officers that were watched spoke of the costs, and 
they did so with much more passion and verve than when they spoke of trackers.  Officers 
that could not watch the feeds, but knew superiors could, used derisive terms for drone 
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technology, “Kill TV” (U.K.-22; U.S.-01), “military pornography” (U.K.-7), “field grade54 TV” 
(U.S.-21) and “voyeurism” (U.S.-02).  When the feed was retained at a higher headquarters 
and not pushed to the unit on the ground, drones were generally resented (U.S.-05; U.S.-15; 
U.S.-20) 
“[His superior] was monitoring everything on the video feed, and so basically 
controlling him. And what made my buddy really mad was that he had 
requested UAV support prior to the mission so that they could look at the 
target and [his superior] denied it” (U.S.-11).   
 
Monitored subordinates are seen to more closely conform to the superior’s standards yet 
also be second guessed in their actions (Aiello, 1993).  With one exception (U.K.-25), officers 
of both armies resented being watched and second guessed by distant officers:  
“It isn’t good seeing the general staff trying to fight a war through TV screen” 
(U.K.-28). 
 
“It got to where [superiors] didn’t believe us.  [Superiors] saw it from a UAV 
at 3000 feet, sitting back in the FOB…I know better than…a view from 3000 
feet…the [1UP] had a hard time believing us because of what they had seen 
on the UAV” (U.S.-21).   
 
“*When+ we got back in, the [2UP] spoke to the [1UP] and said, ‘Hm. I noticed 
that some of your troops weren't taking up some decent fire positions.’...I 
think it engenders a bit of them and us. Those who are out there are putting 
their asses in the wind.  I didn't appreciate [superiors] watching Kill TV” (U.K.-
7). 
 
“[1UP] began telling him where to assault, where to go…He found it insane to 
go in and assault right close to that target right after they had already been 
in there just because [1UP] saw something on the UAV feed” (U.S.-11).  
 
Unlike trackers, which seemed to reduce information requests from superiors, watched 
officers noted that the presence of drones increased questions from above:  
“In the past as long as I was clearing the objective, that was all I would report 
up.  [Now] if [superiors] saw us slow down [on the drone feed] that would 
trigger questions from higher” (U.S.-21). 
 
“*T+he monitoring of the UAV feed led to a desire to get information as 
quickly as possible… what you had was a lot of people at different levels busy 
responding to a request that came from something that someone saw on the 
video feed instead of being able to do their job” (U.S.-11). 
 
Subordinate officers saw in superiors an “immaturity of experience” (U.K.-7) with the use of 
drones contributing to this increased control “they don't use them enough in training to kind 
of fully explore to get the most out of it” (U.S.-06).   
                                                          
54
 ‘Field grade’ refers to officers of the rank of major and lieutenant colonel, mid-level officers and 
usually the direct superiors to the interviewed officers. 
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Summary 
Drones that allowed superiors to know what their subordinates were doing were seen as 
much more disruptive than trackers.  Drones do not simply transmit information known to 
subordinates.  By providing a different perspective, these technologies provided superiors 
information unknown to subordinates, partially reversing information asymmetry.  Drones 
present huge temptations for superiors to control and direct subordinate activities.  
However, there did seem to be a gradual learning over time; more drones do not necessarily 
correlate directly to more nanomanagement.  Two officers, one U.S. and one British, with 
extensive UAV support on a second deployment and little to no access to drones on the first 
captured how the costs and benefits of drones changed over time: 
 
“In the first deployment *2004+, there was no UAV capability.  All of the 
situations that developed at that stage were really by voice with the inherent 
sort of interpretation and misinterpretation of the situation” 
 
“During the *second+ tour, a number of additional UAV systems came 
online…such that we had twenty-four hour coverage day and night…in the 
brigade headquarters fed onto several screens…we had more situational 
awareness than the commanders on the ground…We were able to see a lot 
more from a bird's eye view to actually give [the on ground commander] 
tactical information that helped him go about his business as the brigade 
headquarters saw it.  Which seems to be strange, but at the same time was 
absolutely the right thing to do…We were able to see in the brigade 
headquarters a lot more of the enemy's dispositions and his firing positions, 
and we could assess what his intent was a lot better than the radio traffic 
suggested that the tactical commander on the ground was able to 
achieve…we exerted almost a tactical control over that situation…from 
twenty kilometres *away+” (U.K.-29). 
 
“We had very little UAV support in 2003 and 2004.  The asset stayed at the 
brigade…the company never got the direct feed…the [brigade] didn't know 
how to use it…we used to call it Field Grade TV.  The brigade commander on 
down would be watching a fire team move around and all throwing down 
their two cents…what the squad needed became secondary to what those 
watching wanted to know.  It became a hindrance more than a help” 
 
“In 2003 *drones were+ still new…I just think that now everyone has heard 
the horror stories of the general controlling the fire fight.  They don't want to 
be that guy anymore.  They are a lot more patient…The first couple times I 
had direct UAV feed I was very inquisitive and micromanaging.  As I got used 
to it I realized that stuff happens”. 
 
“*On the second deployment (2007-2008)] I had [UAV feed] down at the 
company level…We had direct line communications with the UAV pilots.  We 
had control and could tell them what sort of shot we needed.  We could push 
it down…Everyone now understands the dangers associated with UAVs…The 
guys in the CP [command post] finally understood how confusing it is on the 
ground. Battalion and brigade would watch it but were very hands off.  There 
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was not any second guessing or questioning.  As an army we are more 
mature with working with those assets.  Everyone has seen a UAV feed and 
90% have been on the ground.  As an army matured the technology 
matured” (U.S.-21).   
 
5.3.3 Long screwdrivers  
 
A long screwdriver is a tool that allows a superior to request increasing quantity and quality 
of information at greater speed, and to direct action at a distance and speed previously 
impossible.  During the period of study, a suite of tools increasingly connected the highest 
command to the lowest levels.  These tools could be relatively cheap and simple adaptations 
of civilian technology (e.g. the expansion of cell phone networks, shared drives and video 
conferencing) or incredibly complex and expensive (e.g. secure satellite communication 
systems, secure data infrastructure).  Whether cheap or expensive, simple or complex, 
between 2003 and 2008 in both armies the amount of connectivity between highest superior 
and the lowest subordinate exploded (Farrell, 2008).   
 
For example, in Iraq the U.S. Army fielded the Command Post of the Future (CPOF), an 
“executive level decision support system” that consists of thousands of networked terminals 
each with no less than three monitors (General Dynamics, 2008).  This technology 
incorporates tracking and communication functions of FBCB2, allows further connectivity 
through secure voice, chat and email functions; and includes a state-of-the-art collaborative 
planning function.  Systems such as CPOF were mere prototypes at the outset of the Iraq 
war; bandwidth did not exist to support such as system.  By 2008, as bandwidth expanded, 
over 1,200 of these systems were manned constantly in headquarters ranging from battalion 
to corps (General Dynamics, 2008).   Figure 5.6 shows the three monitor CPOF system in use. 
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Figure 5.6  The Command Post of the Future55  
 
The increase of communication and contacts between superiors and subordinates proved 
difficult to precisely quantify.  Therefore during the interviews, I asked officers to 
characterize the amount of time, by medium, spent communicating with superiors and 
subordinates.   
 
Officers that deployed in the first years of the study (2003-2004) often said they did not have 
access to email, and noted a lack of available technology.  They communicated with superiors 
in medium and method as subordinates had for centuries—face-to-face and hand written 
orders (U.K.-5; U.K.-19; U.K.-29; U.S.-10):   
“It was all verbal orders…Our e-mail system didn't work...in the summer, the 
computer system would not work in the mid-day” (U.K.-5).   
 
“We had two computers in the battalion…pretty amazing to think that it was 
2003 and we had two official army-issued computers” (U.K.-9). 
 
“[We] used a large amount of pen and paper…It was beneficial in some ways, 
so it made things simpler” (U.K.-12).   
 
“There was no e-mail system that was usable at that time *in 2004+” (U.K.-
29). 
 
“[On the first deployment] comms with higher was almost non-existent” 
(U.S.-13).  
 
When asked, a few officers reported that information demands stayed constant (U.S.-01) 
(U.K.-25; U.K.-27; U.S.-05):   
                                                          
55
 Source (A. Walker, 2009). 
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“I would say *information requirements+ stayed constant throughout. After 
getting over the initial shock of arriving in country and figuring out what 
everybody wanted, it stayed pretty constant” (U.S.-17). 
 
Yet the vast majority (47/52) reported increased quantity of information demands “way up” 
(U.S.-08), “absolutely gone up” (U.S.-09), “The information demands have gone up 
exponentially” (U.S.-21). 
“*On the first deployment+ you don't have to provide as much information. 
When things were that fluid and that busy, and the information systems 
weren't there…the only thing you can really do is pass up the most crucial 
information. *On the second deployment+ when we were…all plugged into 
computers in offices…the amount of information that's demanded…increases 
quite a lot” (U.K.-12). 
 
Officers that deployed in the later years of the study (2005-2008) remarked on the amount of 
time spent communicating with superiors and subordinates: “All day…I was probably in front 
of a computer for fourteen hours if I wasn't doing PT *physical training+ or eating” (U.S.-11), 
“eight to nine hours a day” (U.K.-19), “three to five hours at least just managing the e-mail 
traffic” (U.S.-07).  The change was further highlighted by those officers with multiple 
deployments: 
“By the time I got back there for my second deployment, what didn’t we 
have?...We had the ability to send files and push data through the satellite.  
We were connected and it was required that we had four ways to 
communicate both through data and voice” (U.S.-18).  
 
“Second time was a bit more formal…a lot more e-mail especially upwards” 
(U.K.-12).   
 
“[On the second tour] it was almost like a completely different army...it was 
not anything like I had done before in terms of [command and control] and in 
terms of the technology that was then there to support it” (U.K.-14). 
 
“On the second tour…I think just the ability to speak and speak securely and 
see what was going on…to a level of precision that we just couldn't have 
done before *had a+ profound, huge impact” (U.K.-29).   
 
While both groups of officers noted increases, British Army officers observed the stark 
difference between the amounts of technology fielded by the U.S. versus the British Army:  
“Compared to the U.S., the U.K. is in the Dark Ages…The problem we have as 
Brits is that we don't have technology that lets us talk to each other.  We 
have one computer here and there.  The Brits’ problem is money” (U.K.-1).   
 
“We were lagging something like twenty, perhaps thirty years behind [the 
U.S.+” (U.K.-29).   
 
“My experience in American headquarters was they were…given much 
higher information flow...So initially the British would produce reports 
somewhere a third or a quarter size of a U.S. report. But the U.K. 
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headquarters would start to get into a routine…about wanting more 
information” (U.K.-24).   
 
Benefits of long screwdrivers 
Officers in superior roles noted long screwdriver technologies increased their control of 
subordinates (U.S.-20), allowing superiors to react faster (U.S.-08), and cut down on 
face-to-face meetings (U.K.-19; U.K.-24; U.S.-07; U.S.-08; U.S.-20): 
“I have found *more long screwdriver technology+ has helped…it provides 
more information and allows you to make a more informed decision” (U.K.-
28).  
 
Technology that did not exist during the invasion, were later thought to be mission critical.  
Yet even those that lauded the benefits identified the potential costs: 
“Iraq would not work without electronic communications. The distances are 
too great; the amount of information being thrown around is too great for it 
just to be done in the old way. Does that make it better then? It certainly 
makes it faster. It certainly makes critical information that's passed around 
much quicker and much more all-informed. But information generates 
information, and it's very difficult now to get the critical pieces of 
information identified in amongst so much data…a needle in a haystack if 
you're not careful” (U.K.-31). 
 
Costs of long screwdrivers 
Officers in both armies noted that as more information could be demanded, this allowed 
superiors greater control, at the cost to subordinate autonomy: 
“*During the invasion+…I had very little ability to exert any command 
influence over [my subordinates] once they deployed. On the second tour, 
with data connectivity almost accepted as part of life… *I had] the ability to 
exert long screwdriver influence over a lot more that was going on.  I was 
certainly a lot more able to do that, and therefore felt probably a lot more 
inclined to do so frankly” (U.K.-29). 
 
“If something happened…everyone would automatically know *through long 
screwdrivers+ that something had happened…we lost a little bit of our own 
freedom in that situation” (U.K.-2).   
 
“There was a bit of long handled screwdriver going on…it was pretty locked 
down” (U.K.-14).   
 
Others noted how long screwdrivers that reduced the amount of face-to-face time 
produced sub-optimal outcomes: 
“A lot of the stuff that we did was very old-school, and I liked it that 
way…Too much electronics stuff added more work...you have to sit down at 
this computer and type it out, where if you just walked up to somebody and 
say it face-to-face it's that much easier” (U.S.-10). 
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“One of the *generals+ had what we called a long screwdriver.  We can't have 
a one star with a long screwdriver in his hands.  It goes completely against 
mission command” (U.K.-1). 
 
Where trackers were seen as generally reducing costs and a drone’s cost depended on 
whether the respondent was the watcher or the one being watched, long screwdrivers were 
almost universally seen as costly.  Officers of both armies noted the steady increase of 
reporting requirements, detail and time demands:   
“We could do something more productive” (U.K.-16).   
 
“*Superiors+ were constantly asking you for information…there is a big cost 
to that” (U.S.-09) 
 
“All this reporting is wasting energy” (U.S.-12). 
 
“[Increased reporting] ate into my planning time” (U.S.-20).   
 
The increasing amount of time needed to satisfy the quantity, quality and speed of superior’s 
information requests produced transaction costs, especially the opportunity costs of other 
activities sacrificed in order to meet information demands.  Officers recognized that 
ultimately action was often the cost of reporting more information at greater speeds:  
“You can either report or do, and all too often we waste time reporting 
instead of doing” (U.S.-12). 
 
“After we got a task, we would get tons of questions *from 2UP+, ‘Have you 
done it yet?’  Well if you stop asking me, maybe I could” (U.K.-1).  
  
“If they’re taking a phone call from *1UP], they're not able to monitor [their 
subordinates+…taking them away from the job that they were supposed to 
do at that exact moment in time...just to feed the beast above them that was 
demanding information” (U.S.-11). 
 
Like trackers and drones, mid-level officers did refer to a gradual learning and development 
of a logic of appropriate use.  As templates, times of meetings, formats of reports were 
established, costs began to stabilize, but a dependency on these long screwdriver 
technologies increased:   
“Once I got into the swing of what [superiors] wanted, it was okay. I got a 
template...I would be printing out the PowerPoint slides and handing them 
into my [subordinates] and going okay, here's the order…So people became 
very dependent on computers and PowerPoint...It just seemed like a giant 
mass of computers. Everybody was just sending e-mails everywhere…*but+ if 
one computer went down, offices shut down. So if you lost your [secure 
internet], forget it. I mean I'm not even going to come into work today. 
Everybody became so reliant on the computers” (U.S.-10). 
 
Costs of increased quantity of information demanded 
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Both U.S. and U.K. officers spoke of the requirement to provide ever more reports to 
superiors to “feed the beast” (U.K.-8; U.S.-02; U.S.-15) or “feed the monster” (U.S.-21):   
“When you open a pipe particularly from higher headquarters it expects 
more from you at that point” (U.S.-15).   
 
“It's a natural tendency for my superiors…to want as much information…to 
have an insatiable appetite” (U.S.-07).  
 
“I think sometimes *increased information] may create more 
questions…which kind of can double the work a little bit because now 
[superiors] have another question, and they think you should give them 
another piece of information” (U.S.-03). 
 
“*With technology+ we just have to know when enough is enough” (U.S.-06). 
 
Officers reported that too much information was often the result of long screwdrivers:  
“[T]here is a by-product of having too much information.  It isn't really 
necessary for all decisions.  It has created an atmosphere of demanding 
information over knowledge”  (U.S.-09). 
 
“I think information does not equal intelligence. I think it gets to a point 
where there's too much information and not all of that can be processed. I 
don't think [superiors] need to know every time a bullet is fired by every 
individual soldier. That's what you have subordinate leaders for” (U.S.-06). 
 
As mid-level officers were expected to respond to information demands from multiple levels 
of command, both U.S. and British officers reported requests became redundant (U.K.-12), 
with superiors seeking information on “*S+illy things” (U.K.-5), “*T+rivial issues” (U.K.-18), 
“that really have nothing to do with war fighting” (U.S.-06; U.S.-07),  
“More requirements came with better tech and I wouldn't say it was 
pertinent info” (U.S.-20).   
 
“[I had to deal with] the random requests you would get from [superiors] 
asking you how many left-handed squash players you've got” (U.K.-19). 
 
“There was a tendency...for fairly senior-level officers to want to know real 
detail…For example, when we went out…how many lunch meals we would 
take” (U.K.-15). 
 
“Sometimes *the commander+ could get into real detail. Where’s this specific 
convoy? You know, convoy 101?” (U.S.-14).   
 
“It is ridiculous.  People would ask, ‘Why can't you answer how many guys 
are from the state of Indiana?’” (U.S.-21). 
 
“We are getting to information overload…We have to get a hard look at 
these systems.  Who will use the information?  Who needs it?  At some point 
we have to quit asking stupid ass questions like 'What if a meteor comes 
down?'” (U.S.-21). 
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While superiors requesting information that subordinates perceive as irrelevant surely 
pre-dates the adoption of long screwdriver technologies, these technologies provide more 
opportunity for such requests.  Superiors will request more information when they can 
request more information (Storr, 2002; James Wilson, 2000): 
“[Superiors requested more information] because we can. There's an 
opportunity to do it, therefore there is a knee-jerk reaction to do that. 
There's not necessarily the judgement taken whether the information 
required is absolutely vital, or whether you can get it from somewhere else" 
(U.K.-12). 
 
“[Superiors requested more information] because the information was out 
there” (U.S.-17).  
 
“It's so easy to push the send button and think afterwards [instead of] do the 
thinking first, and then action” (U.K.-31).  
 
Costs of increased quality of information demanded 
As long screwdriver technologies increased the amount of data that could be transmitted 
between subordinate and superior, reports also grew in length (U.K.-23) and the time needed 
to complete expanded, sometimes requiring “days” (U.K.-18; U.K.-19): 
“[to complete required reports I worked] 48 hours straight…it was way too 
much information” (U.S.-20).   
 
“The requirements [for after action reports] grew.  First a Word document, 
then PowerPoint, then pictures, then tables…I wonder where and when it 
will stop...We are fast coming to a human limit to how much we can do” 
(U.K.-12). 
 
“We used to conduct battalion level missions on one page documents…Now, 
I need to do an eight page order for a company level operation…Now it is 
who can produce the biggest, baddest, quickest, most thorough CONOP 
[concept of the operation].56  CONOPS are no longer concepts, they are full 
blown” (U.S.-21).   
 
Officers described orders growing to be “thicker than the D-Day landing report” (U.K.-31) and 
elaborate PowerPoint presentations (U.S.-10) of “about a hundred slides” (U.S.-14).  One 
officer captured how the demand for quality of information increased between and within 
deployments: 
“In the beginning…the only thing we had to do was a daily, one page SITREP 
[situation report that stated] last 24 [hours], next 24, any planned ops...[We 
had] zero requirements for CONOPs the first time.  The second deployment 
started out with a six page CONOP, then it went to a 22 page…It got very 
difficult…It is the same as if you are carrying a ruck sack.  If you make the 
ruck sack bigger, you put more things in it.  As we made the 
                                                          
56
 A CONOP is a written summary of an operation. 
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[communications] system better, the [information] requirements increase” 
(U.S.-20). 
 
An officer with five deployments noted on his last deployment hints of push back, a trend to 
capture information on one page for quicker processing:   
“The information in a CONOP grew almost cumbersome.  That was probably 
a result of all the information we had access to.  I am not sure we needed to 
include all of it in a CONOP up to higher.  [On the last deployment] they 
started to trim the fat on those products…it used to be three pages; then we 
put it all on one” (U.S.-18). 
 
Costs of increased speed of information demand 
While superiors were requesting increasing quantity and quality of information, numerous 
officers reported the information was demanded in increasing speed (U.K.-24) such that 
“there was an incredible pressure to get reports in” (U.S.-15).  Reports were demanded “as 
soon as possible” (U.S.-12), “before the unit is even back” (U.S.-11), resulting in “no edit 
process to the reports anymore” (U.S.-03). 
“In 2004 it was a lot more relaxed environment because there wasn't *sic+ all 
these systems to push information up higher…I could have 24 or 48 hours to 
get [a report] done and get it up.  On the second [deployment] it was just like 
four or six hours” (U.S.-03). 
 
“With this tech proliferation you can no longer say ‘I have to get back to 
you’” (U.S.-21).  
 
“No the last thing you want is the [2UP] commander knocking on the [1UP] 
commander's door saying sorry to hear that you've lost a soldier tonight, and 
[have 1UP] say ‘come again?’  So that could obviously never be allowed to 
happen” (U.K.-29). 
 
“And in my readings of the counterinsurgency doctrine, some of the tenets 
are reduce reporting to a minimum.  [We] absolutely do not believe in that 
concept. *We+ want instantaneous knowledge of everything” (U.S.-12).   
 
During operations, the pressure to report information was constant:   
“And while the comms weren’t always reliable, the pressure from above was.  
Every pause, every security halt…‘Give us a SITREP.  What did you see on the 
objective?’” (U.S.-18). 
 
“In fact my driver had to start walking with a radio on his back…because I 
would get harangued so much from higher for constant feeds of 
information” (U.S.-10).   
 
When activity, casualties or major operations were occurring, the interest from superiors 
increased (U.S.-06):   
“When *superiors+ heard small arms fire on the radio, that's when higher 
really got on the radio” (U.S.-15). 
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“We would get ridiculous questions while the ops were going on. [After a 
soldier was shot superiors] wanted to know immediately what shoulder he 
was hit on, a minute after he was shot.  Who the fuck cares which shoulder 
he was hit on?”  (U.S.-21). 
 
Officers recognized that when the time frame in which information was demanded 
decreased, accuracy was often sacrificed:  
“The first reports were always wrong” (U.K.-28). 
 
“*2UP+ was more concerned about us reporting to them in a timely manner 
than what we actually reported” (U.S.-19).   
 
“Because the first report is never correct…There's no longer an opportunity 
to call back and say really? Is that what you saw? Really? Because the second 
somebody *reports+…everybody is looking” (U.S.-03). 
 
“[Superiors] know they're going to get hounded by the next higher 
commander for the information now...I mean from the President on down, 
they have got to accept delay” (U.S.-12). 
 
Summary 
“Quite often there was a bit of a long handled screwdriver effect” (U.K.-18). 
 
Long screwdrivers are tools that allow a superior to request increasing quantity and quality of 
information at greater speed, and to direct action at a distance and speed previously 
impossible.  Long screwdrivers will likely be accepted by superiors, as they reduce transaction 
costs while increasing control.  As anticipated, subordinates resisted long screwdrivers as 
they increased their transaction costs while reducing their autonomy.  Combined with 
trackers and drones, long screwdrivers can greatly reduce subordinate autonomy. 
 
After adoption of trackers and drones, organizations often reverted to previous practices.  
Not so with long screwdrivers.  The most powerful disruptions create a qualitative change in 
practices, where new permanent practices persist and are normalized.  One U.S. officer’s 
words captured the permanent changes that long screwdriver technologies brought: 
“[In 2003] when we first got there, there was [sic] no computers or anything.  
Only the headquarters had computers that were operational, however we 
didn't. We didn't even have electricity at first. So they were demanding 
copies of my orders and copies of my PowerPoint slides.  I would say I don't 
have those, they don't exist”  
 
“I got the impression that *superiors+ were trying to push electricity and 
Internet to us not necessarily for ease of manoeuvre or because we could 
more easily do our operations…But it was more so they could get something 
that they could send higher”  
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“[Technology] definitely slowed things down. We were used to drawing our 
graphics on the side-skirt of a tank in chalk and going okay…this is where 
we’re going.  Then it turned into I would get from higher these PowerPoint 
slides that need to be in this font, they need to be in this format. And I'm 
like, hey, I'm actually going out on the ground and kicking a door in. I really 
don't care if it's in eleven Courier New font because that's what [3UP] was 
requesting” (U.S.-10). 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that modern technology has dramatically altered traditional forms of 
ex post control.  Superiors may now use sub-categories of police patrols—trackers, drones, 
and long screwdrivers—that decrease the superior’s transaction costs of monitoring.  These 
sub-categories of ex post control fundamentally alter the transaction costs for both superiors 
and subordinates, moving towards greater superior control and less subordinate autonomy.  
An effect of nanomanagement is that it makes police patrols more preferable in relation to 
fire alarms.  Table 5.1 assesses these costs and benefits. 
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 Effect on 
superior’s 
transaction costs 
Effect on 
superior’s 
control 
Effect on 
subordinate’s 
transaction costs 
Effect on 
subordinate’s 
autonomy 
Trackers 
a tool that 
automatically 
communicates 
information about 
subordinates to 
superiors, at little 
to no cost to the 
subordinate 
 
Decreases  
Superiors 
automatically know 
subordinate’s 
location 
 
 
Increases 
Increases ability 
to detect 
subordinate 
shirking 
Decreases 
No longer must 
report their location 
 
Little to no cost 
Decreases 
Subordinate’s 
location known to 
superiors 
 
Ability to shirk 
reduced 
Drones  
a tool that enables 
a superior to 
actively monitor 
and record a 
subordinate’s 
actions 
Decreases 
Superiors now know 
what subordinates 
are currently doing 
 
 
Increases 
Reverse or reduce 
information 
asymmetry   
 
Superiors exert 
tighter control 
 
Increased ability 
to detect shirking 
 
Decreases 
Subordinates no 
longer must report 
what they are doing   
Decreases 
Reversed 
information 
asymmetry possible  
 
Activity now known 
to superiors 
 
Reduced ability to 
shirk 
 
Long 
screwdrivers 
a tool that allows 
a superior to 
request increasing 
quantity and 
quality of 
information at 
greater speed, and 
to direct action at 
a distance and 
speed previously 
impossible 
Decreases 
Superiors now 
request previously 
unavailable 
information at 
greater quantities, 
at greater qualities, 
at greater speed   
 
Some increased 
data processing 
costs 
 
 
Increases 
Increased 
information 
allows superiors 
to know whether 
tasks are being 
completed to 
standard 
 
Increases their 
ability to detect 
shirking 
 
Increases 
Must now report in 
greater detail, at 
greater speeds   
 
Time spent 
answering these 
increasing demands 
is time spent away 
from assigned task 
Decreases 
Reports reduce 
the discretionary 
space, autonomy  
 
Table 5.1  Nanomanagement with trackers, drones and long screwdrivers 
Each of these sub-categories increase superior control, clarifying where their subordinates 
currently are, what their subordinates are currently doing and whether their subordinates 
are accomplishing the delegated task to the standard prescribed.  Each of these 
sub-categories also decrease the transaction costs of superiors, reducing the cost of 
obtaining information and in some cases allowing superiors to obtain previously 
unobtainable information.  With greater control at less cost, superiors will purchase, field and 
employ these technologies.  Cost should be considered a cause of nanomanagement. 
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As these tools decrease a superior’s transaction costs, they may shift a superior’s preference 
away from ex ante controls toward ex post control.  Why spend so much in training, vetting 
and screening subordinates when trackers allow a superior to know where their subordinates 
are and drones allow them to see what their subordinates are doing?  Why spend time 
writing detailed orders, when long screwdrivers allow a superior to tweak and adjust their 
subordinates on the fly?  As Chapter 4 discussed, this effect of nanomanagement—by making 
ex post controls more preferable than ex ante controls—may be a threat to professionals. 
 
Nanomanagement makes police patrols more preferable in relation to fire alarms.  The 
traditional choice between police patrols and fire alarms largely focuses on the influence on 
the superior’s transaction costs.  For the superior, trackers, drones and long screwdrivers can 
be seen as modern police patrols, where the superior expends resources in monitoring, yet 
each pose less transaction costs for the superior than traditional police patrols.  Each offer 
the superior access to heretofore unavailable information, at greater distance, in real-time, 
at greater detail.   
 
For the subordinate, trackers and drones also may be net beneficial; yet long screwdrivers 
increased their transaction costs.  Subordinates may resist the implementation of long 
screwdrivers, but tolerate trackers and drones from a costs calculation.  However, all three 
sub-categories decrease the autonomy that subordinates cherish.  The subordinate feels the 
effects on lost autonomy simply as a result of these tools existing, regardless of whether they 
are actually monitored at that moment.  As subordinates know that their actions can be 
tracked, know that drones can relay information, their autonomy is reduced.  
 
I did not find a difference between the U.S. and British armies in the use of these tools.  Once 
superiors of either army had access to these tools and had the possibility of nanomanaging, 
they nanomanaged.   Despite differences in beliefs of autonomy (Chapter 3), specifically the 
emphasis on mission command, British officers reported these tools were employed by their 
superiors, once available, to the same and sometimes to a greater degree than U.S. officers.  
Despite being members of a profession, and by extension assumed to be trusted, these tools 
allowed superiors to track, monitor and control subordinate behaviour. 
 
Does the increasing adoption of these tools predict ever more exacting and increasing 
control of subordinates by superiors? The evidence suggests not.  Instead, technology 
adoption seems to go through an evolution.  When initially fielded and adopted, without 
training or procedures, these tools seem to be employed by superiors to exert greater 
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control at the expense of subordinate autonomy.  Yet as superiors spent more time using 
these tools, recognizing their benefits but also their costs, they learned to not always 
nanomanage and always exert tighter control.   
 
Each of these technologies, on their own, can be seen in organizations of the past.  Yet it is 
widespread adoption and integrative power of these technologies that produces profound 
effects on superior-subordinate relationships today.  While superiors are empowered and 
subordinates disempowered are the effects of these shifts of power felt the same throughout 
an organization?  Having discussed ex post and ex ante controls, the next chapter explores 
how these technologies influence organizational structures and actors at various positions in 
the hierarchy. 
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 Organizational structure CHAPTER 6
The previous chapters’ discussion of ex ante and ex post controls assessed how superiors 
seek to control subordinates irrespective of their position within an organization’s 
hierarchical structure.  Yet not all superior-subordinate relationships are the same.  This 
chapter examines how nanomanagement influences superiors and subordinates depending 
on where they sit within an organization’s hierarchy.   
In the last century, organizations increasingly formed larger, more hierarchical forms.  These 
organizational forms enable hierarchical control: a rigid and clear path for information to 
flow from the bottom to the top of an organization; limits the number of subordinates a 
superior may control; and establishes a clear and accountable chain of command (Weber, et 
al., 1947).  An actor’s position within the organizational structure—from upper-level 
executives, to mid-level managers and low-level operators—conditions an actor’s roles, 
incentives, responsibilities and interactions with superiors and subordinates (James Wilson, 
2000).    
As technologies were introduced that allowed the most senior executives to control the most 
junior operators, hierarchical control was disrupted.  Many organizations abandoned their 
rigid hierarchies for other organizational forms that allow information to flow freely, spans of 
control to expand, and command chains to blur.  Further, these technologies allow a 
flattening of traditional hierarchies by eliminating the need for entire levels of mid-level 
managers (Heclo, 1978; Thorelli, 1986).   
Yet not all organizations that adopt these new technologies adopt new organizational forms.  
In the past twenty years, the U.S. and British armies adopted information-age technologies 
while retaining their industrial-age hierarchies.  This chapter assesses the tension between 
adopting two year old technology within two hundred year old organizational structure.  
When hierarchical structure is retained yet technologies that undermine hierarchies are 
adopted, how are superior-subordinate relationships influenced?  What is the effect of 
nanomanagement on upper, mid and low-level actors? 
The ex post controls introduced in Chapter 5 increase superior control while decreasing 
subordinate autonomy.  As superior control increases, a superior’s options for action expand.  
Prior to the adoption of contemporary technologies, the superior’s options for action were 
largely limited to determining the degree of ex post monitoring (e.g. should they monitor 
their subordinates heavily, lightly or not at all?) while their subordinates could choose 
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between working and shirking.  Today’s technology allows superiors additional ex post 
control options: they may choose shifting, directing their attention at subordinate 
organizational levels; they may choose drifting, acting at subordinate organizational levels; 
and they may choose grifting, cheating the hierarchy by controlling actions at levels beneath 
their immediate subordinates.  In this chapter, I argue that superiors shifting, drifting, and 
grifting are effects of nanomanagement. 
Executives shifting and drifting reduce a manager’s autonomy.  Yet it is executive grifting that 
fundamentally alters a manager’s relationship to both superiors and subordinates.  This 
chapter proposes that technology allows for a new type of control of mid-level managers.  
Instead of seeking to control through selection, training and screening (ex ante) or through 
monitoring (ex post), nanomanagement enables what I term a control by exclusion (ex 
claudere).  When information technologies are adopted yet policy or tradition requires that 
mid-level managers be retained, executives may functionally eliminate these managers by 
communicating, monitoring and directing action at the operator level.  This retention yet 
exclusion, is another effect of nanomanagement on superior-subordinate relationships. 
 
For the operator under the direct observation and control of distant executives, they now 
suffer from the increased quantity, quality and speed of information demanded discussed in 
Chapter 5.  However, operators may also access a wealth of previously unavailable 
information and higher level guidance.  Where a traditional hierarchy allowed only one 
superior to direct an operator’s action, now an operator can receive input from multiple 
actors in the chain of command above them—their boss, their boss’s boss, their boss’s boss’s 
boss.  When these least experienced operators now access the same information that 
previously only managers and executives knew, does this create overload or empowerment?   
 
In assessing how nanomanagement influences superior-subordinate relationships, this 
chapter argues that influence depends on which superior-subordinate relationships, within a 
hierarchy, are being analysed.  Section 6.1 will explore organizational structure as a form of 
control, specifically hierarchical control characterized by structured information flow, limits 
to span of control and the establishment of a clear chain of command; this section will then 
explore how technology disrupts hierarchical control.  Next, Section 6.2 examines how 
nanomanagement influences the executive, manager and operator levels of the hierarchy.  A 
case study of the exodus of mid-level officers in the U.S. Army will be offered to explain what 
I term the cycle of nanomanagement.  Section 6.3 will then offer empirical evidence 
organized from the executive, manager and operator perspectives.  Section 6.4 will conclude. 
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6.1 Control by hierarchy 
 
This section establishes the theoretical literature surrounding control within hierarchies and 
how technology influences hierarchical control.  This thesis follows Simon in that 
understanding organizational change is not simply a function of looking at differences of 
organizational charts over time (1946).  Indeed, the organizational charts of armies have seen 
little structural change.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, both the U.S. and British 
armies were already highly bureaucratized, having modelled their organizations after the 
hierarchical French and Prussian armies of the nineteenth century.  With only slight 
experimentation (Bacevich, 1986; Heyman, 2009; J. M. House, 1985), through war, peace, 
new weapons and new threats, both armies’ hierarchical structure and manner of control 
endured.   
 
6.1.1 Hierarchies and control 
 
Hierarchies emerged to replace more traditional and inefficient organizational forms (e.g. a 
monarchical or centralized control where one actor (e.g. a king or a general) centralized all 
decision making)(Williamson, 1981).  As monarchical control was replaced, elected 
governments sought to structure their unelected institutions to be accountable (P. Feaver, 
2003).  Instead of the nepotism and favouritism of monarchs, hierarchies provided direct 
supervision, standard operating procedures, a clear chain of command and an “iron cage” of 
routine and efficiency to control actors (Weber, 1968; Weber, et al., 1947).  Each level of a 
hierarchy is granted different levels of responsibility and authority, corresponding to the 
problems sought to be solved, sui generis, at the various levels (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 67).  As 
this structure proved efficient, multiple types of organizations—from public to private 
sector—organized in these hierarchical forms.   Even professions, built on individual 
autonomy, increasingly organized into more hierarchical organizations.57 
                                                          
57
 In the last century, professional organizations underwent substantial change as they sought to adopt 
hierarchical structures.  Early twentieth century professional organizations were observed to operate 
in small groups, often limited by law to the size of their organization (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933; 
Parsons, 1951).  Yet Weber saw the organization of professions into hierarchical bureaucracies as 
imperative to standardize training, set doctrine, and impart knowledge (Weber, 1968).  As professions 
formed increasing large hierarchical organizations (law firms, medical practices, etc.), Hughes rightly 
claimed the “modern professional is an organization man” (1965b, p. 9). Carr-Saunders and Wilson 
warned that “there is a danger that large-scale organization will prove incompatible with [professional 
ideals+” (1933, p. 447).  As discussed in Chapter 4, professionals assumed autonomy merited by their 
specialized training (Burk, 2002).  As professions became more bureaucratized, and as hierarchies 
established superiors and a chain of command within a profession, professionals were “no longer as 
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For centuries, armies balanced the tension between superior control and subordinate 
autonomy through hierarchical control, providing order to the chaos of the battlefield.   
Three elements define hierarchical control in the U.S. Army: “unity of command, reasonable 
spans of control…and effective information distribution” (U.S. Department of the Army, 
2003, pp. 5-23).  Therefore the discussion focuses on the influence of technology on these 
three elements of hierarchical control: information flow, span of control, and unity of 
command. 
 
Information flow 
In hierarchies, individuals communicate primarily with their immediate superiors and 
subordinates.  This structured information flow ensures an actor receives guidance from a 
single superior and then provides guidance to their immediate subordinates (Weber, et al., 
1947).  This limits the degree to which the top levels of a hierarchy understand what is 
occurring at two to three levels beneath them.  In hierarchies, if superiors want to know 
activities occurring two levels below, they must first ask their immediate subordinates, who 
will then ask their subordinates.  Each request is essentially a form of ex post monitoring, 
discussed in Chapter 5, with the inherent problems of information asymmetries, hidden 
action and hidden information.  So while hierarchies formalize and structure information 
flow, they also contribute to the information asymmetry between superiors and 
subordinates (Arrow, 1991).   
 
Why would an organization be structured with inherent information asymmetry?  Hierarchies 
seek to ensure the right information is provided to the right level of organization at the right 
time such that decisions can be made by those with the resources to carry them out.  
Unstructured information flow adds to the complexity of decision making at all levels (Palme, 
1984; Schultze & Vandenbosch, 1998; Stanley & Deimel, 2005, p. 299; Williamson, 1973, p. 
317).  An unstructured information flow produces information overload, where information 
itself adds to the complexity facing not just executives, but actors throughout the hierarchy 
(Bawden & Robinson, 2009; Cordella, 2006, p. 200; A. Edmunds & Morris, 2000).58  Further, 
unstructured information flow slows decision making (Alberts, 2002, p. 57; C. Wilson, 2004b), 
                                                                                                                                                                       
free to follow the dictates of their individual judgments as in the past, though quite unlike other 
workers, their work is expected to involve the use of discretion on a daily basis” (Freidson, 1984, p. 1).  
Abbott sees that the increasing organization of professions could threatening professional work, “We 
have professionalism…because competing forms of institutionalization have not yet overwhelmed 
it…*professions+ may ultimately lose out to organizations” (1988, pp. 324-325). 
58
 Indeed, as junior members of an organization are often more familiar with network technology, 
social networking and the handheld devices that allow access to previously unavailable information, 
the negative effects of information overload are increasingly felt throughout the hierarchy (Allen & 
Shoard, 2005; Dean & Webb, 2011; A. Edmunds & Morris, 2000). 
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producing a “willingness to delay decisions in the expectation of better information” (Alberts, 
2002, p. 64) or attention fragmentation, distracting actors from the difficult strategic 
problems they are chartered to address (Drucker, 1967).   
 
Clausewitz identified that rigid information flow was essential for military organizations as 
“*t+he commander…finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information” 
(1976, p. Chapter VII).   Modern military scholars note that “more powerful sensors collect 
more chaff as well as more wheat” (Biddle, 2004, p. 64), and practitioners have noted that 
increased information flow has indeed overloaded commanders and slowed contemporary 
military operations (McMaster, 2008, p. 10).  The doctrine of both armies warns of 
information overload and discusses the need to prevent it by structuring information flow:  
“Neither humans nor systems can effectively accept any more than a certain 
amount of information. Beyond that point, more information only leads to 
information overload” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 1-11). 
 
“An effective headquarters should be adept at using information, rather than 
becoming swamped or driven by it, as an end in itself” (U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-24). 
 
Span of control 
A second characteristic of hierarchical control is limiting the span of control, or the number of 
subordinates that report to a superior and that the superior can or should supervise (Blau & 
Schoenherr, 1971; Ouchi & Dowling, 1974; Simon, 1946; Urwick, 1956).  Span of control 
directly influences the tension between superior control and subordinate autonomy.  The 
larger number of subordinates, the more autonomy each subordinate may have.  The fewer 
number of subordinates, the greater superiors can control each one, the less subordinate 
autonomy (Williamson, 1973).  Simon found “*a+dministrative efficiency is increased by 
limiting the span of control at any point in the hierarchy to a small number” (1946, p. 53).   
 
What is the ideal ‘small number’ for an appropriate span of control?  With scholars 
recommending spans ranging from one to six, the ideal number of subordinates depends on 
a variety of factors.59  First, geographical dispersion limits the span of control—if 
subordinates are widely dispersed, then supervisors will experience increased difficulty 
                                                          
59
 Citing limitations of the “average human brain”, the first to use the term discussed the ideal number 
of subordinates a superior could control, and found that it varied with higher levels supervising less 
and lower levels able to supervise more (Hamilton, 1921, pp. 229-230).  Later scholars sought to 
identify the optimum span of control recognizing how one additional subordinate exponentially 
increases the number of relationships and peer groups a supervisor must oversee, limiting effective 
span of control to no more than six immediate subordinates (Graicunas, 1937; Urwick, 1956; 
Woodward, 1965).   
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supervising them (Barkdull, 1963; Dale, 1952; Stieglitz, 1962).  Second, the nature of work 
and the capability of workers, where more experienced, trained and trusted subordinates 
may be granted greater autonomy, increases the span of control (Entwisle & Walton, 1961).  
Third, the capability of managers, where more skilled managers may supervise more 
subordinates, expands the span of control (Fisch, 1963; Janger, 1960).  Fourth, the diversity 
of tasks, where subordinates are all performing like tasks, supervision is eased and increases 
the span of control (Bell, 1967; Fisch, 1963; Urwick, 1956).   
 
The doctrine of both armies also discusses the optimal span of control and its 
relationship between superior control and subordinate autonomy:   
“Narrowing the span of control—that is, lessening the number of immediate 
subordinates—deepens the organization by adding layers of command. The 
more layers of command in an organization, the longer it takes for 
information to move up or down. Consequently, the organization becomes 
slower and less responsive. Conversely, an effort to increase tempo by 
eliminating echelons of command or “flattening” an organization 
necessitates widening the span of control. Commanders balance width and 
depth…The aim is to flatten the organization to the extent compatible with 
reasonable spans of control” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 5-25). 
 
British Army doctrine is more sanguine concerning span of control, but recognizes that spans 
may change dependent on conditions: 
“[Span of control is] the number of subordinate organisations given to one 
commander to command directly. A sensible span of command should not 
exceed about 5 subordinate elements, except for brief periods” (U.K. 
Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-22). 
 
Unity of command 
A third characteristic of hierarchical control is a clear unity of command or providing that 
decisions are made “through only one channel of authority” (Simon, 1946, pp. 54-55).  Unity 
of command orders guidance such that “an employee should receive orders from one 
superior only, and that there should be only one leader and one plan for a group of activities 
having the same objective” (Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 1970, p. 150).   Unity of command 
seeks to prevent inefficiency and establish a clear line of responsibility (Gulick, 1937, p. 9) 
where an actor is accountable for his tasks to one and only one superior (R. C. Davis, 1951).  
Where span of control focuses on the superior’s number of subordinates, unity of command 
focuses on the subordinate’s number of superiors.  Without unity of command, when a 
subordinate has more than one superior, they can use conflicting guidance and preferences 
of multiple superiors to expand their own discretionary space (McCubbins, et al., 1987).   
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Unity of command has long been advocated in a military setting.  Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
Maxims of War stated, “Nothing in war is as important as undivided command” (1862).  
Reflecting its lasting importance, unity of command is one of the U.S. Army’s nine principles 
of war, mandating a “single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces 
toward a common objective” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2008, pp. A-3).  Likewise, British 
Army doctrine states that unity of command requires that “each commander is accountable 
to only one superior” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-22).   
 
Information flow, span of control and unity of command are essential attributes of 
hierarchical control.  Hierarchical control provides order and structure to decision making, 
clarifying the roles and responsibilities at each level of an organization.  Hierarchical control 
is predictable and stable, yet few forces have been more disruptive to hierarchical control 
than the technologies introduced in the last 20 years. 
 
6.1.2 Technology and disruption of hierarchical control 
 
The adoption of information technology dramatically influenced hierarchical organizations of 
the twentieth century (Leavitt & Whisler, 1958; Malone, et al., 1987; Powell, 1990; 
Williamson, 1975) affecting hierarchical control and its structured information flow, span of 
control, and unity of command (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992; George & King, 1991; Leavitt & 
Whisler, 1958; Malone, et al., 1987; Robey, 1981).  As technology allowed information to be 
more easily shared, stored, transmitted and processed, new organizational structures were 
proposed to take advantage of these technologies (Heclo, 1978; Thorelli, 1986).  Instead of 
the stability of hierarchical control technology would allow “*t+he number of levels in the 
hierarchy is reduced…The span of control is reduced…The technology becomes part of the 
control structure” (Whisler, 1970, p. 68).  Where hierarchies sought to strictly manage 
information, new organizational forms were proposed to free information, potentially 
reducing transaction costs and facilitating greater communication throughout an 
organization (George P. Huber, 1990; Schein, 2010; Sproull & Kiesler, 1991).   
 
In the 1990s and 2000s, as the U.S. and British armies adopted technology (under the NCW 
and NEC initiatives discussed in Chapter 3) there was a broad debate on how information 
flow, span of control and unity of command would subsequently change these armies.  Some 
believed unity of command would be enhanced as a commander could more easily 
communicate his intent and mission orders (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998).  Others saw that 
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unity of command would erode, as multiple superiors could now provide guidance to a single 
subordinate (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997a, p. 45).   
 
While there was much debate on the effects of technology on superior-subordinate 
relationships, few thought the industrial-era, hierarchical military structure would endure.  
Believing that the beginning of the twenty-first century would herald “an organizational as 
well as a technological revolution” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997b, p. 5), scholars predicted both 
the U.S. Army (Alberts, 2002, p. 40; Boot, 2006; E. Cohen, 1996; Segal, 1993) and the British 
Army (Dandeker, 2000, p. 178) would transition from a traditional hierarchy to a more 
flattened or networked organizational structure (Macgregor, 1997, p. 88).  Yet after spending 
billions of dollars on new technologies, the U.S. and British armies’ hierarchical organizational 
forms persist. 
 
6.1.3 Summary 
 
Hierarchical control seeks to manage information flow, restrict spans of control and establish 
a clear unity of command.  Technology disrupts hierarchical control, leading many 
organizations to abandon and adapt their hierarchical organizational form.  While both the 
British and U.S. armies adopted network technologies they retained pre-information age 
structure and organization whereby “inserting new technology into old systems and 
organizations may create new inefficiencies” (N. C. Davis, 1997, p. 81).  The next section 
examines these new inefficiencies by analyzing how the roles of actors throughout a 
hierarchy change when nanomanagement is possible. 
 
6.2 Hierarchical roles and nanomanagement 
 
Nanomanagement does not merely influence superiors in one way and subordinates in 
another.  In the military, every soldier above the rank of private is both superior and 
subordinate with actors at all levels needing to overcome information asymmetries of 
subordinates while meeting the information demands of superiors.  Yet not every rank is 
influenced in the same way.  The influence of technology on an organization requires an 
assessment of how actors at various levels within an organization adapt and employ these 
new tools (Ciborra, 1993; Cordella, 2006, p. 198).  To explore the effects of nanomanagement 
within a traditional hierarchical structure, this thesis adopts Wilson’s (2000) typology of 
separating the hierarchy into levels of operators (low-level), managers (mid-level) and 
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executives (upper-level).  Technology that enables nanomanagement influences the role of 
executives, managers and operators in different ways.   
 
6.2.1 Executives: shifting, drifting and grifting  
 
The role of the executive is organizational maintenance (P. B. Clark & Wilson, 1961) or 
“assuring the necessary flow of resources to the organization” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 180).  
Executives in government constantly seek resources (Niskanen, 1971) and autonomy, to 
defend their organization’s turf from external actors seeking to encroach on their assigned 
tasks (James Wilson, 2000).60  Advocating for budgets, establishing a clear vision for the 
organization, communicating that vision, and controlling subordinates to accomplish that 
vision are the purview of the executive.   
 
Executives also delegate some tasks to their subordinates, the managers.  In most rational 
choice influenced models, once superiors choose to delegate a task, they are then limited to 
only one activity—to monitor or not to monitor (Arrow, 1991; Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985).  
Once subordinates receive a task, they may choose between working and shirking.  Where 
subordinates have a freedom of action, superiors are limited to only determining the degree 
of monitoring.   
 
Information technologies expand the options for executives to control managers.  Executives 
readily accept technology that advances their own self-interest and reinforces their position, 
while resisting technology that undermines it (James Wilson, 2000).  As executives control 
resources, how, when and to what degree an organization adopts technology will be largely 
dependent on whether the technology aligns with the executive’s desire for greater control.  
However, no longer may only the subordinate violate the delegation contract by shirking.  
With information technology adopted into the hierarchy, this thesis argues executives now 
possess options beyond simple delegation and monitoring.  Today, executives can be found 
shifting, drifting, and grifting. 
 
Shifting is focusing attention on subordinate levels.  Largely passive, increased information 
flow dramatically changes the amount of knowledge that an executive can know of 
subordinate activities (A. Roberts, 2006, pp. 112-114; Schein, 2010).   Shifting is beyond 
monitoring.  Shifting is the constant observing, in real-time, of subordinate activities.  When 
                                                          
60
 This is similar to a profession’s defence of autonomy over an area of abstract knowledge discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
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shifting, executives shirk their organizational maintenance tasks, and instead focus their 
attention towards observing action at the manager and operator levels.61   
 
Drifting is acting at subordinate levels.  Information technology tempts superiors to move 
away from the critical tasks of their level, to do more than observe subordinate actions but to 
perform those actions themselves (Hunt, 2003).  Drifting is enabled by modern forms of ex 
post control, such as drones, trackers and long handled screwdrivers (Chapter 5).  Like 
shifting, drifting comes at a cost to the superior-level tasks that are ignored when acting at 
the subordinate level.  Additionally, drifting comes at a more severe cost to the autonomy of 
subordinates.  Executives not only know more about what their subordinates are doing; with 
drifting they may take control of subordinate action.62   
 
Grifting is cheating the hierarchy by controlling actions at levels beneath immediate 
subordinates.  This hierarchical cheating by executives marginalizes managers.  Grifting 
depends on technology that expands the span of control of executives, and increases 
information flow allowing executives to direct, observe and monitor operators.  Further, this 
open line of communication allows operators to marginalize managers, now able to report 
directly to executives.  For example, a conservative manager may seek more time and 
resources before proceeding, claiming an operator is not ready or up to the task.  Through 
grifting, an executive may now directly communicate with an operator, determine the 
operator’s readiness, and then direct the operator to execute the mission, to the exclusion of 
the manager.63 
                                                          
61
 British Army doctrine warned that information technologies would allow actions that I define as 
shifting where “information may in *the+ future more easily distract commanders from their strategic 
and operational foci, further hindering their deep understanding of the situation” (U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, 2004b, p. para 404). 
62
 Drifting, as described here differs from coalitional or principal drift.  Principal or coalitional drift 
occurs when, after establishing an agency, the preferences of the principals change and modify.  In 
anticipation of this coalitional drift, principals will hard wire institutions such that future, drifting 
principals will be unable or unlikely to exert significant change (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1994; Horn & 
Shepsle, 1989; K. Shepsle, 1992; K. A. Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997). It more closely resembles 
bureaucratic drift, where policies drift from the original intention through independent action of 
bureaucrats (McCubbins, et al., 1987; O'Connell, 2006).  In our case, it is the independent action of 
superiors that allows drifting. 
63
 Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll, testifying before Parliament, outlined the potential for shifting, drifting 
and grifting: ”if, for example, there was a small operation going on somewhere and something was 
happening in that operation that might have a strategic impact, it may be possible in future (and it is 
to some extent possible now) for people at the strategic or grand strategic level to reach across the 
operational and tactical levels of command and make a decision and alter what is occurring there… 
[This does not mean] we get rid of the tactical and operational layers of command. There are still 
functions that these levels will have to carry out and the larger the operation the larger the burden on 
them because of the ability of somebody at the top of the tree to be able to see everything that is 
going on will obviously not be there regardless of how big the network is. This is one of the potential 
downsides of network-enabled capability; it allows ‘long screwdrivers’ to reach forward. What we 
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Shifting, drifting and grifting undermine hierarchical control.  They disrupt information flow, 
expand span of control and confuse unity of command.  These actions of superior control 
directly affect an organization’s ability to define roles into a set of tasks and responsibilities.  
This ambiguity of role leads to increased anxiety and can lead to less effective performance 
for both executives and the levels beneath them (Kahn, 1981).  While this section focuses on 
executive shifting, drifting and grifting, these actions are available to superiors throughout a 
hierarchy.  However, with control of resources and multiple levels of subordinates below 
them, one should expect to see these actions most clearly at the highest levels, thus the 
focus on executives. 
 
Modern technology increases the ability of superiors in different organizations to shift, drift 
and grift; yet executives in professions will be exceptionally prone to these activities.  First, in 
professions executives are experienced at the manager and operator level.  Indeed, the rigid 
promotion schedule of military hierarchies ensure that the more experienced make the 
strategic decisions (Blaker, 2007).   
 
Second, action at the manager and operator levels is in many ways more professional.  As 
professionals rise in organizations, their role is one of organizational maintenance—a task of 
management, not necessarily a task of a professional.  Generals may seek to relive their role 
on the battlefield, chiefs of surgery in the operating room, heads of law firms in the 
courtroom.   
 
Third, action at the manager and operator levels is in many ways more resolvable.  The work 
of upper-level professionals is often more abstract than the quantifiable, concrete results of 
low-level activities.  Upper-level issues may take weeks and months to resolve, and focused 
effort to understand.  In addition, success and failure at the upper-level may be more difficult 
to determine with only incremental and marginal changes noted on a day-to-day basis.  
Conversely, low and mid-level efforts may often be resolved in a single hour.   
 
Fourth, executives of professions must guard the organization from external threats, 
maintaining the autonomy for the overall profession (Blau & Scott, 2003).  As Chapter 4 
discussed, external sanction comes at the cost of the overall reputation of the profession.  If, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
want to try and do in our evolving thinking is try and work out procedures, a doctrine, for how we 
exercise that command such that control is exercised when it should be but is not over-control nor 
excessive control across the layers of command” (U.K. Parliament Defence Committee, 2003, p. 34). 
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through shifting, drifting or grifting executives can be seen as conducting organizational 
maintenance by protecting professional autonomy, they will do so. 
 
Information technologies allow executives more choices than deciding on the degree of 
delegation and the subsequent amount of monitoring.  Through shifting, drifting and grifting 
executives may now be much more involved in their subordinates’ activities.  The 1990s was 
thought to produce the strategic corporal—a low-level actor that, because of media and 
instantaneous communication, can act at the strategic level (Krulak, 1999).  Usually perceived 
as negative, the actions of the lowest level operators (e.g. soldier abuse at Abu Ghraib) were 
seen to have strategic effects.  With tools that allow executives to shift, drift and grift, the 
modern battlefield produces another actor—the tactical general—a high-level executive that, 
because of technology, directs action at the tactical level (Singer, 2009; Sowers, 2008).   
 
6.2.2 Managers 
 
The effects of information technologies on the executive level are significant, largely 
empowering the executive.  At the managerial level, the effects are existential, excluding and 
functionally eliminating managers.  The role of managers is to “coordinate the work of 
operators in order to attain organizational goals” with “powers...sufficient to produce the 
needed coordination” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 154).  In hierarchical control, managers serve 
the vital role of limiting spans of control while monitoring subordinate performance and 
correcting problems (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 41).  One would expect managers to readily 
adopt tools that allow them to monitor their subordinates more closely.   
 
Does increasing technology empower managers?  As a manager can increasingly control a 
subordinate’s work, it may “simplify[y] the managerial problem” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 
160).  Yet the same technology simplifies the executive’s problem, allowing them to observe 
and direct action at both the managerial and operator level.  With modern technology that 
enables executives to shift, drift and grift, information can flow directly from executives to 
operators, excluding managers from their traditional role of operator supervision. 
 
The effect of shifting, drifting and grifting on managers—ex claudere controls 
How does the ability of executives to shift, drift and grift influence their immediate 
subordinates, the managers?  As the costs decline for the highest levels to gain information 
on the lowest levels, the roles performed by many mid-level managers become obsolete 
(Nichiporuk & Builder, 1997, p. 299).  In business, these managers will be eliminated.  In 
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public institutions, or other hierarchies where organizational restructuring is far less 
responsive and nimble, managers may be controlled by exclusion, what I term ex claudere 
controls.   
 
Ex claudere controls differ from the ex post and ex ante controls discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 
respectively.  Ex ante controls seek to control subordinate behaviour through selection, 
screening and training.  Yet the most stringent ex ante controls will still not produce in 
managers the same amount of expertise that the executive possesses.  Empowered by 
technology, executives can cheat the hierarchy and bypass managers, exerting influence on 
operators either through observation or direction.   
 
Ex post controls seek to control subordinate behaviour through monitoring.  With 
information technologies that allow executives to grift, ex claudere controls enable 
executives to forgo monitoring of their managers.  Instead of delegating tasks to managers, a 
grifting executive may now communicate and direct operators, bypassing the managerial 
level.  Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers all decrease transaction costs for executives 
seeking to control operators.  Indeed, technology that enables grifting reverses information 
asymmetry in another way.  With grifting managers comes the possibility that their superiors 
may know more information about their subordinates, in greater quantities, qualities and 
sooner, than the manager does (Blaker, 2007, p. 48).64   
 
Just as ex claudere controls may solve some executive-level problems, they may create new 
inefficiencies.  Excluded managers may “demand more and more information as a way of 
justifying their existence” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 228).  Information technology magnifies 
information demands as they flow through a hierarchy.  An operator’s report, sought by an 
executive by a certain time with a certain detail, will likely be demanded by the manager 
earlier with greater detail.  This produces a “demand cascade” with each hierarchical level 
adding to an initial information request (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 3-12).  
When organizations adopt network technologies but retain hierarchical forms, the manager 
loses autonomy yet critically retains the tools to exert greater superior control.  In cases 
where an executive shifts, and especially grifts, a race for information ensues with managers 
scurrying to know more information about their operators than their executives know 
(Schein, 2010, p. 287).   
 
                                                          
64
 U.K. doctrine actually predicts this: “Armed with appropriate timely information, higher 
headquarters may have better overall situational awareness than local commanders” (U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, 2005). 
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6.2.3 Operators 
 
Operators are the front-line workers, “a person who does the work that justifies the 
existence of the organization” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 33).  In hierarchies, operators are 
granted the least autonomy and are the most tightly controlled.  These street-level 
bureaucrats nevertheless will exercise their own discretion, interpreting policies in order to 
carry out the work of the organization (Lipsky, 1980).  Shifting, drifting and grifting by 
executives allow not only a reduction of information asymmetry, but also an ability to act and 
communicate with the operator level.  Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers increase the 
transaction costs for the operator.  With their positions and actions known, their ability to 
shirk is further reduced.   
 
Yet technology may increase an operator’s autonomy for four reasons.  First, in an 
environment where information can be instantly transmitted and known both inside and 
outside an organization, the low-level operators’ ability to have strategic impact increases 
(e.g. the strategic corporal).  This creates incentives for the lowest levels to be granted 
greater access to information and greater autonomy to determine how to use it (Alberts & 
Hayes, 2003; Krulak, 1999).   Strategic corporals require access to strategic-level information.   
 
Second, as information flow becomes less structured, “commanders cannot control what 
subordinates see or know” (Alberts, 2002, p. 60).  With technology, operators may see and 
analyse information that was previously restricted to the manager or executive level.  These 
operators may then take more initiative or second-guess decisions made at higher levels.65   
 
Third, grifting allows communication not simply from executives to operators, but between 
executives and operators. Just as an executive can cheat by exerting more influence down an 
organizational structure, operators can cheat by exerting more upward influence.  An 
operator suffering underneath an incompetent middle manager now has multiple secure and 
direct lines of communication with the executive, the boss’s boss.66 
 
Fourth, technology muddies unity of command, adding confusion to the guidance that 
operators follow.  As technology opens up new lines of communication, which guidance 
should an operator follow—that of a manager or an executive?  To whom should the 
                                                          
65
 British doctrine warned of the potential of “tactical anarchy” when operators are granted too much 
autonomy (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2004b, p. para 207).   
66
 An example of this is the British Army’s Rumour Service whereby internal whistle-blowers could 
perform their duties with anonymity (T. Edmunds & Forster, 2007). 
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operator report?  Unity of command is threatened, with an operator being able to select and 
choose from multiple levels instead of a single superior. 
 
It is not enough to say technology influences superiors is one way and subordinates in 
another.  Nanomanagement affects different levels of a hierarchy in different ways.  The 
most profound effects should be observed in the mid-levels of hierarchical organizations.  
The following case study, the exodus of mid-level officers in the U.S. Army, examines these 
effects. 
 
6.2.4 A case study of the U.S. Army: effects of shifting, drifting and grifting  
 
The organizational structure of the U.S. Army today is remarkably similar to its organizational 
structure ten, twenty, and even fifty years ago.  Simon (1946) suggests that one must look 
beneath the surface of organizational charts to understand how organizations adapt to 
disruptions and new conditions.   
 
On the surface, the organizational structure of the Army seemed stable.  However, as the 
U.S. and British armies adopted network technologies, the managerial level was not 
eliminated; instead the proportion of mid-level manager positions expanded.67  While the 
proportion of mid-level officers expanded, in the early 1990s, the rate at which mid-level 
officers were leaving the U.S. Army increased (Wardynski, Lyle, & Colarusso, 2010b).68  By 
2006, the U.S. Army projected a shortage of 3,000 officers with the “most acute shortfalls in 
senior captains and majors with 11 to 17 years of experience” (Henning, 2006).  Dubbed an 
“unprecedented exodus” (M. Smith, 2007)  the dearth of mid-level U.S. Army officers created 
                                                          
67
 In the last 60 years, in both the U.S. and British armies, the overall proportion of officers to enlisted 
soldiers expanded.  Today, as opposed to World War II, there are nearly four times as many general 
officers (executives) in the U.S. Army, and close to eight times as many in the British Army.  Where the 
British Army has become especially executive-heavy (A. King, 2011), the U.S. Army has expanded most 
at the manager level.  In World War II, there was one U.S. Army field grade officer for every 190.1 
enlisted soldiers.  Today, that ratio is one field grade for every 12.3 enlisted, or proportionally fifteen 
times more mid-level officers compared to just 50 years ago (2010a).  Instead of technology flattening 
the middle, the middle has fattened.  Numerous explanations have been offered as to the increase of 
mid-level officers in relation to enlisted soldiers, ranging from the long-term decline of amount of 
manpower enlisted, to the need for greater technological and managerial skill manifested in 
commands (Offenhauer, 2007).  Theorists saw that the rise of staff positions and assistants could 
mitigate the span of control (Barkdull, 1963; Stieglitz, 1962), allowing militaries to control greater 
organizations by virtue of expanding staff positions for mid-level officers (Urwick, 1956, p. 46).   
68
 While the author was able to obtain data concerning the mid-level officer exodus in the U.S. Army, 
in the British Army the implementation of the Joint Personnel Administration System in 2007 made 
current data unavailable.  On May 30, 2011, a Freedom of Information Act was filed with the U.K. 
government to request information prior to 2007.  On June 22, 2011, a response from the U.K. MoD 
was received (U.K. Department of the Army, 2011).  Where applicable to the following case, a footnote 
will indicate corresponding, British Army data. 
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a void such that “by 2014, the U.S. Army may be short 30% lieutenant colonels and 20% 
majors” (George Brown, 2008).  
 
There are a number of reasons offered by both official and unofficial studies to explain this 
exodus (Harding, 2007).  Deployment schedule, time with family and related personal issues 
were a stated cause of mid-level officers giving up their commissions.  Yet as armies of the 
past faced similar conditions, without seeing a similar exodus, the studies uncovered a 
surprising finding.  Across a wide body of surveys, junior officers indicated a lack of autonomy 
as a reason for leaving the U.S. Army (Wong, 2000), noting  “excessive micromanagement by 
superiors” (M. R. Lewis, 2004). 
 
The U.S. Army attempted a wide variety of strategies to respond to this exodus.  First, 
financial incentives were offered.69   In 2007, the U.S. Army began an unprecedented 
program of offering financial incentives of up to $35,000 for mid-level officers to stay in the 
service (Tice, 2008b).70  A 2010 assessment of the $500 million program concluded it “may 
have done more harm than good” by paying marginal officers, who would have stayed 
without pay, while not preventing talented officers from leaving (Wardynski, et al., 2010b, 
pp. 26-27). 
 
Second, the U.S. Army accelerated promotion of officers from the low to mid levels.  The U.S. 
Army reduced the time by 30% from entry into military service (commissioning) to promotion 
to captain.  By accelerating promotion time, junior officers were hurried through the ranks.  
Figure 6.1 graphs the declining amount of time from commissioning to promotion to captain 
between 1990 (54 months) and 2010 (38 months). 
                                                          
69
 As Congress sets military salaries, the U.S. Army was constrained in giving mid-level officers salary 
increases.  In response, the U.S. Army has offered financial bonuses for staying in the military.  While 
these reenlistment bonuses have long been employed to enlisted soldiers, bonuses were traditionally 
not offered for officers to stay in the U.S. Army.   
70
 The first year of the program enticed 12,556 officers to reenlist at a cost of nearly $400 million (Tice, 
2008a), falling short of its goal of 14,000 officers (Coates, Silvernail, Fulton, & Ivanitskaya, 2011).  The 
program was extended for an additional year where an additional 2,769 officers reenlisted for the 
bonus.  One criticism questioned whether the army retained their most talented officers or merely 
paid additional funds to retain marginal officers that were already intent on staying in the military 
(Coates, et al., 2011). 
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Figure 6.1  Months from commissioning to promotion to captain—U.S. Army (1990-2010)71 
 
Third, the U.S. Army increased promotion rates to close to 100%, from lieutenant all the way 
to lieutenant colonel (Broadwell, 2009; Wardynski, Lyle, & Colarusso, 2010a).72  Figure 6.2 
graphs the increasing promotion rates from the historical average, to 2005 to 2009.   
 
 
Figure 6.2  Increase in promotion rate in the U.S. Army73 
                                                          
71
  Source (Congressional Budget Office, 1990) and (Wardynski, et al., 2010b).   In the British Army, 
promotion rates to captain were much more stable, falling from six to five years in 1994 and remaining 
constant at five years through 2010 (U.K. Department of the Army, 2011). 
72
 An officer commissioned in 1990 stood a 70% chance of being able to serve twenty years and be 
promoted to lieutenant colonel; by 2009, that chance had risen to 95%.  Junior officers received 
“virtually no performance ranking” in their promotion to major (Wardynski, et al., 2010a).  As one 
senior army officer stated, “Basically, if you haven't been court-martialed, you're going to be 
promoted" (Mazzetti, 2006).  As standards were relaxed, an officer could now serve 15 years, with 
minimal separation of rank or pay between the worst and the best performing officers (Kane, 2011).   
73
 Source (Henning, 2006) and (Wardynski, et al., 2010b).  In the British Army, promotion rates were 
available for two periods, 1994-2001 and 1999-2006.  Between these two periods, promotion rates 
increased for all three ranks albeit far from the dramatic changes seen in the U.S. Army:  LT-CPT 
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Fourth, the U.S. Army reduced the selection and screening criteria for commissioning by 
changing the proportion of officers commissioned to the least rigorous of the three 
traditional sources.74  As more mid-level officers left the ranks, the Army compensated by 
“radically shift*ing+ its sources of commission from those that extensively screen, vet, and cull 
for talent…to those with minimal talent filters” (Wardynski, et al., 2010b, p. v).  Figure 6.3 
shows the percentage mix of commissioning sources from 1998-2009.   
 
Figure 6.3  Source of U.S. Army officer commission (1998-2009)75 
 
Fifth, to make up for the shortfall of mid-level officers, the U.S. Army commissioned 
thousands of excess lieutenants (Wardynski, et al., 2010a).  While an exodus of mid-level 
                                                                                                                                                                       
(77.2%-84.0%).  CPT-MAJ (59.5%-62.0%).  MAJ-LTC (48.6%-51.0%) (U.K. Department of the Army, 
2011). 
74
 For officers in the U.S. Army, there are three routes to becoming an officer—officer candidate 
school (OCS), attending a civilian university on an R.O.T.C. scholarship or attending the United States 
Military Academy (West Point).  West Point and R.O.T.C. both provide a college degree and consist of 
training typically for the entire four years of college; conversely, OCS is only three months in length.  
OCS is a 14 week school that allows enlisted and other individuals to be directly commissioned and 
does not require candidates to have an undergraduate degree.  OCS has typically been used during 
wartime when the size of the military is expanding (Coumbe, 2010).  It has been estimated that the 
cost to train and commission an officer through West Point is three to four times the costs of R.O.T.C. 
and eight to fifteen times the cost of OCS (Congressional Budget Office, 1990).  This cost has been 
justified by performance; West Point graduates are rated significantly higher as they move up through 
the ranks, trailed by R.O.T.C and then OCS (Wardynski, et al., 2010b).   
75
 Source (Henning, 2006) and (Wardynski, et al., 2010a).  The British Army has seen the opposite shift 
of commissioning source, towards more graduates. The British Army has changed from approximately 
60% non-graduate/40% graduate in the early 1980s to 15% non-graduate/85% graduate in 2009.  In 
the response to the FOIA request, the respondent stated this change “has simply been a manifestation 
of a greater number of graduates in society” (U.K. Department of the Army, 2011). 
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managers would influence most organizations, this exodus affects professional organizations 
severely. In a profession, executives have fewer tools to replace departed managers.  In 
contrast with other businesses, the military profession does not allow (except in rare 
circumstances) outsiders to enter into the profession at a mid-level.76  Yet commissioning 
excess officers affects the set amount of time allocated for a new professional to both qualify 
and then apprentice in a low-level position.   
 
Mid-level professionals cannot be conjured or directly hired; they must gain critical 
experience in the lower ranks of the profession.  The first major apprenticeship of a U.S. 
Army officer’s career, and step towards mid-level, is leading a platoon.  As Figure 6.4 
demonstrates, as the U.S. Army commissioned more junior-level officers (excess lieutenants), 
the amount of months that lieutenants had in their key developmental job decreased 
precipitously, resulting in less experienced mid-level officers.  A U.S. Army study found that 
reducing platoon leader experience for junior officers encouraged “senior officers to be more 
directive in their leadership and less tolerant of mistakes” (U.S. Department of the Army, pp. 
OS-8).77   
                                                          
76
 The military profession bears the burden of ex ante training costs.  All professionals pay the upfront 
opportunity cost of time committed to professional training.  Yet in both the medical and legal 
profession, professional school costs are borne by most students.  Not so in the military profession, 
where the U.S. government dedicates hundreds of thousands of dollars and years of time to produce a 
mid-level officer.  Further, once commissioned as an officer, training costs continue to be borne by the 
organization.  In the military profession, the cost of building mid-level officers is born largely by the 
organization not the individual officer. 
77
 For an excellent summary of the mid-level officer exodus see Lewis (2004).  He captures the junior 
officer frustration: “The young staff officer was triply frustrated; he was micromanaged in his platoon 
leader job because he never fully matured there. Pulled out of his platoon too early, he was ill 
prepared to serve on a higher-level staff and he was micromanaged there as a result” (M. R. Lewis, 
2004, p. 78). 
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Figure 6.4  Excess lieutenants against platoon leader time78  
 
The data on the effects of the exodus is clear—the pool of mid-level officers became 
younger, less educated, and less experienced.   Officers that in the past would never have 
been promoted into the mid-level ranks were now not only given financial incentive to stay 
but were almost universally promoted.   
 
6.2.5 The cycle of nanomanagement 
 
In the above case, one can begin to see a cycle of nanomanagement, a disruptive force for 
organizations that adopt information technology but retain their mid-level positions in rigid 
hierarchical organizations: 
 
Step #1:  Technology allows upper-level officer (executive) to shift, drift and 
grift marginalizing mid-level officers (managers) and nanomanaging the 
low-level officer (operator).  The effect is that the low-level operators feels 
less autonomous and empowered, less willing to take risks.  The mid-level 
manager suffers a loss of autonomy and is excluded from their traditional 
role.  Seeking to retain their information advantage over their executives, the 
mid-level manager scurries to find out what their operators are doing, 
increasing the information demands on the low-level operator. 
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 Source (Wardynski, et al., 2010b, p. 6). 
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Step #2:  Frustrated by being excluded and by a lack of autonomy, talented 
operators and managers leave the profession.  Remaining low-level 
operators are promoted with greater speed, with less experience, into 
mid-level manager positions as standards are lowered in order to fill the now 
vacant mid-level positions.  Underperforming and incompetent managers 
who would normally be discharged, separated or retired are retained.  Those 
mid-level managers who do stay are promoted to be executives from a 
smaller pool of candidates many of whom have institutionalized lessons of 
nanomanagement as appropriate. 
 
Step #3:  With less experienced mid-level managers, the upper-level 
executives see even more reason to tightly control subordinates.  
Furthermore, these former mid-level managers, that were conditioned to 
accept nanomanagement as appropriate, do so now as executives.  They 
bypass the mid-level manager, and direct low-level officers, or act at that 
level—they shift, drift and grift.   
 
When this cycle repeats, it may actually resemble more of a spiral than a cycle, producing 
worse results with each repetition.  As the worst junior officers are promoted to the mid and 
upper-level ranks at the same rate as the best junior officers, talented junior level operators 
increasingly leave the service, further shrinking the talent pool of future mid and upper-level 
officers.  Further, as the worst junior officers are promoted they require the most 
supervision.  This produces rational justification for superiors to seek ever tighter control. 
 
The ordering of these three steps is not to imply that the cycle must begin with Step 1.  This 
cycle may begin with a mid-level manager leaving an organization, producing a void that 
must be filled.  More data would be helpful in determining the spark of this cycle.  Yet 
regardless of what initiates the cycle, the sequence of effects is not impossible to reverse.  As 
seen in Chapter 5, when superiors become more familiar with the costs of nanomanagement, 
they may develop practices that restrict how and to what degree superiors may use this 
technology.  Whether the cycle is observed by mid-level officers, whether it repeats or 
whether it reverses will be explored in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.6 Summary 
 
The clash between new technologies grafted onto old hierarchical organizational forms 
produces effects on information flow, span of control and unity of command, changing the 
roles for executives, managers and operators.  For executives, trackers and drones enable 
shifting, where their attention may fix on levels far below their mandate.  Further, long 
screwdrivers allow drifting and the ability to act at the manager and operator level.  Finally, 
grifting opens up new channels of communication between executives and operators, 
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excluding managers from their traditional role.  For managers with reduced autonomy and 
now controlled by ex claudere controls, they find themselves scurrying to gain information 
before their superiors, increasing the information demands on operators.  Frustrated by a 
lack of autonomy, mid-level managers leave the organization.  Those that stay adopt shifting, 
drifting and grifting as appropriate and replicate these activities when they are promoted.  
For the operator, increased technology both allows for access to previously unavailable 
information, and opens a new line of communication with executives.   
 
Table 6.2 captures the changes to control and autonomy at the executive, manager and 
operator level as technology is adopted in a static hierarchical structure.  Executives see 
increased control.  Managers see lost autonomy.  Operators see variable changes to their 
autonomy. 
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 Information flow Span of control Unity of command 
Executives 
Pre-tech 
Uni-directional 
Receive and request 
information from 
managers 
 
Limited to supervision 
of 3-5 subordinates 
 
Strict chain of command; 
clear lines of authority 
Executives 
Post-tech 
Multi-directional 
Grift—use ex claudere 
controls to bypass 
managers  
 
New information 
produces information 
overload 
Increased control 
 
Shift-no longer 
constrained by chain 
of command 
executives may direct 
their attention to 
multiple subordinates   
 
Increased control 
 
Drift-ability to direct action 
of managers  
 
Grift-ability to direct action 
of operators as well 
 
 
Increased control 
Managers 
Pre-tech 
Bi-directional  
Receive information 
from executives and 
request information 
from operators 
 
Limited to supervision 
of 3-5 subordinates 
 
Strict chain of command; 
clear lines of authority 
Primary concern is to meet 
information demands of 
single superior—the 
executive 
Managers 
Post-tech 
Multi-directional  
Able to be bypassed 
 
Will increase 
information demands 
on subordinates in 
attempts to maintain 
their information 
asymmetry 
 
Information overload 
will be observed 
Loss of autonomy 
 
Shift-able to control 
more operators and 
also be excluded  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss of autonomy 
 
As operators can receive 
direction from executives, 
excluded from clear line of 
command  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss of autonomy 
Operators 
Pre-tech 
Uni-directional 
Information received 
from, and sent to, 
managers 
 
N/A 
 
Strict chain of command, 
clear lines of authority.  
Primary concern is to meet 
information demands of 
single superior—the 
manager 
Operators 
Post-tech 
Multi-directional  
Able to communicate 
with executives 
 
Must meet increased 
information requests 
from both managers 
and executives   
Variable autonomy 
 
N/A 
 
Multiple inputs from various 
levels of the organization   
 
Able to select guidance from 
a menu of options 
 
 
Variable autonomy 
Table 6.1  Nanomanagement in hierarchies 
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I would expect to observe different behaviours as technology is adopted and used to 
nanomanage.  For executives, as technology allows increased superior control, drifting, 
shifting, and grifting are observed.  For managers, as technology reduces their autonomy, 
they increase their information demands on subordinates while meeting the information 
demands of superiors.  For operators, nanomanagement produces variable changes to their 
autonomy.  With different effects, the analysis turns to the empirical evidence analyzing how 
the mid-level managers of this case that could be nanomanaged, could nanomanage and 
could be excluded, experienced nanomanagement in Iraq. 
 
6.3 Empirical findings 
 
The mid-level officers were in a unique position to provide observations at the executive, 
manager and operator levels.  When serving on staffs at the executive level, these mid-level 
officers could observe executive behaviour.  In both command and staff positions at the 
manager level, these mid-level officers could provide the most robust observations.  And as 
former operators, with many having deployed at a junior rank in the early stages of the Iraq 
War, they could also provide observations at the operator level.   
 
6.3.1 Executive shifting, drifting and grifting 
“It wasn't interference. It was the benefit of additional capacity of our 
headquarters being brought to the *subordinate’s+ plan” (U.K.-25).  
 
For executives, technology enabled increased superior control.  As technology also increased 
information flowing to the executive level, officers observed tell-tale signs of executive level 
information overload: 
“*At the executive level+ we do tend to overload ourselves with routine white 
noise, which can detract from what you're really there to do…to contain the 
guzzle of information” (U.K.-19).  
 
“There was a lot of information, but [executives] needed that information to 
ensure that [they] were making the right decision” (U.K.-28). 
 
“So there were a lot of instances there in Iraq where we would be looking for 
more in-depth information but get possibly more than, and at a level of 
detail, we probably shouldn't have got” (U.S.-02). 
 
Shifting 
The mid-level officers observed how technology distracted executives from their assigned 
tasks, allowing them to fix their attention on subordinate activities: 
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“On nightly time sensitive raids, then everyone is watching us.  [1UP] 
wouldn't interfere, they would monitor my company net which I wasn't too 
happy with.  The [2UP] was almost always watching.  [2UP] staff guys would 
talk to you next time they saw you...then they’d offer you their two cents, 
like it went well, or you looked fucked up” (U.S.-21). 
 
“I would say there were probably more than 30, 40 people including my 
[1UP], the [2UP], the commanding officer, the deputy commander…always 
the JAG [legal officer].  Then you'd have myself and the battle staff watching 
it” (U.S.-08). 
 
“I did feel for the company commander on the ground knowing that people 
back in rear were watching what he was doing on the ground” (U.K.-31). 
 
As expected, the primary cost of shifting noted by officers of both armies was the transfixing 
effect of drone technology:  
“The UAV feed is the car wreck on the highway” (U.S.-09). 
 
“It transfixed.  It was always like something out of YouTube. Everybody 
would be watching it like it was, you know, the coolest thing ever” (U.S.-10).  
 
“He *the superior+ was always watching” (U.S.-06).   
 
“*UAVs+ captured the entire headquarters completely.  Everyone was 
fixated…*UAVs+ were a drinking straw approach to combat” (U.K.-29).   
 
“*Operations were monitored with technology+ regularly…There were 
sensitive feeds coming in on what we call Kill TV.  I would watch that…So I 
could do something about *the subordinate’s operation+ as soon as it 
occurred” (U.K.-22).   
 
Those that noticed a focus at subordinate levels seemed to indicate that they understood the 
costs of shifting:   
“I mean we're focusing on these current tactical operations. What we're 
losing sight of is the current center of gravity” (U.S.-07). 
 
“Guys like to watch.  It doesn't mean anything.  They just look at it… 
everybody is in the TOC looking at the [UAV] feed.  You could have taken the 
feed away and it wouldn't have changed nothing” (U.S.-09). 
 
“*The executives+ really wanted to know what was going on *at the operator 
level]. They knew they had absolutely no effect on situations because that's 
completely out of their purview” (U.S.-02). 
 
“We didn't lose sight of our primary operational task, but we did become 
occasionally utterly fixated on small tactical actions” (U.K.-29). 
 
“There was a fascination in watching what was going on, on the ground, but 
it doesn’t actually help the operation because it distracts” (U.K.-31). 
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Instead of shifting answering more questions about subordinate activities, officers stated 
shifting sometimes produced more questions:   
“In a more conventional fight, *superiors+ would be fighting their battalion or 
brigade…instead of answering questions he ends up asking more questions 
based on [the UAV+” (U.S.-09).   
 
The desire to shift posed tangible costs, not just in knowing that actions were being 
observed, but also in delay: 
“Our guys were in the right location…but because we couldn't see them in 
the UAV feed they delayed the mission.  It took two and a half hours to get 
on target just so the [2UP] could watch the mission go down…After that, we 
took a step back and asked well what is it for?  Is it for [2UP] to watch and 
verify what the [2DN] were doing?” (U.S.-21). 
 
Drifting 
This desire to ‘do something’ came up repeatedly in the interviews and shows a distinction 
between shifting and drifting.  When the sub-categories of police patrols introduced in 
Chapter 5 provided information that subordinates did not have, superiors were tempted to 
move past passive observation (shifting) into active direction (drifting) of their immediate 
subordinate’s action (U.K.-29; U.S.-09): 
“Everybody would sit there and watch to see what was happening… 
sometimes the colonel would make his directives back down to the 
battalions to do this or do that by looking at the UAV feeds” (U.S.-16). 
 
There seemed to be more of an acceptance of shifting, yet drifting was seen as an 
inappropriate encroachment on subordinate autonomy: 
“The commander at the [1UP], [2UP] and [3UP] has to have discipline to not 
be involved in what we were doing.  Yes you can monitor and ask questions.  
You just don't get into and say move your guys here.  You have the possibility 
of leaders echelons above each other to get more involved in what 
subordinates are doing”  (U.S.-20). 
 
“We mostly watched UAV footage almost twenty-four hours a day…it was 
monitoring, but we didn't watch it to manoeuvre troops around the 
battlefield” (U.K.-28).   
 
“But then *2UP] is watching the same feed, but they wouldn't 
micromanage…Mostly they didn't micromanage too much” (U.S.-07). 
 
In professions, executives have served and succeeded at the operator and manager 
level.  Officers remarked that as a result, executives preferred to act at subordinate 
levels: 
“A lot of it is an inability for some senior leaders to truly think and conduct 
themselves strategically…The comfort zone is at the tactical level, so they 
revert back to the tactical level…they just naturally seem to pour their energy 
into where they're most comfortable” (U.S.-07).  
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“*Technology allowed those+ wanting to be involved, [to be involved] with it, 
but not necessarily understanding what was going on the ground…the more 
senior officers haven't had that background…they may not have been under 
fire” (U.K.-7).   
 
This thesis proposed a second reason why one would expect more drifting in professions—
escape from organizational maintenance.  Real-time technology enables escape for the 
executive level whose job is seemingly abstract or less relevant, incentivizing senior 
executives to direct action at subordinate levels: 
“Have you ever seen the movie Aliens? Every soldier had a little camera on 
their head, and the lieutenant sat back in the armoured vehicle and 
monitored where the soldiers were and was able to manoeuvre them…That's 
where I see us going. The command will be able to separate themselves from 
getting dirty, and manoeuvre the soldiers around on the battlefield…like it's a 
video game” (U.S.-10).  
 
”It was very personality dependent…One guy gets technology and he’s hands 
off, another would get his hands on…because they can, some do.  Especially 
when their boss, and rater, and senior rater is watching the screen” (U.S.-18). 
 
Grifting 
While grifting was reported at the manager level, it was observed at the executive 
level: 
“I can remember being in the American TOC…and the entire TOC is sitting 
there watching the feed on UAV.  One comment I always remember is 
‘Somebody tell that mother fucker to look to his left!’  So it's like a [staff 
officer] calling down to give an order to a private on the ground…which I 
guess it can be considered a good thing, but then again, that guy on the 
ground has got a lot going on” (U.S.-05). 
 
“[A] lot of times we'd even bypass [1DN] and go straight down to [2DN], 
sometimes right down to the [3DN] because [the commander] wanted to 
know” (U.S.-02). 
 
“The *2UP] had good command of the situation, and because of his desire to 
get down and dirty in the weeds, he spent more time with [2DN+…rather 
than go through the chain of command” (U.K.-16). 
 
Officers of both armies noted how grifting executives would anticipate requests (U.K.-14; 
U.K.-29; U.S.-01; U.S.-18).   
“We were able to watch, and deliberately not engaging in what 
[subordinates were] edging to do.  But knowing that if there was assets that 
had to be queued we would jump ahead and didn't have to wait to get a call”  
(U.K.-29). 
 
Grifters noted that on many instances what executives believed to be needed on the ground 
was not actually requested (U.K.-29; U.S.-11) or needed:   
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“It was considered either a hindrance or a wasted asset” (U.S.-11). 
  
“We were not being particularly helpful by interfering because we had this 
God’s eye view of what was going on” (U.K.-29). 
 
“[Technology] made us more focused on tactical issues than I guess a 
headquarters ought to be…I can recall a few occasions where [2DN] 
commanders would come back afterwards and say actually that wasn't that 
helpful…please don't do it again unless I ask you to” (U.K.-29). 
 
Officers of both armies attributed this grifting to the ‘warrioristic’ culture of the army and 
commanders in headquarters wanting to be involved (U.K.-7).  Others mentioned how these 
feeds connected those sitting in offices to those engaging in fire fights: 
“People are under direct fire and [superiors in rear headquarters] want to 
feel like they're taking part in it, but I think it's a bit distasteful” (U.K.-7).  
 
“There's a tendency where rounds are flying and people's adrenaline is up, 
it's exciting for everybody to get involved…When actually it should just be 
left to those who had been charged with the execution to conduct 
it…Everyone can fight the tactical battle, but it should just be left to those 
who are currently fighting it…you could cut me out” (U.K.-30). 
 
“We would not interfere unless it looked like we had information that the 
tactical commander just didn't have…being army officers, being action 
oriented personnel, [officers] wanted to do what they joined up to do. We 
found it quite hard...to resist” (U.K.-29).  
 
“When we first got into the fight it was really hard for the brigade 
commander to not revert back to being a battalion commander and fight the 
fight” (U.S.-19). 
 
“When it looked *on the UAV feed+ like there were rounds either coming in 
or going out, there was a fire fight, I saw a lot of emotion and it was as if we 
were almost there” (U.S.-11). 
 
“*T+hey're wising up the fight is not at a *the superior’s+ level, the fight is at 
the [subordinate] level. I think that's very hard for commanders to do…it's 
how we grow our leaders to really come in to lead, and they've got to lead 
something” (U.S.-07). 
 
Shifting, drifting and grifting were all observed.  One British Army officer captured 
the full extent of the change wrought by technology, empowering further and tighter 
superior control: 
“On the first tour [in 2004], I think I was less concerned about issues that I 
didn't know anything about…I was quite happy to then find out sometimes 
days after the fact what had actually happened, what we've done about it, 
and I'd be back briefed at that stage. So in the intervening days of what was 
actually going on, I was thinking about the next problem frankly…I had very 
little tactical control over the actions that took place. [On the second 
deployment in 2007+…commanding two levels up by the stage, I’d be at 
battle command post as a staff officer, and much more involved in 
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minute-by-minute tactical action because I could see it happening, and 
therefore able to affect it…” (U.K.-29).  
 
“I recall a situation where again the logistics patrol…two hundred kilometres 
north of our position, [that] received contact several times on the way to 
resupply the battle group.  They still had to come back again. With the 
vehicle casualties and human casualties that ensued, they didn't have 
enough transportation to bring back everything that had to come back, and 
therefore it was a whole situation of what do you leave behind? …Probably a 
company commander-level problem, frankly, but actually being watched 
over by brigade headquarters.  We relayed minute-by-minute suggestions to 
them purely because we could see what was going on. On the 2004 tour, 
probably a very similar situation happened actually, but I didn't find out until 
about two days after they had solved the problem” (U.K.-29).  
 
6.3.2 Manager 
“Half of the day we were going what are we doing, what am I doing here?” 
(U.K.-3). 
 
With executives shifting, drifting and grifting, a loss of autonomy was observed at the 
managerial level.  As technology alters information flow, I expected first to see information 
overload at the manager level, as managers seek to respond to executive’s increasing 
requests by demanding more information from operators.  With the potential for executives 
knowing more about operator actions than managers did, mid-level officers spoke of the 
challenge of maintaining the information asymmetry between themselves and their superiors 
(U.K.-25).  With greater access to computers and other long screwdriver technologies, U.S. 
officers used the term ‘information overload’ more often than British officers: 
“There was way more information than I could manage…for a person with 
twenty-four hour coverage to even go through…so you would spend a lot of 
time just trying to get good information” (U.S.-11). 
 
“It's just there's a lot of reports and a lot of information…I don't think 
anybody's comfortable with it” (U.S.-17). 
 
“It's hard to say that it's information overload because you're trying to get as 
much information as you can get. It's just your ability to manage it that 
results in overload…In trying to do a mission there’s no such thing as too 
much information” (U.S.-08). 
 
“Information overload was challenging for new folks like me out there 
because there was a wealth of knowledge” (U.S.-01).  
 
“Information overload is definitely going on...The ability to produce products 
has exploded and then the demand flows from that” (U.S.-09).  
 
“The second time there was a sense of information overload.  I had a 
telephone a laptop, several desktop computers, a number of terminals.  If 
you've got a large number of computers serving you, you end up serving 
them” (U.K.-12).   
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With multiple levels of command above them, mid-level managers noted that this created 
additional requests and increased costs as they sought to know the communication between 
the executive and operator levels.  As discussed above, increased communication allowed 
superiors to lean forward and anticipate.  It also allowed subordinates to lean forward and 
anticipate a superior’s actions, producing additional costs:  
“The demand from the *subordinates+ is always high…they want stuff before 
I even brief my boss…I sent it to them a lot…if I didn't give it to them 
[subordinates], they'd freak out and say ‘I don't know enough’” (U.S.-03).   
 
“You get a request…somebody had the bright idea, or worse still somebody 
thinks that the next level up has a bright idea…you end up with just a 
ridiculous circle of information flying around” (U.K.-31). 
 
Ex claudere controls: the effect of grifting on managers 
The majority of officers reported being contacted and directed by executives higher than 
their immediate superiors; levels above were bypassed.  For every one officer that stated he 
did not see superiors grifting, three officers witnessed it. 
“*2UP] had to find out what was occurring.  He would interfere and barrage 
us with questions.  Why are you sending out the patrol now?  I think he was 
under a ton of pressure to find out what was going on” (U.K.-1). 
 
“MoD…would bypass *2UP and 1UP+ and come down to me, so they would 
bypass about three or four chains of command” (U.K.-22).  
 
“I was dealing with *3UP+…who was specifically interested in what I was 
doing” (U.K.-27). 
 
“*3UP+ would call us and ask us for updates, and they would bypass those 
two layers” (U.S.-10). 
 
Mid-level officers reported a host of consequences of executive drifting and grifting, to being 
excluded from the decision making process, to creating redundant work as managers sought 
to condition what was reported to executives, to seeking to restrict information flows 
between operators and executives:  
“*2UP+ shouldn’t have been operating at my level…And when you act at my 
level, you create problems that I don’t have the resources to solve” (U.K.-6). 
 
“*1UP might call you and say+ You might get a phone call in the next thirty 
seconds from [2UP] here, this is what he's going to ask. Is there anything 
contentious that you're going to say?  Let me know how it went and any 
issue that came out of it” (U.K.-12). 
 
“You may eventually do double work but it is better if you're ahead of the 
curve” (U.S.-17).  
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Officers especially noted when they were bypassed and excluded: 
 “[When superiors would contact our subordinates] we had lost control of 
our own subunit” (U.K.-2).   
 
“There were people who would always try to jump the chain of command” 
(U.K.-24). 
 
“There was definitely a lot of that *jumping chain of command] going 
on…[1UP] would call the [2DN] directly and task them…[1UP] always thought 
there was a good reason” (U.S.-20). 
 
“*Superiors+ have the ability to reach down and touch your squads and 
platoons, day in day out.  It all can be done…Because they have the ability to 
reach down and touch people, they do“ (U.S.-21). 
 
Seeking to maintain oversight of their units, and relevancy in their jobs, officers remarked 
that they tried to “run interference” (U.S.-10) to determine what operators would tell grifting 
executives.  Their insecurity about their position became apparent in their words:   
“I just had to establish what they [subordinates] had been told [by 
superiors]“ (U.K.-27).  
 
“People were trying to keep information to themselves without letting it get 
out” (U.S.-10).  
 
While mid-level officers observed their superiors contacting their subordinates, a reciprocal 
approach was not tolerated:   
“So while you were expected to use the chain of command yourself...[1UP] 
and indeed [2UP] would frequently speak directly to [individual soldiers]” 
(U.K.-30). 
 
“[2UP] could hear and see everything that we saw...If you don't want 
everyone to see it, tough shit” (U.S.-18). 
 
Further, just as these officers could watch their subordinates’ actions, they understood that 
grifting superiors could watch their subordinates’ actions as well:  
“Anything I was watching my commander was able to watch…It influenced to 
a significant degree not only the planning and also the conduct of what we 
did” (U.K.-25).   
 
“Having higher headquarters on the same feed caused some problems.  
You’ve got dozens of folks watching, they were anticipating too” (U.S.-18).   
 
“The Pentagon asked for the feed…you can end up with as high as the 
Pentagon trying to command the company on the ground, if you aren’t 
careful” (U.K.-31). 
 
“Now I know a lot of those feeds *of subordinate action+ went directly to 
[2UP]…Then the phone would start ringing *from 2UP+” (U.S.-07). 
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Hierarchical redundancy 
As hierarchies adopt network technologies, they typically eliminate levels of the hierarchy, 
with the mid-levels as the most likely candidates for removal.  In the interviews, I asked 
which level of command could be eliminated.  Three U.K. officers stated that each level of 
command was necessary.  One stated:  
“In terms of the fighting piece that we were doing, the operational piece that 
we were doing, everybody from the army soldiers to the top man did the 
right thing. And because you never know where the point of value's going to 
be until it arrives” (U.K.-19). 
 
However, the vast majority believed that some level could be eliminated.  Two levels up and 
one level up were the most commonly mentioned levels for elimination:   
“My group headquarters in the U.K. [could have been eliminated]. That 
would have made us all happier” (U.K.-5).   
 
“I got the sense that some of them, certainly some of the more senior 
captains and some of the majors didn't really have that much to do…so 
people were looking at small crap…I think of it as a lack of employment” 
(U.K.-21). 
 
“The hierarchy has not been flattened.  I am not sure what *1UP and 2UP+ 
are doing” (U.S.-09). 
 
“I would have flattened the [2UP] at any minute” (U.S.-17).   
 
“I think without him [1UP] there we would have been more productive, and I 
generally don't think he added a great deal of value” (U.K.-16). 
 
“I'm not sure that level *1UP] works in high-intensity conflict” (U.K.-31). 
 
“I didn't know what they *1UP+ were doing. It seemed to me that they were, 
in many instances, acting *at our level+” (U.S.-11). 
 
“Sometimes we wondered what are *1UP+ doing for us that we aren't doing 
for ourselves?”  (U.S.-19). 
 
“There's too many generals in Baghdad that results in…too much 
oversight…No oversight was common in the first deployment, and we 
actually got a lot done that way” (U.S.-05). 
 
No officer mentioned a level of command subordinate to them as a candidate for 
elimination. U.S. officers attributed this to the nature of the fight in Iraq: 
“In a tactical sense there is really nothing that my battalion and brigade 
provided that helped my fight at the company level…It is really a company 
level fight executed by platoons and squads.  There is no brigade or battalion 
level enemy” (U.S.-09).   
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“With a *counterinsurgency+ type fight…I don't think you need [senior 
officers+ sitting around…I honestly don't know how much you need that in 
theatre.  Maybe for the admin crap” (U.S.-21). 
 
“You need to increase dramatically down at the company level, within this 
specific fight” (U.S.-20).   
 
Somewhat surprisingly, two officers serving in staff positions stated they could eliminate 
their own organizational level:  
“Well arguably it was my level of command *that could be eliminated+ 
because [1UP] could speak directly to the [1DN+” (U.K.-30)  
 
“[O]ur level of command is extremely irrelevant” (U.S.-05).   
 
6.3.3 Operator 
“Does Joe need a lightening link to a satellite, the space shuttle?…It ain't 
about connecting Joe to the space shuttle, it’s about connecting Joe to the 
other Joes…The focus should be on what the guy needs to know in the one 
kilometre around you and not all this other stuff“ (U.S.-09).79 
 
I anticipated the most diverse effects of technology on the operator level, as the least 
experienced and youngest members of the profession were granted access to increased 
information and new lines of communication with executives.  Where executives and 
managers often employed large staffs to handle increased information, I anticipated 
operators would experience information overload as they do not have support staff. 
 
Officers experiencing information overload at the operator level: 
“You're trying to command a vehicle, fight a vehicle, and use machines on 
the move…we'd find if people sat down to use the computer they couldn't 
multi task. It was actually much easier to do it by voice” (U.K.-13).  
 
“It was like drinking through a fire hose…At some point guys on the ground 
would get overwhelmed…Information overload was a huge problem in the 
beginning” (U.S.-19). 
 
Officers of both armies questioned just how much information should be available at the 
operator level: 
“I’m concerned.  How much information can we give the guy on the 
front-line? Can we be giving someone too much information?” (U.K.-2). 
 
“*Subordinates+ have limited resources.  You can't flood *your subordinates+ 
with massive amounts of information” (U.S.-09). 
 
                                                          
79 
‘Joe’ is a slang term of the U.S. Army, referring to a low-ranking enlisted soldier 
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Increased demands for information from both managers and executives distracted 
operators from their assigned task, producing the demand cascade predicted in 
doctrine: 
“Sometimes people in headquarters above you would see an e-mail and just 
go the brigade can answer that.  And [then] the brigade guy would go maybe 
the battle groups can answer that.  So it was just getting passed down and 
sometimes you'd sit there and answer two or three questions perhaps 
because somebody hadn't said, look, these guys are actually doing something 
else” (U.K.-19). 
 
As the theoretical discussion explained, ex claudere control of managers could empower 
operators.  Operators indeed spoke of bypassing their managers.  Grifting is bi-directional—
as executives connect with operators, excluding managers, operators may seek guidance 
from executives: 
“In company command, whenever we received mortar attacks and send the 
fire mission, we bypassed the [1UP] to speed things up” (U.S.-18). 
 
“In order to make something happen I had to cut out going through my [1UP] 
direct to the [2UP+ officer…in my view it was going to be the only way that 
we would achieve the objective by short-circuiting the chain of command” 
(U.K.-18). 
 
British officers noted that as clear lines of responsibility between levels of command 
eroded, unity of command became “quite blurry” (U.K.-22) where “you've got two 
chains of command” (U.K.-13) each with their own expectations and information 
demands: 
“The [3UP] was speaking to the [2UP], who was speaking to my [1UP], who 
was asking me as well for that information…so I was kind of getting it from all 
different angles to be honest…When it got slightly heated was when [3UP] 
staff came out directly to me, bypassing all the chain of command” (U.K.-16). 
 
“There are inevitably cases of two people in the same level of headquarters 
separated by a single wall asking [an operator] for exactly the same 
information at different times” (U.K.-17). 
 
Increased communication could both increase and decrease operator autonomy.  Officers 
expressed concern over the loss of operator autonomy as their decisions and actions were 
observed and recorded by managers and executives (U.S.-13; U.S.-14; U.S.-15) “based on a 
guy sitting in a room with a computer screen, but he knew better than I did” (U.S.-15). 
“If every radio set is being tracked around the battlefield, and every soldier's 
movement is visible on one screen to everyone, how much freedom does 
that give the guy on the ground? How much micromanagement comes in? I 
don't know. I think that's the fear from people on the ground” (U.K.-2). 
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“*Commanders+ can watch the guy down to the micro level…In the past there 
was always that level of not knowing.  Now they know exactly what I am 
doing.  Especially when you screw up” (U.S.-21).  
 
Yet even once the technology was in place, numerous officers stated they preferred to use 
other mediums: 
“It's quite easier and more effective...to pick up the phone and just talk it out 
or make the effort to try to see someone face-to-face and sit down and try 
and decide what it is that's going to happen next” (U.K.-18). 
 
“Face-to-face and being there was a lot better...I would go talk to [superiors] 
and follow it up with an email” (U.S.-19). 
 
“If you wanted to get to speak with somebody for a specific purpose, you 
can't beat face-to-face…I would hunt people down because as we all know 
the difficulty with electronic traffic is it can be conveniently ignored, or it can 
be immediately forgotten about because people think that what is your 
priority is not the recipient's priority. But if you go in face-to-face at an 
agreed time, you can do so much more business” (U.K.-30). 
 
6.3.4 Summary 
“I think people have tried to match the information systems onto their 
current structure…the current structures should be restructured in order to 
make allowances for the new information” (U.K.-31). 
 
The evidence here largely confirms what was expected—nanomanagement influences 
superior-subordinate relationships in different ways, depending on which level was analysed.  
Nanomanagement increased executive control, decreased manager autonomy, and produced 
variable changes to operator autonomy.  These changes speak primarily to effects of 
nanomanagement.  No longer is it only the subordinate that can violate the delegation 
contract by choosing to shirk instead of work; executives may now shift, drift and grift.  
Managers can be retained and controlled by exclusion, an ex claudere form of control.  
Operators may be empowered by increased information and a blurring of unity of command, 
but they may also see their autonomy reduced as now multiple superiors may observe their 
actions and request more information.  The tension of technology and hierarchy produces 
profound effects on superior-subordinate relationships. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
“Doctrine should be thrown out.  Who gives a shit what we did in 
[19]89?...Tech should allow us to cut out huge parts of the hierarchy.  
Everyone doesn't need to know everything at all times” (U.S.-21).80 
                                                          
80
 In the military, a term often heard is ‘need to know’ or the determination of whether “the intended 
recipient must have access to the information to perform his or her official duties” (U.S. Department 
of Defense, November 8, 2010, p. 257).  If information is on a ‘need to know’ basis, this means that 
information should not be shared with everyone.  The purpose of need to know information is to limit 
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Hierarchies allow for a specific type of control that manages information flow, restricts spans 
of control, and establishes a clear unity of command.  The U.S. and British armies have 
adopted technologies but retained their traditional hierarchical form.  This has produced 
effects throughout the organizational hierarchy.  By analyzing actors at different levels of a 
hierarchical structure, this chapter sought to explain differing effects of nanomanagement on 
superior-subordinate relationships. While each hierarchical level faces a common challenge 
of information overload, this chapter argued that nanomanagement affects these different 
hierarchical levels and roles in unique ways, creating incentives for executives to 
nanomanage, existential threats to managers, and challenges and opportunities for 
operators.   
 
For the executive, technologies enable them to monitor subordinates throughout the chain 
of command (shift), to direct action at subordinate levels (drift) and to cheat the hierarchy 
(grift) by communicating with levels beneath immediate subordinates.  While executives 
bring a wealth of experience to a lower level of their organization, this comes at a large cost.  
These tools allow distant executives to focus on one action, at the peril of ignoring all other 
actions and the executive-level tasks they are chartered to perform.  This may contribute to 
why the former Chief of the U.K. Defence Staff’s stated that the military had lost “an 
institutionalised capacity for, and culture of, strategic thought” (Stirrup, 2009).  The 
temptation to abandon strategic thought, to shift, drift and grift may be especially pernicious 
in a profession, where executives have progressed, and presumably succeeded, at lower 
levels of command.   
 
For managers, technology that empowers executives comes at substantial cost to manager 
autonomy.  The sub-categories of police patrols introduced in Chapter 5, especially long 
screwdrivers, enable ex claudere control, where executives can control managers by 
excluding them from their traditional role of managing operators.  While exclusion reduces a 
manager’s autonomy, exclusion does not obviate the manager’s need to understand what 
their operators are doing.  What results is a demand cascade of additional reporting, as 
managers scurry to maintain the information asymmetry and find out information about 
their operators before their superiors do.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
access, to protect information, to prevent people from thinking of things beyond their purview.  The 
concern is that with modern technology ‘need to know’ has been replaced with ‘everyone must know’ 
and with that a need to act, think, and conduct oneself outside one’s assigned role. 
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For the operator, technology allows access to previously unavailable information.  These 
operators bear the brunt of the demand cascade as well as face the potential for decreasing 
autonomy, as superiors—both managers and executives—can now take action at the 
operator level.  As their autonomy suffers, they will increasingly seek guidance for actions 
that they previously would have acted upon. Like executives, operators can also grift, 
bypassing their managers and seek guidance from executives, undermining unity of 
command.   
 
How can a hierarchical organization retain its form yet adopt network technologies?  The 
clearest path is to tread where business has gone before and eliminate positions now made 
redundant by technology.  Elimination of function without elimination of position is one of 
the seeds of the cycle of nanomanagement.  This would require policy and commanders at 
the mid and executive levels to accept fewer officers on their staffs.  As the U.S. and British 
governments look to cut back on defence spending, an elimination of mid-level officers could 
be the place to start.  This change would produce profound effects in each army, requiring 
assessments of future potential as promotion from operator to manager levels would 
necessarily require a much more austere promotion rate than 100%.  Yet professionals 
should not want to be a member of an organization that lets everyone in, nor promotes the 
worst alongside the best.  For an organization that accepts and promotes everyone is not 
exclusive, and cannot be considered a profession.     
 
Of course, just as standards can be relaxed, they can be tightened.  These changes are largely 
influenced internally; the last four chapters have explored factors largely within the control 
of actors inside an organization—its culture, use of ex ante, ex post, and hierarchical control.   
Yet could nanomanagement be caused by factors largely external to the organization?  To 
complete this analysis of the causes and effects of nanomanagement, in Chapter 7 this thesis 
assesses two exogenous factors outside of the confines of the organization. 
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 Exogenous factors: uncertainty and CHAPTER 7
accountability 
 
The previous chapters examined the dynamics of superior-subordinate relationships within 
the walls of an organization.  Factors—an organization’s culture, the use of ex ante and ex 
post controls by superiors, and an actor’s position within an organization’s structure—were 
assessed to explain both the causes and effects of nanomanagement.  Yet organizations do 
not exist in vacuums; they operate within changing environments and evolving societal 
conditions.  Can conditions outside the organization motivate actors inside the organization 
to nanomanage?  This chapter concludes the analysis by examining how two related 
exogenous factors—uncertainty and rising accountability—influence superior control and 
subordinate autonomy within an organization.   
 
The first exogenous factor assessed is uncertainty.  Wilson claimed that organizations were 
born out of uncertainty; through structuring various actors’ roles and relationships, 
organizations provide a stable response to an unstable environment (2000, p. 221).  
Organizational structure helps actors see a chaotic world in an ordered way—one may not 
know what the next day will bring, but one knows their role, who their superior and 
subordinates are, and the requirements each needs fulfilled.  Uncertainty external to the 
organization is countered by a certainty of role inside the organization.    
 
Military organizations are formed to reduce the environmental uncertainty of warfare, 
defining roles to help manage the chaos and confusion of combat.  When military command 
is seen as “an endless quest for certainty” (Van Creveld, 1985, p. 264), the amount of 
superior control and subordinate autonomy inside an organization can be seen largely as 
response to the uncertain environment of war.81  Yet what occurs when not just the 
environment is uncertain, but one’s role is uncertain as well?  When external changes 
demand changes to internal roles, one should expect resistance—organizations tend to be 
conditioned to view the world in a specific way and are difficult to change.  This study 
expands this understanding of how variable uncertainty—of both the role of actors and the 
environment—conditions superior-subordinate relationships.   
 
                                                          
81
 As Chapter 4 explained, militaries, like other professions, sought to mitigate this uncertainty by 
training and preparing their professionals to master a field of abstract knowledge that they could then 
apply to uncertain environments.   
166 
 
Where uncertainty has been endemic to warfare, increasing accountability is thought to be a 
more contemporary phenomenon of the information age.  Organizations large and small face 
increasing calls for greater accountability for what they do and how they do it.    As 
accountability and transparency provide an alternative to self-policing, societies have 
increased the use of external audits and investigations to control organizations and make 
them more accountable (Power, 1999). Seeking to comply and demonstrate transparency, 
these organizations have increased their own internal monitoring and control systems 
(Power, 2000a, 2007). These audits, both external and internal, produce a rise of 
protocolization—an explosion of rules, standard operating procedures and regulations—that 
increasingly guide organizational practice. 
 
External and internal auditors can now employ technology to know more about what is 
occurring inside an organization, complicating accountability and liability.  If technology exists 
that allows the highest superior to monitor, track and record the activities of the lowest 
subordinate, must it be employed?  If it is, what are the effects?  If it is not, who is liable for 
subordinate misdeeds—the subordinate, or the superior who failed to employ all the 
available monitoring tools?  In this chapter, both doctrine and empirical findings are used to 
assess whether in an environment of accountability, superiors must nanomanage both to 
avoid external audit and to reduce their liability exposure.   
 
This case provides a unique opportunity to examine uncertainty and accountability for three 
reasons.  First, the case captures variable uncertainty over time, both in the environment and 
in each actor’s role.  In Iraq, the invasion phase was characterized by the uncertain 
environment endemic to war.  Uncertainty over the enemy (Would Saddam Hussein use the 
chemical and biological weapons he was believed to have?  Would he destroy the bridges 
and dams across the Tigris and Euphrates?), the allies (Would Turkey allow the 4th Infantry 
Division passage through their country?), and even the weather (Would sandstorms impede 
progress to Baghdad?) influenced military decision making.  Following the rapid invasion, this 
uncertainty over the environment persisted.  Should the coalition dissolve Iraq’s military?  
Where were the leaders of the Iraq regime?  What type of government should be installed 
and what method should be employed to install it?  As the insurgency began in earnest in the 
summer of 2003 and grew into what some characterized as a civil war by 2006, who was 
friend or foe?  
 
Uncertainty also varied in the role each military officer performed.  In the invasion, roles 
were largely certain.  Officers performed tasks for which they had trained.  However, 
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post-invasion Iraq was characterized with uncertainty over roles.  Should soldiers deter 
looting?  Should soldiers hand out food and water to civilians?  Should an officer focus on 
developing Iraqi capability or on securing the Iraqi population?  As the mission changed and 
officers groped for a role, their traditional and trained-for roles became uncertain. Over the 
six years of this case (2003-2008), units became more experienced.  In this case, where other 
contemporary military engagements were comparatively short (e.g. the ground combat of 
the Gulf War lasted only 100 hours) or static (e.g. the peacekeeping roles in Kosovo), as 
individuals and units return for their second, third and greater deployments, best practices, 
standard operating procedures and a familiarity with the Iraqi environment increased.  As 
environmental uncertainty decreased, roles became more certain over time.   
 
Second, the case captures a unique timeframe of increasing external pressure, and internal 
need, to give account.  In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, public opinion and approval of 
the British and U.S. mission surged.  As the conflict dragged on, casualties mounted, and 
prisoner abuse scandals covered the front pages in both the U.S. and Britain, support of the 
mission in Iraq fell.  As discussed in Chapter 4, external trust is vital for a profession to 
conduct its business.  The loss of external trust may create incentives for nanomanagement.  
The case provides a lens through which to understand how organizations respond to greater 
calls for accountability from external bodies.  Just as the audit explosion leads to an audit 
implosion, with increased calls for the military to account for its actions to others, I anticipate 
increased calls for accountability within the military.   
 
Third, this case provides a unique perspective on the influence of technology on uncertainty 
and accountability.  Set within the broader societal context of the rising audit society in the 
U.K. and the increasing litigious society in the U.S., the armies that entered Iraq in 2003 
possessed a dramatically different suite of technology than the armies of 2008.  The case of 
Iraq from 2003-2008 provides an excellent lens through which to understand effects—how 
nanomanagement, as a response to environmental and role uncertainty as well as internal 
and external pressures for greater accountability, influences superior-subordinate 
relationships.  Where the time of deployment mattered less in previous chapters, in this 
chapter the time of deployment captures these changing exogenous factors.   
 
Section 7.1 will examine uncertainty, both environmental and role.  Section 7.2 will discuss 
accountability, the changes to liability and the increased protocolization of work.  Section 7.3 
will then present evidence from the interviews.  Section 7.4 will conclude. 
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7.1 Uncertainty  
 
Organizations are formed largely to manage uncertainty, replacing the random actions and 
whims of free actors with structure, rules, order and discipline (Beck, 1992; Kale & McIntyre, 
1991).  The adoption of modern technologies affects the tension between those seeking to 
manage and eliminate uncertainty and those seeking to accept and plan for uncertainty.  This 
section explores this tension by first introducing the theories surrounding uncertainty and 
then discussing the uncertainty endemic to war, and how this uncertainty is dealt with in the 
doctrine of both the U.S. and British armies.  Armies use two opposing military strategies—
one rooted in the writings of Sun Tzu, the other in Clausewitz—to combat the exogenous 
factor of uncertainty. 
 
7.1.1 The influence of uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty conditions each of the four previously discussed factors.  Chapter 3 illustrated 
that organizational cultures vary based on traits, one of which is “uncertainty avoidance” 
(Hofstede, 1984) defined as “the extent to which ambiguous situations are threatening to 
individuals, to which rules and order are preferred, and to which uncertainty is tolerated in a 
society” (R. J. House, 2004, p. 602).  For cultures intolerant of ambiguity, one expects to see 
increased rules, laws and technology employed to mitigate uncertainty (R. J. House, 2004).   
 
Chapter 4 discussed how professional organizations trust their subordinates to act following 
selection, screening and training; this training allows autonomous subordinates to adapt to 
an uncertain environment.  Trust is seen as an effective method of control (Bromiley & 
Cummings, 1992; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Le Grand, 2003) especially in uncertain environments 
(Dore, 1983).  As experienced and trained professional subordinates perform in their role, 
the implication is that they will be trusted.  However, as subordinates move outside this role 
into unfamiliar actions and environments they are trusted less (Mayer, et al., 1995).  The 
discussion of costs and ex post monitoring in Chapter 5 showed that efforts to reduce 
uncertainty generated transaction costs to both superiors and subordinates.  Technology that 
reduces uncertainty reduces costs only so far; the ideal is the self-observing and 
self-disciplining subordinate (P. Miller & O'Leary, 1987).   
 
Chapter 6 illustrated how organizational structures vary with the uncertainty of actors.  The 
management of uncertainty is seen as one of the main organizational maintenance tasks of 
executives who believe that “more information means less uncertainty” (James Wilson, 2000, 
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p. 228).  Yet there is broad disagreement in how managing uncertainty influences actors 
throughout a hierarchy.  Some believe that uncertain environments call for delegated 
decision making, where those further from the top must be empowered to make decisions 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Others believe 
when goals are uncertain “more discretionary authority in an agency is pushed upward to the 
top” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 133), where decisions that were once made by subordinates 
should now be made by superiors (Staw & Boettger, 1990).   
 
7.1.2 Uncertainty in warfare and doctrine 
 
The degree to which organizations can and should reduce environmental uncertainty is the 
subject of much debate.  Numerous studies have found that the greater the uncertainty of 
the environment, the greater the amount of information demanded by superiors (Galbraith, 
1977; K. H. Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, p. 615; Tetlock, 1985).  Superiors seeking more 
information encourage protocolization, promulgating rules, regulations and SOPs that 
systemize the production and flow of information.  Wilson argued “*the SOP+ is not the 
enemy of organization; it is the essence of organization” (2000, p. 221), yet rules can go only 
so far.  Even the most exacting rules fail to produce a certain environment (March & Olsen, 
2004, p. 10).  Accepting that perfect knowledge cannot be obtained, and that efforts to do so 
are costly to both superiors and subordinates, organizations design systems that account for 
uncertainty in the environment by creating certainty in actors’ roles (Bernstein, 1996, p. 229).   
 
As war is “the most unpredictable of all human activities,” uncertainty is widely discussed in 
military theory  and doctrine (Coker, 2009, p. 174).  The U.S. Department of Defense’s 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published just weeks after September 11, 2001, called 
for “a new strategy for America's defense that would embrace uncertainty and contend with 
surprise” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001b, p. III).  2006’s QDR saw the operational 
environment “characterized by uncertainty and surprise” (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2006b, p. vi).  The 2010 QDR stated “*t+he United States faces a complex and uncertain 
security landscape” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010b, p. iii).  The U.K. Ministry of 
Defence’s most recent Strategic Defence Review (SDR) went so far as labelling today “the age 
of uncertainty” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010b, p. 4) in its title Securing Britain in an Age of 
Uncertainty.82 
                                                          
82
 This uncertainty is enshrined in both armies’ doctrine but with slightly different degrees of 
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.  The British Army seems more Clausewitzian: “No matter how much 
information there is in conflict, a ‘fog of war’ will descend that can lead to uncertainty” (U.K. Ministry 
of Defence, 2010a, pp. 3-2).  U.S. doctrine recommends more of a Sun Tzu approach: “Good 
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Yet two of the fathers of military theory, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, recommend diametrically 
opposed approaches to dealing with environmental uncertainty.  Sun Tzu recognized 
uncertainty as pervasive, but recommended that commanders could obtain more perfect 
knowledge with greater information (Freedman, 1998, p. 318).  In The Art of War, Sun Tzu 
recommended a commander request ever more information about himself, his forces and 
the enemy, seeing more information correlating directly to less uncertainty and better 
command in war (Tzu, 2007). 
 
Clausewitz described a fog and friction in war between truth and report that contributed to 
the “great uncertainty of all data in War”.83  However a Clausewitzian approach sees more 
information would not necessarily help, and could potentially hinder, the commander.  The 
collection, storage and analysis of additional intelligence may deluge the commander, adding 
to the friction of war (Handel, 1992).  Clausewitz recommended commanders accept 
uncertainty and weigh the limited marginal benefit of additional information against the 
significant cost to obtaining that information.   
 
In the modern era, one finds adherents of both a Sun Tzuian or Clausewitzian approach to 
uncertainty.84  However the doctrine of both U.S. and British armies reflect a more 
Clausewitzian approach: 
“In contemporary operations, effort to reduce centralisation and increase 
decentralisation is especially important. A commander could retain a high 
degree of control himself, thereby reducing his own level of uncertainty, but 
he should aim to delegate decision-making authority to his subordinates, 
perhaps reducing his own ability to influence events directly. This will have 
the benefit of reducing uncertainty at lower levels and improving the ability 
of his subordinates to act and react themselves” (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 
2010a, pp. 6-24). 
 
“Predictability is rare, making centralized decision making and orderly 
processes ineffective...leaders of forces in contact can often see and act on 
immediate opportunities and threats better than their superiors can. 
Delegating the greatest possible authority to subordinates helps the force 
                                                                                                                                                                       
leadership, flexible organizations, and dependable technology can lessen uncertainty” (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 1-18). 
83
 “The great uncertainty of all data in War is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain 
extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently—like the effect of a fog or 
moon shine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance” (Clausewitz, et 
al., 1976, pp. Book 2, Chapter 2, Paragraph 24). 
84
 Some early proponents of NCW and NEC saw technology as the chance to abolish Clausewitz and lift 
the fog of war (Owens & Offley, 2000).  Other military thinkers warned about being transfixed with 
technology: “technological advances cannot eliminate ambiguity, uncertainty, chance, and the forces 
of chaos from the field of conflict” (Macgregor, 1997, p. 123).   
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adapt the operation to the situation quickly and retain the initiative” (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 3-6). 
 
While both doctrines recommend superiors accept a degree of uncertainty, U.S. Army 
doctrine recommends two solutions to reduce uncertainty—an information-focused solution, 
that reflects Sun Tzu’s belief and an action-focused solution, reflecting Clausewitz.  Stating 
that “Commanders use both,” U.S. doctrine captures the trade-offs of these two approaches: 
“The information-focused solution reduces uncertainty at the higher 
echelons by collecting more and better data, and increasing the information 
processing capability at the top. This solution results in greater uncertainty at 
lower echelons because those echelons either do not have the information 
or receive it later than the higher ones. This approach requires greater 
control of lower-level commanders and more detailed orders.” 
 
“The action-focused solution reduces uncertainty evenly throughout the 
force. Commanders train their organizations to manage and cope with 
uncertainty as part of normal operations. They delegate authority for 
decision making to those levels that can acquire and process the information 
adequately. This solution may result in less certainty at higher levels. The 
action-focused solution leads to more general, flexible orders and a more 
agile force. The information-focused solution may not be as efficient as the 
action-focused solution because even increased information collection does 
not provide absolute certainty. Although focusing information processing at 
the top can produce enough information to execute operations, it may cost 
the efficiency and time” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 1-11). 
 
That an organization has competing beliefs and doctrines inside it returns to the discussion of 
culture in Chapter 3.  As seen with the replacement of orders-based tactics (Befehlstaktik) 
with mission-based tactics (Auftragstaktik), organizations often are somewhere within a 
continuum of contrasting doctrines of what is best and right.  As technologies are employed 
to nanomanage, and either succeed or fail, this results in varying degrees of adoption of a 
more Sun Tzuian or Clausewitzian approach.   
 
7.1.3 Summary 
 
Conditioning all previous factors of this study, in war environmental uncertainty is both 
endemic and variable.  The desire to reduce uncertainty has been a common desire of 
commanders throughout millennia of warfare.  One tactic to reduce this environmental 
uncertainty is to make roles certain.  Military doctrine recommends two options to reduce 
uncertainty: an information-based choice of requesting ever more information that 
centralizes decision making, recommended by Sun Tzu; and an action-based choice that 
limits the amount of information requested and decentralizes decision making, 
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recommended by Clausewitz.  This thesis next examines an exogenous factor more particular 
and pervasive in the contemporary environment—rising accountability. 
 
7.2 Rising accountability 
 
With the rapid defeat of Iraq forces, in May 2003, public opinion polls in both the U.S. and 
the U.K. reflected public approval of the Iraq War (IPSOS-Mori, 2003).  As the insurgency 
began and casualties mounted, support in both countries eroded.  Yet it was not until the 
spring of 2004, coinciding with the exposure of the prisoner abuse scandal of Abu Ghraib, 
was a threshold for support crossed—from 2004 on, more Americans would oppose the Iraq 
War than support it (Pew Research, 2008).  In response to Abu Ghraib (and a similar prisoner 
abuse scandal involving British Army forces) numerous U.S. and U.K. governmental inquiries 
were initiated, seeking to have the military give account of their procedures.  Whom, within 
the military and civilian chain of command, knew what and when consumed the time and 
attention of both the U.S. Congress and Parliament (Townsend, Doward, & Beaumont, 2005).   
 
In testimony to the U.S. Senate and House Armed Services Committees, then U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld stated: 
“In recent days, there has been a good deal of discussion about who bears 
responsibility for the terrible activities that took place at Abu Ghraib. These 
events occurred on my watch. As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for 
them. I take full responsibility” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004). 
 
Later in the testimony, a senator questioned whether it would have been better had 
Secretary Rumsfeld come forward earlier to hold those accountable.  To this, Secretary 
Rumsfeld responded: 
“Well, Senator Collins, I wish I had done that…we’re functioning in a — with 
peacetime restraints, with legal requirements in a wartime situation, in the 
information age, where people are running around with digital cameras and 
taking these unbelievable photographs and then passing them off, against 
the law, to the media, to our surprise, when they had not even arrived in the 
Pentagon” (Associated Press, 2004). 
 
In the end, while eleven low-ranking soldiers were found guilty of various crimes, no senior 
U.S. officers or administration officials were found guilty for the actions at Abu Ghraib.  The 
response to Abu Ghraib represents the complex, accountable environment in which the U.S. 
and British armies operated—decreasing public support of the Iraq War, increasing calls for 
external and internal accountability, technology that captures more information and can be 
communicated instantly and largely effortlessly both to internal and external superiors, and 
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questions pertaining to who is liable when something goes wrong.  This section examines this 
complex environment of accountability and its related influence on the causes and effects of 
nanomanagement. 
 
7.2.1 Accountability  
 
The increasing demand for organizations and individuals to account for their actions is 
reflected in the dramatic increase of auditing (Power, 1999).85  This form of accounting has its 
roots in the swelling use of rules and regulations for organizational control (Weber, et al., 
1947; James  Wilson, 1980),  the adoption of ‘New Public Management’ techniques in the 
U.K. (Hood, 1991; Power, 2000b, p. 114), the expanded legalization of procedures and 
performance measures in the U.S. (Power, 2007; Radin, 2006; Sitkin & Bies, 1994a), and a 
overall decline in trust of institutions (Fukuyama, 1995; O'Neill, 2002, 2006).   Power (1999) 
dubbed this collective phenomenon the “audit explosion” empowering the external regulator 
to control organizations and by extension, the actors within.  The rise of the external audit 
quickly led to the “audit implosion” and a dramatic adoption of internal monitoring and 
control systems (Power, 2000a).  As a means to pre-empt external audit, executives, 
chartered with organizational maintenance, increased the transparency within their 
organizations (Power, 2000a).86   
 
That auditing exploded as information technologies were increasingly adopted is no 
coincidence.  O’Neill sees technology promulgating rules and regulations leading to “an 
endless quest for greater, faster and more precise accountability” (2002, p. 7).  Technology 
does reduce the transaction costs of auditing (e.g. monetary, time spent), making it cheaper, 
faster and more precise.  As digitization reduces storage and search constraints, audits 
became feasible as modern technologies “reduce*d+ the cost of disclosing large amounts of 
organizational data to the public at large” (Hood, 2006, p. 217).  These reduced transaction 
costs greatly benefited external auditors.  Yet what was the cost to the audited 
organizations? 
 
A fundamental cost of greater accountability is rooted in transaction costs theory.  Greater 
accountability costs the auditor the time and resources spent fielding and analyzing an audit, 
                                                          
85
 Auditing differs from our earlier discussion of monitoring: monitoring (what Power calls 
‘surveillance’) focused on control of people while audits focus on control of organizations (Power, 
1999).   
86
 Critiques of the concept of an audit society or explosion (Bowerman, Raby, & Humphrey, 2000) 
centred on definitions and empirical evidence.  Yet few doubt that contemporary public organization 
face greater external scrutiny for their procedures, structure, finances and their subordinates’ actions. 
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and in the resources used complying with increasing information demands by those audited 
(Fukuyama, 2004).  Increased accountability has three broad effects: first, what data is 
collected; second, what a subordinate reports; and third, what a subordinate does (Power, 
1999, p. 13).  First, in terms of what data is collected, technology creates an “empirical 
mood” that sees accountability based on quantifiable evidence (Power, 2007, p. 158).  
Advocates of performance measurement believe that all actions and activities of an 
organization can be measured and quantified (Radin, 2006).  This places a value on numbers 
and the “quantitative presentation of accomplishments” that may not fully capture reality or 
what an agent did and how they did it (Radin, 2006, p. 240).  As the qualitative is difficult to 
quantify and therefore audit (Schein, 2010), subordinates comply with quantification, 
distilling their efforts into metrics and data (Hubbard, 2010; Porter, 1995).  Why trust a 
subjective assessment when “numbers replace trust”(D. Boyle, 2004, p. 35)?  This 
quantification of qualitative effort is “intrinsically at odds with professionalism, since its aim 
is to reduce discretion as much as possible” (Freidson, 2001).   
 
Second, increased accountability may influence what a subordinate reports (Prat, 2006, p. 
99).  This manipulation may be subtle, with mere degrees of emphasis and de-emphasis, or 
much more nefarious.  Under persistent monitoring and auditing, subordinates can respond 
with delay and fabrication of records (Hood & Rothstein, 2001; O'Neill, 2002, p. 73; Schein, 
2010).  Examples of such fabrication include changing and manipulating records to meet the 
perceived desires of superiors (James Wilson, 2000, p. 228), failing to report news and 
information that may be negatively perceived by superiors (Williamson, 1992) and producing 
an “overall decline of candour”  (A. Roberts, 2006, pp. 112-114).  An increase in monitoring 
by superiors can produce “excruciating levels of accountability” where “verification 
increasingly substitutes for trust” (Schrage, 2003, p. 10).   
 
Third, increased accountability may influence what a subordinate does, primarily through 
incentivizing subordinates to do less (Power, 1999, p. 147).  With more accountability, 
operators face increasing risk that their actions will be known and that they will be 
sanctioned if they do not perform the task to standard (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997c, p. 464; 
Leonhard, 1998).  In these environments, documentation, as opposed to action, increases in 
importance (G.P. Huber, 1990; C. Wilson, 2004b, p. 222).  Accountability increases the 
incentives to create audit trails, recording every communication with superiors to later justify 
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one’s actions.  These audit trails drive up transaction costs; as subordinates report more, 
they act less (Hood, 2006).87  
 
7.2.2 Variants of accountability: liability and blame 
 
As organizations become more accountable, deviant action is increasingly known and can be 
punished.  As a result, an increase in accountability is related to an increased concern of 
liability (Sitkin & Bies, 1994b) and blame (Hood, 2002, 2006, 2011).   Liability is a major 
source of tension between actors across an organizational hierarchy conditioning what actors 
report and do where “*i+f the administrator is going to get into trouble for what an operator 
does, the former will find ways of making the decision for the latter” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 
133).  Liability generates “a climate of organizational defensiveness” which conditions what 
an actor reports, placing a premium on “rationalized approaches to show they have done 
everything that is reasonable because of fear of institutional sanctions” (Power, 2007, p. 11).  
By demonstrating due diligence, box checking, rules and procedures actors may report they 
“did all they reasonably could have done to foresee and prevent those loses” (Hood, 2011, p. 
91).  Emplacing these rules allows the most senior leaders to “transfer liability and risk” to 
subordinates (Hunt, 2003; O'Neill, 2002, p. 87).  This protocolization reduces agent discretion 
“turning human functionaries into some approximation of robots” (Hood, 2011, p. 93).  
Actors take a defensive posture of risk aversion, caring more about avoiding and shifting 
blame to other actors and less about their delegated tasks (Hood, 2011, p. 5).   
 
Liability and blame can be understood differently depending on the actor’s position in the 
organizational structure.  Hood’s analysis of blame at multiple levels employs a military 
analogy of generals (i.e. executives), infantry (i.e. operators) and “all those who care to be 
found somewhere between the generals and the infantry” (i.e. managers)(Hood, 2011, p. 
25).  The executives possess resources to restructure organizations such that blame can be 
shifted down or out.  As technology increases the ability for superiors to know, it 
subsequently increases their liability for not knowing.  If technologies exist that monitor and 
record subordinate action and reports make subordinates more accountable, yet superiors 
                                                          
87
 The threat of audit increases the rules and regulations under which a professional practices (O'Neill, 
2002, p. 49).  While professions seek to apply abstract knowledge, to fundamentally apply qualitative 
judgment to unique, circumstances, with a rise of accountability “subjective personal judgments are 
replaced by impersonal bureaucratic rules, which…are less effective and more costly to implement” 
(Fukuyama, 1995, p. 311). Indeed, a profession’s autonomy makes it a more likely candidate for audits 
as “*a+udits exist to negotiate and represent the accountability of autonomous agents; if these agents 
were not autonomous audit would be unnecessary” (Power, 1999, p. 135; Shapiro, 1986, p. 212).   
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do not adopt them, superiors face the threat of being liable.  Recent laws and trends in the 
U.S. and U.K. reflect: from CEOs, now liable for their content of their financial statements; to 
medical doctors, paying hundreds of thousands of dollars annually for liability insurance; to 
phone hacking scandals, where who knew what and when determines who is fired and who 
is retained.   
 
The operators have few resources to shift blame but can more easily claim victimhood using 
ill-informed orders, vague procedures and policies to shift liability toward the top (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; James Wilson, 2000).  They may also shift blame upwards if superiors 
interfered in decisions supposedly delegated (Hood, 2002, p. 30).  As Weber (1947) saw rules 
and regulations used for control, the modern manifestation can be seen in automated 
programs that force operators to follow specified steps and decision trees.  While these 
programs reduce the operator’s discretion, they also allow the operator to blame the system 
when something goes awry (Hood, 2011).  These same technologies that reduce the 
discretion of street-level bureaucrats may shift liability from the rule followers to the rule 
creators (Lipsky, 1980). 
 
The managers can be caught in the middle, with blame “directed to them from top-and 
bottom-level players” (Hood, 2011, p. 35).  Technology however allows them to shift blame 
(Hood, 2011, p. 129).  One strategy that has emerged is ‘locking in’ or ensuring superiors are 
aware of decisions.  By copying superiors on all emails, managers can ensure that they have 
an email record, with time stamp, proving that their superiors were aware of their activities, 
or their subordinates received the order by a certain time.  Whether the email was read, 
analysed and understood is less important (Hood, 2011).  Liability-minded subordinates now 
can produce the documentation, the read receipts and their own audit trail that can prove 
that their actions were conducted with full knowledge of their superiors. 
 
The exogenous factors of accountability, liability and blame influence superior-subordinate 
relationships inside an organization.  The next section demonstrates that the military also 
faced increasing accountability, reflected in the doctrine of both the U.S. and British armies 
as well as in the increasing presence and role of lawyers in combat.   
 
7.2.3 Accountability in the U.S. and British armies 
 
The doctrine of both the U.S. and British armies has long maintained that individuals can be 
held criminally accountable for their actions.  Guided by the Law of Land Warfare, Geneva 
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Conventions, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice and other regulations, this personal 
liability is well discussed in doctrine.  Both armies’ doctrine emphasizes that in 
superior-subordinate relationships, subordinates are accountable to superiors while 
superiors are accountable for all subordinate actions: 
“While commanders can delegate authority, they cannot delegate 
responsibility. Subordinates are accountable to their commanders for the use 
of delegated authority, but commanders remain solely responsible and 
accountable for the actions over which subordinates exercise delegated 
authority” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 2-3). 
 
“A commander can devolve specific authority to subordinates to decide and 
to act within their own areas of delegated responsibility, but the overall 
responsibility is his…[Commanders] are responsible for how those under 
their command act and should not derogate that responsibility by failing to 
supervise…Accountability involves a liability and an obligation to answer to a 
superior for the proper use of authority and resources” (U.K. Ministry of 
Defence, 2010a, pp. 6-10). 
 
While superiors are accountable for all their subordinates do, and fail to do, who is liable?  In 
the last 10 years, U.S. Army doctrine remained largely consistent stating that “*c+ommanders 
assume legally established and moral obligations, both for their decisions and for the actions, 
accomplishments, and failures of their units” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003, pp. 2-3).   
 
Yet the past ten years has seen the British Army become more reflective of the times.  In 
2005, British Army doctrine did not mention liability associated with command.  Yet in 2009, 
the U.K. court of appeals upheld a ruling by the High Court granting soldiers protection under 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  British Army commanders would now be liable 
for failing to provide soldiers adequate equipment and “had an obligation to avoid or 
minimize risks to the lives of its troops” (Hurst & Bird, 2008).  This increasing liability was 
reflected in the 2010 update to British Army doctrine, which introduced the concept of 
“Command Accountability” holding commanders “criminally accountable” for their 
subordinates’ actions (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 2-13).88 
 
                                                          
88
 “Individual members of the armed forces are accountable for their own actions on 
operations…Commanders have additional accountability in that they can be criminally accountable if 
they knew or ought to have known that crimes were being committed or were about to be committed 
and they failed to take all necessary and reasonable action to prevent or investigate them” (U.K. 
Ministry of Defence, 2010a, pp. 2-13).  The key qualifier ‘if they knew or ought to have known’ is 
further complicated by information technologies providing further imperative to nanomanage 
subordinates.  If soldiers are nanomanaged, do we lose a sense of individual accountability for their 
decision making (Coker, 2008) that forms the ethical basis of war (Cornish, 2006)?  Does the word 
‘ought’ imply that any technology available should or must be employed? 
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Scholars believed increased command liability within the military would manifest in different 
ways.  Storr predicted commanders would “tend to be highly conservative…to allow 
subordinates little freedom of action…to seek precise direction from superiors” (Storr, 2002, 
p. 88).  Others thought officers would be deliberately vague, diffusing responsibility such that 
it would be difficult to hold individual officers accountable (A. King, 2011; Ledwidge, 2011).  
Much of this debate continues as either tactic is difficult to observe and measure.  Yet a 
tangible representation of increased liability within the military is the increasing proportion 
and role of uniformed lawyers. 
 
The rise of military lawyers 
Power sees increasing liability manifested in the growth of legal departments and roles of 
lawyers inside organizations (2007, pp. 111-112), and the military is no exception (Coker, 
2008; Cornish, 2006; Martins, 2011; Myrow, 1996).  Prior to the 1980s, military lawyers were 
rarely found in combatant headquarters.89  Yet the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions for the first time obligated signatories to “ensure that legal advisers are 
available, when necessary, to advise military commanders” (Geneva Conventions, 1977).  
Whether in response to treaties (Yoo & Sulmasy, 2007), deviant soldier action (Borch, 2001) 
or international humanitarian law (Risius, 2005), the role of military lawyers has increased 
dramatically “from back-line staff officers to wartime advisors” (Yoo & Sulmasy, 2007, p. 
841).  In both the U.S. and British armies, legal officers (commonly referred to as judge 
advocates or JAGs) now deploy alongside commanders and are found in every major 
combatant headquarters (Kramer & Schmitt, 2008).  Military lawyers are far more than 
simply present, but filling an active role “an integral part of operational planning” (Risius, 
2005, p. 21).90  
 
Reflecting this chapter’s focus on how the environment conditions relationships, the nature 
of contemporary war has been seen as instigating the increased role of lawyers: 
“In a battlefield environment thick with media and nongovernmental 
organization scrutiny, every tactical event risks strategic consequences.  Such 
transparency heightens the influence of legal advisers over choices made by 
commanders because the mere perception of an operation as unlawful 
                                                          
89
 During the Falklands War, British Army military lawyers arrived in theatre only upon completion of 
hostilities and “the very idea that lawyers might have a role to play…would have been regarded with 
amusement” (Risius, 2005, p. 23).   
90
 An interesting ‘Burger King theory’ emerged that as a theatre becomes more routine, more lawyers 
deploy, and a higher proportion of legal accountability is expected:  “*i+f a Soldier can eat at Burger 
King, he is also more likely to face court-martial for any serious misconduct he may commit. If he is 
deployed somewhere without a Burger King, it is less likely that his misconduct will be addressed by 
court-martial. This notion, which suggests that combat zone courts-martial are rare except on stable, 
large, garrison-style bases, can be called the Burger King Theory” (Kramer & Schmitt, 2008). 
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(whether true or not) can hinder future operations, place troops at risk, and 
adversely affect the professional advancement of those involved.  As never 
before, judge advocates are valued, and their advice heeded” (Kramer & 
Schmitt, 2008). 
 
This increasing role has been codified in doctrine and practice.  In January 2006, the British 
Army formalized an Operational Law Branch to provide “expert advice on the practical 
application of international law on operations” (U.K. Department of the Army, 2008a, p. 16) 
with the intention that “permanent formations should always have legal officers” (Risius, 
2005, p. 30).  In the U.S., doctrine now mandates that all plans, policies, directives and rules 
issued by a commander “are reviewed by legal advisors to ensure their consistency with *the 
DoD Law of War Program+ and the law of war” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006a, p. para 
5.11.18).  The role and importance of military lawyers in Iraq was reflected in the words of 
General David Petraeus:  
“Military lawyers were true combat multipliers in Iraq…we “threw” lawyers 
at very difficult problems and they produced solutions in virtually every 
case—often under very challenging circumstances and in an uncertain 
security environment…I tried to get all the lawyers we could get our hands 
on—and then sought more” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007a, pp. II-9). 
 
This increased number, role and presence of military lawyers did not occur without 
resistance.  Scholars asked should “[a]rmy OPLAW [operational law] advisors sit through 
combat engagements in the operations center, monitoring tactical radio traffic for possible 
problems?” (Solis, 2007).  Yoo and Sulmasy went further, stating that the presence of lawyers 
in command posts “interferes with the efforts of military commanders to achieve victory on 
the battlefield” (2007, p. 1836), that “the growth in JAG influence can have a detrimental 
impact on the nation's ability to win wars” (2007, p. 1836) and that the “unregulated 
deference to the JAGs has limited some combat operations, and will continue to do so” 
(2007, p. 1844).   
 
7.2.4 Summary 
 
The growth of auditing and drive for greater accountability is an external force that can 
influence how superiors monitor subordinates within an organization.  Increasing 
accountability may also replace qualified judgement with quantification.  Further, with 
increasing accountability, officers will be compelled to nanomanage—if they can hold 
subordinates accountable, they must.  While rising accountability may be a more 
contemporary factor, it helps meet the endemic need to reduce uncertainty.  I turn now to 
the empirical evidence, this case where variable uncertainty meets increasing accountability. 
180 
 
 
7.3 Empirical findings  
 
This section presents the impressions of both armies’ officers in regards to uncertainty and 
accountability.  To explore uncertainty, I asked officers to assess the uncertainty of their role 
(e.g “How uncertain was your day-to-day?”) and how they became more or less certain over 
time.   
 
7.3.1 Uncertainty 
 
During the invasion, officers reported being certain in their role, while the environment was 
very uncertain.  They saw this relating to granted autonomy: 
“*During the invasion]…I had one hundred percent freedom to what I wanted 
to do …it's symptomatic of you being in a high intensity conflict.  People 
actually have jobs to do…we didn’t have time to be playing around with the 
computer” (U.K.-13). 
 
“In *the invasion+…everybody knew what their role was.  Everyone knew 
what the command intent was, and everybody was significantly resourced, 
and there wasn't a requirement to get involved and change the plan” (U.K.-
14).   
 
“We knew exactly what we knew we needed to do…*the invasion] was no 
different from what we trained for” (U.K.-21). 
 
“*During the invasion+ was a tremendous amount of uncertainty.  I think it 
gave us more freedom” (U.S.-18). 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion (2003), officers reported that both the 
environment and their roles become highly uncertain: 
“After the *invasion+…nobody knew exactly how to control the situation 
where we found ourselves in” (U.K.-11). 
 
“The whole concept of what we were doing drastically changed.  So my job 
changed completely” (U.K.-10). 
 
“*We+ would be doing things quite alien to what we'd done before…We 
haven't got a book for this...We were learning all the time” (U.K.-2). 
 
 “*After the invasion] there was a general sense of looking for something to 
do” (U.S.-15). 
 
“The first tour was extremely dynamic because my mission changed 
mid-deployment…but it was discovery learning for the most part” (U.S.-05). 
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As the conflict shifted into a counterinsurgency fight, between 2004-2006, officers became 
more familiar with the environment but there was uncertainty over role.  As a winning 
strategy was groped for, officers groped for their role:  
“There was theoretical understanding, but no real experience…We were 
making up processes” (U.K.-12). 
 
“Vagueness was kind of a nice luxury.  But sometimes it's frustrating because 
you kind of have to make it up on your own as you go along” (U.S.-06). 
 
“We had to double-check everything, which probably meant that my boss 
had to double-check everything else and that my subordinates had to 
double-check everything else. We were all learning” (U.K.-2). 
  
“There was an element of micromanagement to a degree because it was a 
new role, a new task, and I don't think any of the levels of command had a 
good understanding of what this was really going to look like...So because of 
frankly mutual ignorance on everybody's part, you end up going down a level 
quite a lot to get a better understanding of what was happening at that 
level”  (U.K.-12). 
 
Beginning in early 2007, a new strategy of counterinsurgency was settled upon.  By this time, 
most officers were on their second, third or fourth deployments.  For those officers in the 
last years of the case (2007-2008) as the environment became more certain and officers had 
more deployments and more time in Iraq, they tended to describe their roles becoming 
increasingly certain:  “It was really boring. Fairly certain” (U.K.-3), “mundane” (U.K.-9), 
“routine” (U.K.-20; U.K.-24; U.K.-26; U.K.-27; U.K.-29).  As roles became routine and certain, 
officers observed increased superior control: 
“The second time the guys were a lot more rigid.  You are to do this exactly 
like this.  It was more specified.  The first time there was a lot of crap going 
down but there was more humour.  You had the freedom to make a mistake. 
The second time, if the guys made a mistake, they felt it.  Of course when 
you live in that environment you can’t make mistakes, well, that just isn’t 
war” (U.K.-1). 
 
“The differences between the freedom of action we had *in the invasion+ 
because people had roles and were focused on those roles...[on the second 
tour] where there was a great deal of micromanagement going on to be 
honest…we got close to mutiny” (U.K.-16).  
 
7.3.2 Accountability  
 
To explore accountability, I asked officers to assess the level of accountability, how it 
changed over time, how records were used to produce audits and whether they faced 
liability concerns.  This section first examines this rise of accountability.  This section then 
examines the proposed costs and benefits of increasing accountability—an increase in 
quantification, and changes to what actors do and what they report.  With the increased 
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quantification, one should see a more formal protocolization of reporting.  To highlight this 
change, evidence concerning a common report that changed over time—Iraqi Army unit 
assessments—will be offered.  Finally, this section will discuss shifting blame and liability 
from the perspective of the surveyed officers.  
 
British officers noted how activities on early deployments were largely done without 
generating reports and records: 
“I don’t think there was much accountability *early on+” (U.K.-13). 
 
“My first deployment which was done on verbal [orders] without an audit 
trail of who had actually done what” (U.K.-30). 
 
While a single British officer stated records were not used to audit his activities (U.K.-24) the 
vast majority of British officers saw technology creating a digital record—an audit trail.  Some 
records were created and retained because of direction from superiors, but other officers 
reported creating or manipulating records to meet their needs: 
“I created my own audit trail…I created that because we were in an area that 
could be contentious in the future.  I think information assists in clarification 
and in its absence invites a drama” (U.K.-25). 
 
“I deliberately made records and minutes of meetings, and sent them out to 
people to provide that audit trail” (U.K.-30). 
 
“I wouldn't use e-mail for anything other than something I wanted to keep a 
record of” (U.K.-9). 
 
Some officers reported that they attempted a defensive strategy to ‘lock in’ superiors by 
reporting everything: 
“We followed the doctrine of no surprises and reported everything…often 
we reported something just for the sake of it” (U.K.-1). 
 
“We were keen to maintain a trail on decision-making, so if I would talk to 
[the superior], if I gave him a brief, he would want me to back it up with 
e-mail. Especially if he was going to forward it on for further direction” (U.K.-
14). 
 
“*E-mail] would be sort of back-up with we agreed this, you said that, you 
know, recording information” (U.K.-30). 
 
The costs of creating these audits were recognized in terms of manpower dedicated to the 
maintenance of a record and the increasing protocolization of work: 
“*We had two full-time officers whose job] was just to keep [everything] in 
order…it's a nightmare” (U.K.-31). 
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“Every two weeks it was probably 36 hours of work to get the right 
information [documented+…I think the whole process was a little bit of a 
farce to be honest” (U.K.-16). 
  
“We spent maybe a fortnight writing policies, standing orders…minute detail 
and everything that was going to be operated on, and that was kept in the 
records” (U.K.-9). 
 
“We ended up creating a massive audit trail.  We spent the last six weeks of 
the deployment going back in the books and fixing accounts and filling in the 
details…There was always the threat of a big audit” (U.K.-13). 
 
In asking what drove this need for greater accountability British officers noted the role of 
media and the instant transmission of low-level activities necessitated greater accountability: 
“If we failed, then there would be sort of a high-level theatre-wide 
implication” (U.K.-23).  
 
“*There is+ the strategic corporal.  A small incident on the ground can just 
create mayhem further up the chain. You know, one soldier letting off a 
couple of rounds can have strategic consequences…I think the commanders 
do watch very closely what’s going on, and I don't go under the premises it's 
because he's got nothing else to do. I think it is because the consequences 
are so great really…Everything…has to be auditable, which is fine” (U.K.-31). 
 
British Army officers spoke often about accountability, largely in negative terms, 
while U.S. officers, with access to far more technology, rarely mentioned increased 
accountability or the costs incurred. Multiple U.S. officers provided a potential 
explanation related to Chapter 3’s discussion of culture—the use of technology to 
account and record was expected in the U.S. Army, indeed inculcated through 
training: 
“Email was to verify what we talked about in the meetings.  *I would+ type up 
the notes just to remember what the tasks were.  That was a staff habit.  I 
would then [carbon copy] the staff to say this is what I heard...[Using email 
to document meetings+ was part of our training…*email+ was kinda a record 
to help get everyone on the same sheet of music” (U.S.-19). 
 
U.S. officers commented they used recordings from drones to conduct after action reviews 
(AARs) to determine what should be sustained and changed. 
“We would use those recordings for AARs…you can't lie and everyone knows 
that going in.  Everyone sees people fucked up… Let's talk about it and get it 
out there and move on…We never used it as an investigation“ (U.S.-21).   
 
“We also used *the video feeds+ for AARs throughout the deployment...I 
never saw it as somebody using it to go after somebody.  It was a useful tool” 
(U.S.-18).   
 
One shared attribute of officers of both armies was that accountability reflected in an 
increased preference on quantitative data: 
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”You've got to provide stats every day, you've got to have numerical data” 
(U.K.-5). 
 
“Metrics were driving the train…the only thing that really mattered.  The 
qualitative is accounted but is tied to metrics—number of patrols, number of 
bad guys killed and captured…Company commanders are pretty competitive.  
If your boss is pushing certain metrics, you are going to respond” (U.S.-09).   
 
To assess how rising accountability and protocolization increases the preference for 
subordinates to produce measurable ‘stats’ and quantifiable metrics, I sought to explore the 
development of a single report—unit assessments of Iraqi Army units.  The U.S. and British 
armies’ units assigned to train the Iraqi Army were required to report progress in the training 
and capabilities of their Iraqi forces.  Early in the period of study (2003-2004), these reports 
were largely self-generated and shifted between many formats.  In later deployments 
(2005-2008) the assessment protocol was standardized into what became known as the 
‘stoplight’ chart, and became more quantitative, moving from colours to percentage 
assessments.  Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the gradual protocolization of quantifying progress, 
from a unit’s self-assessment (circa 2005) to a structured American led assessment (circa 
2007). 
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Figure 7.1  Stoplight PowerPoint chart from Iraq91  
 
Figure 7.1 exemplifies early qualitative assessment.  Qualified assessments grant 
subordinates broad autonomy but often generate questions from superiors.  The advantage 
of colour schemes allows a superior a quick assessment of the status of the various 
measures.  However, a disadvantage is the ambiguity from the same simplicity.  In Figure 7.1, 
what does “Neutralize ‘terrorist channel’” mean?  Why is it black?  What would it take for 
this to be rated red, amber and green?    
                                                          
91
 Source (Senior Army Reserve Association, 2008). 
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Figure 7.2  Transition readiness assessment92 
Figure 7.2 represents the much more quantifiable assessments that replaced the initial 
self-generated stoplight charts.  The colour code is now derived from percentages and 
numbers, instead of an officer’s qualitative opinion.  Areas of focus are now clearly defined 
(e.g. ‘Command & Control’), and a quantifiable assessment of unit level (Level 1-4) allows the 
entirety of the unit’s assessment to be understood in a glance.  Further, this quantification 
allowed a protocolization of progress across units in differing locations. 
 
Where earlier assessments relied on qualitative write-ups, later assessments required 
detailed counting resulting in specific percentages (e.g. 78% assessment for detention 
operations).  This drive for greater metrics meant that more officers spent more time 
quantifying and documenting their previously qualitative and undocumented activities: 
                                                          
92
 Source (D. Walker, 2006, p. 23). 
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“*Iraqi unit assessments+ took probably about a week to put together every 
month…” (U.S.-15). 
 
“*The commander] spent a lot of time developing those color coded formats 
of slides…There were ten million different formats…I'd come in and do it one 
format, and go and turn it in…and then somebody else would want it in some 
other format” (U.S.-06). 
 
“It was an American-led study that we had to traffic light the capabilities… 
that added significant amounts of work to what we were doing” (U.K.-16). 
 
Both British and U.S. officers complained of having to quantify their assessment of Iraqi 
partner units: 
“We had a daily reporting requirement on what we had achieved following a 
red, amber and green icon.  But what the bloody hell was red, amber and 
green?” (U.K.-1). 
 
“[My reports were qualitative] but the exception to that was the monthly 
reports, which I think were American driven…[quantifying] wasn't especially 
easy…So I didn't spend a huge amount of time doing it” (U.K.-20).  
 
“It’s like a freaking homeland security thing, with lots of colors. But they also 
started to attach metrics. Those metrics were hard to measure, like are [the 
Iraqis] at 70% or 90%?” (U.S.-05). 
 
“I took exception to the format of a report…It condensed my battalion [into a 
single color] red, yellow, or green” (U.S.-15). 
 
A common concern was that once an Iraqi Army report had been quantified at a 
certain level, officers noted it was difficult to reassess negatively: 
“If *the performance rating of an Iraqi Army unit a British officer was training] 
got worse, trying to justify where it got worse was a real issue. And we'd 
almost get told that it cannot get worse…And there was a lot of resistance to 
[downgrading a unit] because of our desire to continue our progression 
towards the green” (U.K.-16).  
 
“A couple of times we had to kind of modify our verbology...[Our 
commander] wasn't too bad until towards the end, saying I can't believe 
you're still reporting [the Iraqis] as amber”  (U.S.-05). 
 
A few mid-level officers saw this demand for quantifiable progress was tied to their 
superiors’ promotion and evaluation: 
“[H]ow [the superior] was perceived amongst his peer group perhaps was 
what we felt was the driver behind it” (U.K.-18). 
 
“*The] commander would have a different opinion on *the Iraqi’s+ 
capability…He tied their efforts to [his performance] ratings versus being 
simply objective about it…*He would say+ it was red when I got here, how can 
it still be red?” (U.S.-07). 
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“About five months before we came back, the colonel suddenly…got much 
more involved in the day-to-day, wanting to see improvements across the 
board…as he got closer to leaving his sense of not having completed 
everything he wanted to increased, so therefore his demand for information 
went way up” (U.S.-16). 
 
7.3.3 Liability and blame 
 
The increase in accountability corresponded to changes in liability and blame.  Officers noted 
the role legal officers played in Iraq: 
“The legal officer was there a majority of the time because you could call 
them in to cover your ass, frankly, and just make absolutely sure that your 
assessment was legally correct” (U.K.-29). 
 
”We would send *an order+ back to be checked by legal…*the orders] were 
checked, and advised, and re-written until it was right” (U.K.-9). 
 
Both U.S. and British officers noted how the technologies discussed in Chapter 5 (trackers, 
drones and long screwdrivers) produced records that were used to determine liability and 
assess blame: 
“Every time somebody fired their rifle...[the Royal Military Police] would 
come in and check the ops room transcripts, the radio net logs, the 
assessment report, the contact report, and other bits and bobs…they would 
also then check the e-mail trail to make sure that you sent this stuff up, or if 
you hadn't, why you hadn't. So if you hadn't sent something immediately, 
they would check why there was a delay” (U.K.-23). 
 
”Whenever fatalities were involved, we went through [the UAV imagery] in 
absolute minutiae. I recall several occasions sitting almost for an enquiry 
going through an operation where somebody lost a life, trying to work out 
who did what...indeed [the video recordings] were used by the appropriate 
authorities for subsequent investigations as required” (U.K.-29). 
 
“*We used] all the e-mail chains to say look, this is what I was asked to 
do...e-mail chains were used as evidence to prove whose responsibility it 
was, or who had done what action” (U.K.-16). 
 
“[Superiors] knew exactly what we did…so we could record it back at our 
station and we could review the video tape...Every three seconds a snapshot 
was saved” (U.S.-20). 
 
“Absolutely [documentation was used] in investigations…We had an 
accidental discharge [an inadvertent firing of a weapon] that resulted in a 
soldier’s death.  Everything was investigated, the emails back and forth 
between *commanders+, what our SOPs were…Our culture has come to 
produce these records instinctively to have that CYA, that cover our ass 
mentality” (U.S.-19).   
 
“I was friends with someone whose husband was seen shooting someone by 
a UAV…it wasn't really much of a second guess there. He walked up and shot 
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somebody…That was on record…He's in prison right now” (U.S.-10). 
 
The technologies introduced in Chapter 5 demonstrated a profound effect on the 
costs of monitoring, resulting in more ex post control.  These costs also extended 
throughout the organization, affecting the day-to-day activities as superiors sought 
to make subordinates more accountable.  One U.K. officer captured the influence of 
technology on accountability: 
“I don't think *recording operations+ influenced actions on the ground per 
se…Like it wasn’t on everybody’s mind the fact that god was watching and it 
was being recorded. However, subsequently once the task commander came 
back to the base location...we had voice reports and you had the CCTV 
footage as it were, and you could correlate the two. I sense and understand 
an unease from tactical commanders that they were going to be somehow 
caught out on what they reported...wasn't actually what actually transpired” 
 
“[W]hen you looked at the footage that was twelve levels removed and [you 
have the+ luxury to go through it three times…that probably affected them 
[operators] somewhat actually…certainly any battle group commanders who 
lost forces out on the ground would get straight through brigade 
headquarters as soon as they got back in…they wanted to make absolutely 
sure that we weren’t going to draw conclusions” 
 
“In one instance where a soldier lost a life there were some debates about 
the direction where the fire came from that killed the soldier. Now in that 
regard it was actually categorically proved that it was actually enemy fire 
that killed the guy.  But there was an uneasy period for about four or five 
hours where there was some suggestion from the battle group that actually 
had been [fratricide].  Then luckily for the battle group they were able to 
prove that it was actually as the result of an enemy action [due to the 
footage+…clearly if they had just reported the action, and if the footage 
hadn't been available, we'd have quite happily accepted their reports and 
that would have been the end. But no, there were several staff officers 
plumbing through imagery for several hours trying to find out whether there 
was actually enough for launching an investigation into a real incident” (U.K.-
29). 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Nanomanagement is not conditioned simply by factors inside the organization.  By examining 
exogenous factors, this chapter argued that factors outside the organization must be 
considered.  An organization may have a stable trusting culture, ex ante controls that predict 
behaviour, ex post controls that monitor subordinates, and clearly established organization 
structures and defined roles.  Yet when that organization is placed in a new environment—
the uncertainty endemic to war, and rising accountability—these exogenous factors help 
explain both causes and effects of nanomanagement.   
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This case provided a longitudinal lens through which to examine how common actors and 
organizations adapt to both environmental and role uncertainty.  In analyzing uncertainty 
over time, roughly four separate phases of the war—invasion (2003), immediate aftermath 
(2003), failing counterinsurgency (2004-2006), succeeding counterinsurgency (2007-8)—a 
relationship between these two types of certainty emerges.  Much as a relationship between 
observed outcomes and outputs established a typology of organizations, the evidence 
suggests uncertainty, of environment and role, corresponds to Wilson’s typology of 
organizations.   
 
Craft organizations—When an organization is in a new or uncertain environment, but actors 
are trained for and certain in their roles, there is little cause to nanomanage.  Superiors are 
certain on what must be done, subordinates are certain how to do it.  Professions train for 
and prepare for these uncertain environments; superiors trust in their ex ante controls and 
depend on the training to guide subordinate behaviour through the uncertainty of war.   
 
Coping organizations—When an organization is in a new or uncertain environment, but 
actors are not trained for their assigned roles, there is little ability to nanomanage.  Superiors 
are uncertain on what must be done; without clear tasks and objectives, subordinates are 
uncertain as to what to do.  While all actors figure out their role in an uncertain environment, 
there is little control exerted while little autonomy is granted. 
 
Procedural organizations—When an organization is operating in a more certain environment, 
but actors are untrained and therefore uncertain in their assigned roles, there will be more 
cause for nanomanagement.  Superiors are uncertain on what must be done; so are 
subordinates.  Yet as the environment is more known, processes will be developed to capture 
as much information as possible in the belief this will assist in developing an organization’s 
objective and purpose. 
 
Production organizations—When an organization is operating in a more certain environment, 
and actors are trained for their assigned roles, there is the most cause for nanomanagement.  
Superiors are certain on what must be done; so are subordinates.  Procedures and processes 
have become protocolized.  Because the environment is certain, and the organization’s 
objective and purpose is certain, work become routine, predictable and nanomanaged. 
 
Figure 7.3 diagrams this typology based on role and environmental certainty/uncertainty. 
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Procedural Organization 
Iraq (2004-2006) 
Role uncertainty 
Environmental certainty 
Superiors uncertain what needs to be done 
Subordinates uncertain how to do it 
More cause for nanomanagement 
 
Production Organization 
Iraq (2006-2008) 
Role certainty 
Environmental certainty 
Superiors certain what needs to be done 
Subordinates certain how to do it 
Most cause for nanomanagement 
Coping Organization 
Iraq (May-Dec 2003) 
Role uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty 
Superiors uncertain what needs to be done 
Subordinates uncertain how to do it 
Little ability for nanomanagement 
 
Craft Organization 
Iraq (Mar-May 2003) 
Role certainty 
Environmental uncertainty 
Superiors certain what needs to be done 
Subordinates certain how to do it 
Little cause for nanomanagement 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3  A typology of organizations based on role and environmental uncertainty 
 
This typology suggests but does not predict a relationship between role and environmental 
uncertainty.  There were many exceptions to this typology; there was evidence of 
nanomanagement as response to uncertainty in the invasion and early years of the case.  Yet 
in general, those in the later years of the case were more nanomanaged than those in the 
earlier years.  This could be explained, as Chapter 5 attempted, to be an effect of more 
access to technology.  Yet I cannot rule out that uncertainty, of environment and role, played 
no effect on motivating a superior to nanomanage or not. While the evidence is not 
conclusive, it appears the same technology that was thought to lift Clausewitz’s fog of war, 
allowed a giant thumb of Sun Tzu’s information-based approach to descend on mid-level 
officers.   
 
Where uncertainty may better explain the causes of nanomanagement, increasing 
accountability may better explain the effects of nanomanagement.   Superiors, more 
accountable for their subordinates, will provide their subordinates with detailed direction in 
the form of SOPs, regulations and quantifiable reports.  Subordinates, more accountable for 
their actions, will take fewer risks, seeking more guidance from superiors.  For the actions 
that remain in the subordinate’s purview, they will seek to create records of their actions 
that will be defensible.   Accountability places a preference for the quantitative, affecting 
what a subordinate does and what a subordinate reports.  Nanomanagement makes 
quantifiable measures more preferable than qualitative judgements. 
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In Iraq, this was reflected in the increasing calls for mid-level officers to quantify their actions 
and reports.  British officers spoke of creating audit trails of defensive documentation and of 
using modern technology not simply to improve operations but to determine fault.  U.S. 
officers spoke of the need for documentation to learn from mistakes.  This is puzzling, as 
clearly the U.S. had greater access to computers, trackers, drones and long handled 
screwdrivers—the tools that Chapter 5 predicted would enable superiors to nanomanage.  
This may reflect broader societal forces at play—the U.K. penchant for audit or that the 
British Army is a less trusted institution relative to the trust placed in the U.S. Army. 
 
Rising accountability can be seen as both causing nanomanagement and producing more 
permanent effects than other factors.  Once it is established that a superior can know, with 
greater accuracy, amount and speed, a bit or bob of data about subordinate outputs or 
outcomes, the superior must know.  In an environment of greater accountability, 
superior-subordinate relationships do not return to their previous form.  Instead of the 
analogy of an elastic band, the effect of technology that allows greater accountability is more 
like the ringing of a bell—it cannot be unrung.  When external and internal auditors hear the 
bell, and know what can be measured and known, not only will superior-subordinate 
relationships become more accountable, they must become more accountable. 
 
The preceding chapters have sought to integrate broad literatures to help explain the causes 
and effects of nanomanagement.  In addressing culture, ex ante controls, ex post controls, an 
organization’s structure and now exogenous factors, each chapter respectively discussed 
how technology is fundamentally altering supervision.  The final chapter integrates these 
separate threads into a whole.  What emerges is a logic of nanomanagement useful in 
determining the causes and effects of nanomanagement. 
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 The logic of nanomanagement CHAPTER 8
 
This thesis examined causes and effects of nanomanagement—where superiors use 
technology to control, in ever-increasing detail, the actions of all of their subordinates.  Like 
the general in Baghdad, superiors may now observe their subordinates to a degree and detail 
impossible just a few years before.  Through the perceptions of mid-level officers of the U.S. 
and British armies in the Iraq War, this case captured a unique moment of rapid technology 
adoption, a moment where much of the fog that long separated superior from subordinate 
lifted.   
 
This thesis sought to view nanomanagement through multiple lenses—culture, ex ante 
controls, ex post controls, hierarchical structure, and exogenous factors.  Each chapter 
allowed specific conclusions to be drawn concerning why nanomanagement occurs and how 
nanomanagement influences superior-subordinate relationships.  With these approaches in 
mind, this thesis now seeks general conclusions.   What causes nanomanagement?  Is 
nanomanagement inevitable?  What are its effects on superior control and subordinate 
autonomy?  Are these effects permanent?   
 
This concluding chapter begins in Section 8.1 by offering a holistic summary—a logic of 
nanomanagement.   Section 8.2 discusses how the research design proved appropriate to 
exploring nanomanagement, identifies both contributions to theory and where additional 
research methods could prove beneficial, and then briefly examines evidence of 
nanomanagement in a wide variety of organizations.  Section 8.3 concludes with a discussion 
of the future of nanomanagement. 
 
8.1 The logic of nanomanagement 
 
Through this thesis’s analysis of five factors, a logic of nanomanagement emerges.  This logic 
helps to explain both why and how technology influences the conflict between superior 
control and subordinate autonomy. Table 8.1 characterizes three causes and three effects of 
nanomanagement.   
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Causes of nanomanagement Effects of nanomanagement 
Cost 
 
Increased ex post control 
Uncertainty 
 
Reversed information asymmetry 
 
Self-interest 
 
Undermined hierarchical control 
 
Table 8.1  The logic of nanomanagement 
The term ‘logic’ is not to imply that nanomanagement is correct or logical behaviour.  
However, the term ‘logic’ frames both why superiors would choose to nanomanage and 
nanomanagement’s effect on superior-subordinate relationships.   
 
8.1.1 Causes—why nanomanagement? 
 
While the following conditions may help explain why a superior would, or would not 
nanomanage, none of these factors should be seen as uniformly deterministic.  Indeed, the 
first two factors analysed proved inconclusive.  The findings presented first in Chapter 3 
suggest the relative lack of importance of organizational culture in determining why 
nanomanagement occurs or does not occur.    Despite a strong and inculcated doctrine of 
mission command in the British Army, British officers were just as likely to see superiors use 
technology to exert greater control.  The findings of Chapter 4 suggest that an organization 
may invest heavily in ex ante controls and call itself a profession but neither prevents 
nanomanagement from occurring.   
 
Despite an organization’s culture or its professional ex ante controls, both armies’ officers 
noted that nanomanagement was related to personality.  Technology does not nanomanage 
people; people nanomanage people.  Given the exact same conditions—the same 
organizational culture, profession, available technology, hierarchical structure and the same 
war—some superiors nanomanaged and others did not.  We live in a world where 
nanomanagement is possible, perhaps probable, but not inevitable.  When it does occur, the 
following logic helps explains why it occurs. 
 
Cost 
Superior-subordinate relationships are born from a cost calculus.  Why hire a subordinate 
when one can do the task?  Why do the task when one can hire a subordinate?  With cost in 
mind, I expected the professional nature of the two armies, with their sunk cost of ex ante 
control, to resist nanomanagement.  Instead I found reasons suggesting the opposite—that 
one may expect more nanomanagement in professions.  As executives in professions are 
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promoted, rather than hired from external sources, they are perceived, and perceive 
themselves, as more experienced than the managers and operators beneath them.  Unlike 
non-professionals, where executives must not necessarily serve at the operator and manager 
levels, executives in professions must rise through the ranks.  Because superiors in 
professions seek to control levels of an organization in which they had previously served, 
nanomanagement exhibits less transaction costs.  Further, executives charged with 
organizational maintenance have rational incentives to take greater control into their own 
hands and not allow third parties to expose shirking.  The cost of fire alarms and police 
patrols are factored differently for superiors within professions, especially when trackers, 
drones and long screwdrivers may be used. 
 
With prior studies in mind (Nagl, 2005; Sowers, 2005), I expected to find variance between 
the well resourced, technologically oriented U.S. Army, and the relatively resource poor, 
British Army.   In the initial years of the surveyed time frame, when the U.S. Army possessed 
technologies that the British lacked, this appeared to be the case.  Yet as the British fielded 
technologies that enabled nanomanagement, it was observed that the British immediately 
used these tools to nanomanage.  This suggests an answer to why nanomanagement: when 
one can nanomanage, one will nanomanage.  Technology that offers superiors greater 
control at less cost will be adopted, used and employed.   
 
When tools are available that decrease a superior’s transaction costs while increasing their 
ability to control and observe subordinates, there are strong incentives to use these tools.    
While one should expect subordinates to resist technologies that increase superior control, if 
these same technologies reduce the subordinate’s transaction costs, they will more likely be 
accepted.  The difference of this cost calculus could be seen in the different responses to 
tracker, drone and long screwdriver technologies.  Trackers and drones, which may reduce a 
subordinate’s transaction costs, were more accepted; long screwdrivers, which invariably 
increased a subordinate’s transaction costs, were resented.  As these technologies improve, 
demands on the subordinate will increase.  When a superior can nanomanage more at less 
cost, they will nanomanage more. 
 
Uncertainty 
Organizations are born from the desire to reduce uncertainty.  The hierarchical military 
organizes such that actors have specific and certain roles that are meant to withstand the 
chaos and confusion of war.  Role certainty is the antidote to environmental uncertainty.  
Environmental uncertainty alone should not be considered a cause of nanomanagement.  I 
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cannot say if war, then nanomanagement.  Even in the uncertain environment of war, if 
superiors are certain what tasks needs to be done and subordinates are certain in how to do 
those tasks there seems to be the least cause to nanomanage.   Yet the evidence suggests I 
can say the more certain the environment, the more cause for nanomanagement.    
 
When assessing role and environmental uncertainty as variable, the case tracked the 
transition of these two armies through all four types of organizations in Wilson’s typology—
from craft, to coping, to procedural and finally to production.  In the invasion, roles were 
certain and the environment was uncertain (craft).  Superiors knew what needed to be done 
and subordinates knew how to do it.  Subordinates were granted broad autonomy and there 
was little nanomanagement reported.  In the fog of war, officers are certain in their role, a 
role for which they’ve trained, allowing them to predict and understand their part in an 
organization’s response to complex events.  Immediately after the invasion, roles were 
uncertain and the environment was uncertain (coping).  Superiors didn’t know what needed 
to be done and subordinates didn’t know how to do it.   
 
As the armies became more familiar with the environment, yet a failing counterinsurgency 
strategy was executed, roles remained uncertain (procedural).  As environments become 
more certain, superiors may still not know what to direct their subordinates to do, or what 
metrics are important to measure, so they will measure all that they can with the belief that 
more information means less uncertainty.  This phase was characterized by processes 
development (James Wilson, 2000, p. 228).  Finally, with a successful counterinsurgency 
strategy in place, after years and multiple deployments both the environment and roles 
became certain (production); this phase was characterized by routine, quantifiable 
assessments and nanomanagement.  
 
This suggests that ex ante controls do have an effect on nanomanagement, but only in a 
specific type of uncertain environment.  Yet as more is observed and less is obscured, as 
environments and roles become more certain and more measurable, there is more cause to 
nanomanage. 
 
Self-interest 
Rational choices are born from self interest.  There are few more rational choices than 
ensuring one’s own preservation.  This case captured a period of time where both armies 
sought to preserve their organizational autonomy and officers sought to preserve their 
individual autonomy; nanomanagement may be caused by both of these rational choices of 
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preservation.  At the organizational level, both the U.S. and British armies faced increasing 
calls for transparency and accountability.  Answering these calls is in the interest of the 
leaders of these organizations; not answering these calls leads to more external oversight 
and monitoring.  The more a superior external agency wants to know about an organization, 
the more the leaders of that organization must know.  Failure to employ available 
technologies to monitor or create an audit trail or to demonstrate transparency to 
increasingly suspect external actors, would be against the self-interest of executives seeking 
either to maintain their organization’s autonomy or retain their position.  If a tool exists 
where the superior could have known his subordinate’s location and activities, and the tool 
was not adopted, the superior may be liable for not knowing.  Because a superior can 
nanomanage, they must nanomanage.   
 
Yet nanomanagement may also be motivated by the self preservation instinct of actors 
beneath the executive level.  Calls for greater accountability by external actors produces a 
demand cascade within an organization.  When hierarchical forms are retained but 
technology allows superiors to bypass levels of subordinates, it is in those bypassed actors’ 
interest to maintain their relevancy to the organization.  In response to an increased ability to 
demand information, Wilson and Sun Tzu agree—more information will be demanded as 
superiors believe that more information is better.  Yet as superiors demand more 
information, those bypassed will demand more and more information themselves, “as a way 
of justifying their existence” (James Wilson, 2000, p. 228).  Especially for mid-level managers, 
nanomanagement and maintaining some information asymmetry between themselves and 
their superiors, is vital for their self preservation. 
 
Individuals and organizations seeking to preserve themselves may explain why 
nanomanagement is observed.  Yet another form of self-interest based in utilitarianism—the 
maximization of pleasure and the avoidance of pain—may also be a cause of 
nanomanagement.  For those doing the nanomanaging, nanomanagement is fun.  
Nanomanagement may produce happiness.  Technology provides escape for those who have 
risen through the ranks.  Instead of sitting through another dull briefing or struggling with the 
abstract tasks of budget and resources endemic to organizational maintenance, why not 
watch a UAV and fire a missile at the enemy?  The growth of organizations and complexity of 
tasks have pushed executives away from the frontlines; now generals may lead vast armies, 
in real time, from air conditioned executive suites and auditoriums.  The adoption of 
technology allows those generals to virtually push back to the front, to once again lead 
soldiers in combat, to pursue the enemy.  This pursuit—of a simple task, that produces an 
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immediate measurable outcome—may simply be a pursuit of happiness and a cause of much 
nanomanagement. 
 
8.1.2 Effects—how does nanomanagement influence superior control and subordinate 
autonomy? 
 
This thesis sees nanomanagement producing three overarching effects: increasing ex post 
control, reversing information asymmetry and undermining hierarchical control.  The large 
caveat to the below logic is that these effects must not be permanent.  While 
nanomanagement disrupts these established norms of superior control and subordinate 
autonomy, it must not necessarily destroy them.  It is still costly to conduct police patrols.  
The hierarchical structure of the military is remarkably similar today as it was in 2003.   
Organizations, especially conservative military organizations, are remarkably resilient.  Like 
squeezing a balloon, the force of nanomanagement produces effects that may change the 
shape, appearance and look of organizations, making some parts momentarily bigger and 
others smaller.  Once the pressure is released, organizations return to broadly, and 
sometimes exactly, the same shape.  This evidence suggests this occurred with some factors; 
as superiors became more familiar with the technologies, they did not use them to exert ever 
more control.   Yet other factors had more permanent effects; with every year producing 
more and better technologies that allow the most senior superior to watch, direct and record 
the actions of the most junior subordinate, I expect we are only beginning to see the short 
and long term effects of nanomanagement. 
 
Increased ex post control   
Nanomanagement tilts a superior’s preference away from ex ante control towards ex post 
control.   As nanomanagement allows superiors to observe more at less cost, three 
sub-categories of police patrols (trackers, drones and long screwdrivers) emerge.  A tracker is 
a tool that automatically communicates information about subordinates to superiors, at little 
to no cost to the subordinate.   A drone is a tool that enables a superior to actively monitor 
and record a subordinate’s actions.  A long screwdriver is a tool that allows a superior to 
request increasing quantity and quality of information at greater speed, and to direct action 
at a distance and speed previously impossible.   
 
When trackers, drones and long screwdrivers increase superior control at less cost, superiors 
will increasingly use these ex post controls.  The preference, or dependency, on third party 
fire alarms becomes less cost effective.  As ex post control costs reduce, the quantity and 
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quality of information requested by higher superiors increases.  Both U.S. and British officers 
reported records were produced to create an auditable and defensible trail.  Information was 
also demanded in increasing speed; numerous officers stated that reporting took preference 
to action.  As the cost of ex post control is reduced, more aspects of work will be quantified, 
with metrics replacing qualitative judgement.  What can be measured can be more easily 
nanomanaged.  The case study of the stoplight chart, where quantification of effort 
supplanted qualitative judgement proved useful in illustrating how nanomanagement will 
force quantification of that previously qualified.   
 
Increased ex post control does not mean the end of organizations that depend heavily on ex 
ante controls, such as professions.  Technology that increases ex post control allows 
superiors within a profession to more easily demonstrate transparency and accountability to 
external audiences.  Increased ex post control within professions may subsequently enhance 
the external trust central to professions.  However, the same technology that may enhance 
professions—and by extension the autonomy of the upper-level professional—may produce 
the death, or fundamental transformation, of the low-level professional. 
 
Reversed information asymmetry  
With nanomanagement, the assumption of a persistent information asymmetry between 
superior and subordinate is no longer valid.  Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers may 
reduce and in some cases reverse information asymmetry, where a superior may now know 
more about what a subordinate is doing, or has accomplished, than the subordinate.  
 
The reversal of information asymmetry produces effects throughout an organization.  
Superiors, believing they know more, will believe they know best.  Superiors will be tempted 
to exert tight control, to take over subordinate activities.  Subordinates, believing that 
superiors know more, will do less.  They will seek guidance from superiors for actions that 
previously they would have performed with their own discretion.  As they look over their 
shoulder, or in the assessed case, up in the sky, they will take less risks, caring more that their 
now recorded actions are defensible first and effective second.   
 
That a superior may know more about a subordinate’s actions does not mean that more is 
“known”.  The subordinate already knows his actions and results.  Every moment a superior 
spends observing or acting at subordinate levels is a moment not focused on the superior’s 
level of action.  That a superior may know more about a subordinate’s actions does not mean 
that more is being actively monitored, just more is being controlled.  Simply the potential 
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that a superior could know what a subordinate is doing increases superior control, modifying 
subordinate behaviour away from shirking, towards working.   
 
Undermined hierarchical control  
As nanomanagement alters information flow, span of control, and unity of command, 
traditional hierarchical structure and roles are eroded.  An actor’s position within an 
organizational hierarchy conditions the effects of nanomanagement.  With 
nanomanagement, executives can shift, drift, and grift.  By observing, acting and bypassing 
levels beneath them, organizations that retain hierarchies but adopt network technologies 
will find their executives involving themselves increasingly in subordinate actions.  This 
comes at significant cost to the activities that executives are chartered to perform.   
 
A nanomanaging executive functionally eliminates much of the need for mid-level managers, 
who are controlled by exclusion (ex claudere control).  Executives may now know more about 
a manager’s operators than the manager does.  Intent on maintaining their informational 
advantage and subsequent relevancy, managers respond to executive shifting, drifting and 
grifting by increasing their information demands on their operators.  Managers may find 
their critical role of channelling information flow upwards and downwards marginalized.   
 
Operators may access increased information but may also suffer from a lack of unity of 
command.  With operators having access to open lines of communication with managers and 
executives, they can bypass the chain of command and select from a menu of guidance.  
Operators face increased oversight with nanomanagement, as both their immediate and 
higher superiors may now be instantly aware of their activities.   
 
Organizations that retain hierarchies yet adopt technologies that allow ever-increasing detail 
to be captured may enter into a cycle of nanomanagement.  The exclusion of managers 
through ex claudere controls and the increase of executive shifting, drifting and grifting 
contribute to mid-level managers prematurely leaving the organization.  While professional 
hierarchies are not easily flattened, this flattening by manager resignation may produce long-
lasting detrimental effects.  The case study of the mid-level officer exodus in the U.S. Army 
demonstrated the limited options available when two year old technology is inserted into 
two hundred year old organizational forms. 
 
So is an effect of nanomanagement the end of hierarchical control?  It would be far too hasty 
to discard an organizational model that has been replicated, tested and tried over centuries 
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of warfare.  Few organizations could meet the challenge of recruiting, training and organizing 
hundreds of thousands of personnel, moving them and tons of equipment thousands of miles 
to fight and kill people without a hierarchical structure.  Through the adoption of all these 
technologies, the hierarchy has morphed, adapted and persisted; there is little evidence to 
call for its near-term extinction. 
 
8.2 Assessment of design, contributions to theory and future 
research 
 
My selection of a single conflict (Iraq from 2003-2008) and actors at a specific hierarchical 
level (mid-level officers) from two armies (the U.S. and British armies) presented both 
advantages and disadvantages in analyzing the causes and effects of nanomanagement.  This 
section assesses my research design as well as this thesis’s contribution to theory, with both 
suggesting future paths for research. 
 
8.2.1 Assessment of design 
 
In assessing the causes and effects of nanomanagement, this study approached the same 
phenomenon from different angles.  The factors I selected should be seen as extensive for a 
single work yet not exhaustive, providing a framework for expansion of the study of 
nanomanagement.   Other factors could include fields as diverse as behavioural and 
organizational psychology as well as management and leadership studies.   Another line of 
research would be to examine institutional design and compare how the 
superior-subordinate relationships within the military were predetermined by deck stacking 
in the U.S. and U.K. governmental systems. 
 
This thesis also could have examined a specific moment of technology adoption (e.g. one unit 
on one deployment) or compared across multiple conflicts.  However, because this study 
sought to capture the influence of information technologies on actors and organizations, a 
timeframe long enough to capture the short and medium term effects of technological 
adoption was needed.  The choice of the Iraq War is unique in that the armies of 2008 differ 
significantly from the armies of 2003 in their level of technology.  A comparative of the Iraq 
War with the Afghanistan conflict during the same time period (2003-2008), where 
Afghanistan was thought to be relatively poorly resourced with technology (Duffield & 
Dombrowski, 2009), could provide a rich path for future research.  Additionally, a study of 
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military organizations that adopted and employed these technologies during the same time 
period, either in shorter conflicts (e.g. the Israeli Army’s use of technology in 2006 and 2009) 
or by units in operations other than war (e.g. the U.S. Army’s mission in South Korea), could 
prove insightful.  Further, changing the unit of analysis from the individual officer to the 
organization, over multiple deployments, would provide another useful longitudinal 
comparison. 
 
Complementing this line of future research would be a historical comparison between other 
critical inflection points where information technology was adopted on the battlefield (e.g. 
the adoption of the telegraph during the U.S. Civil War, or the use of wireless technologies by 
the British during World War I).  This would be able to assess whether it was technology in 
general or the specific technology of the twenty-first century that produced these effects.  
Yet comparing across conflicts exposes studies to numerous intervening variables, possibly 
resulting in the inability to draw even tenuous conclusions.  Focusing on a single case allowed 
me to identify and isolate factors during a unique period of technology adoption.   
 
I selected mid-level officers because I speculated that they would feel effects of 
nanomanagement most acutely.  This proved an appropriate choice—mid-level officers were 
nanomanaged, were themselves nanomanaged, and were excluded when their superiors 
nanomanaged their subordinates.  Another beneficial approach would be to survey actors 
across the organizational hierarchy, capturing the simultaneous impressions of executives, 
operators and managers.  Yet with experience at the operator, manager and executive levels 
(with many who observed executive behaviour whilst working on executive staffs), mid-level 
officers provided a perspective that allowed me to draw conclusions across the 
organizational spectrum.   
 
Finally, comparing two armies allowed this study to isolate differences in beliefs in 
autonomy.  Given more resources, this study could have included Australian, Spanish, Italian, 
Polish or South Korean forces, that all, at one point, had over 2,000 troops on the ground in 
Iraq.  Yet these would only provide snapshots of armies with dramatically different missions 
and levels of technology adoption; their inclusion would fail to capture the steadily increasing 
role of technology.  Limiting the scope of the case to the U.S. and British armies, coupled to 
the organizational culture similarities of these two armies, allowed for a measured 
comparison and internal validity. 
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A noted, and attempted, expansion of this study would include quantitative data.  As Chapter 
2 discussed, the initial research design sought to incorporate a mixed-method approach.  A 
more limited discussion of factors would have facilitated the use of a survey.  However, given 
the multiple deployments and relationships during single deployments, capturing 
impressions of culture, trust, monitoring, hierarchical relationships and the relative 
uncertainty of the roles and environments proved unwieldy in a single survey.  Future work 
could overcome this by narrowing the surveyed population (e.g. all company commanders 
that served within a single chain of command during the length of a single deployment), or 
by focusing on a single factor.  As I sought to capture a multitude of relationships, across 
time, across two different militaries, the qualitative method proved appropriate in what 
ultimately is a theory building thesis.  Future research should employ quantitative data to 
test the concepts introduced in this study. 
 
8.2.2 Contributions to theory 
 
Numerous bodies of literature address and assess the tension between superior control and 
subordinate autonomy.  This thesis relied extensively on Wilson’s seminal work Bureaucracy 
(2000).  Yet Wilson wrote of a military before nanomanagement; updating Wilson’s concepts 
for the ever-increasing detail that characterizes twenty-first century control is where this 
thesis presents the greatest potential contribution. Wilson’s typology of organizations, based 
on observed outputs and outcomes, predicts much of how organizations are structured and 
the behaviour of superior-subordinate relationships inside organizations.  He saw the military 
falling into only two of the four types of organizations, depending on whether the military 
was at war (craft) or training for war (procedural).   
 
Figure 8.1 updates Wilson’s typology.  In the case, the U.S. and British armies seem to have 
evolved, albeit at differing rates, through all four types of organizations.  Observed outputs 
and outcomes still largely determine the four types of organizations.  In addition, the 
environmental and role uncertainty as well as available technology help explain in what type 
of organization, under what conditions, more nanomanagement is likely to be observed. 
 
Nanomanagement makes outcomes and outputs more known and observed.  The findings of 
this thesis suggest a nanomanaged superior-subordinate relationship is most likely found in 
production organizations (see Figure 8.1).  What does Wilson see as characteristic of the 
superior-subordinate relationships in production organizations?  Superiors will be able to 
observe and measure both outputs and outcomes.  They will prefer subordinates’ work with 
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measurable outcomes over work with indeterminate outcomes.  Work will not be considered 
professional.  Subordinates will be under pressure to produce ‘stats’.  Rules and regulations 
will define the tasks.  Superiors will have the most control and subordinates the least 
autonomy (James Wilson, 2000).  This is consistent with those that see public administration 
gravitating towards more efficient, accountable and transparent organizations (Gregory, 
1998; Gregory & Hicks, 1999; Hood, 2006; O'Neill, 2006; Prat, 2006).    
 
Procedural Organization 
Outputs observed/outcomes obscured 
High superior control 
Low subordinate autonomy 
Ex post controls—focus on process 
Role uncertainty 
Environmental certainty 
More cause for nanomanagement 
Production Organization 
Outputs/outcomes observed 
High superior control 
Low subordinate autonomy 
Ex post controls—focus on efficiency 
Role certainty 
Environmental certainty 
Most cause for nanomanagement 
Coping Organization 
Outputs/outcomes obscured 
Low superior control 
Low subordinate autonomy 
Minor ex post and ex ante 
Role uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty 
Little ability for nanomanagement 
Craft Organization 
Outputs obscured/outcomes observed 
Low superior control 
High subordinate autonomy 
Ex ante controls—professionalism 
Role certainty 
Environmental uncertainty 
Little cause for nanomanagement 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1  Wilson’s typology updated for an era of nanomanagement 
This thesis should also prove useful for the various literatures reviewed.  For the literature on 
culture, the unanswered question is whether technology alters culture or culture alters 
technology.  Does new technology transform superiors into nanomanagers or simply provide 
superiors long sought tools of tighter control?   Organizational culture, especially when 
determined by doctrine which may or may not be followed, is not as powerful a predictor of 
behaviour as some have suggested.    
 
The most distinct cultural difference was observed in the role of technology and 
accountability.  Where U.S. officers were accustomed to accountability as appropriate, British 
officers saw greater accountability as largely negative, describing environments more intent 
on assigning blame and producing audits than on the learning that Americans discussed.  Was 
this because of the difference in the various national societies’ trust of the military?  Or was 
Outcomes (results) Observed Obscured 
Role Certainty Uncertainty 
En
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l 
 
U
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
 
C
er
ta
in
ty
 
O
u
tp
u
ts
 (
w
o
rk
) 
 
O
b
sc
u
re
d
 
O
b
se
rv
ed
 
205 
 
this sourced from a focus on audit in the U.K. against performance measurement in the U.S.?  
Future research can and should extend beyond organizational culture, to examine how 
beliefs and practices of accountability, liability and control extant in a broader society 
influence how superiors control subordinates. 
 
How nanomanagement shifts subordinates towards the measurable, quantifiable and 
bureaucratic work of production agencies, should be of interest to the literature on 
professions.  Can a nanomanaged organization be called a profession?  Can a nanomanaged 
individual be called a professional?  While the literature speaks of technological advances 
making individual professions obsolete (e.g. the telephone reducing the need for professional 
telegraph operators), nanomanagement technologies threaten all professionals with 
obsolescence.  This thesis has argued that when strict control replaces trust, when ex ante 
controls lose relative value to ex post controls, work may no longer be considered 
professional in nature.   As the cost of ex post control reduces, the logic of nanomanagement 
suggests the eventual decline of professional work. 
 
Transaction costs theory should also benefit from the focus on ex post control.  Chapter 5’s 
discussion of sub-categories of police patrols contribute to the application of transaction 
costs to understanding intraorganizational behaviour.  In general, this thesis supports Brehm 
and Gates’ (1997) contention that to understand control of organizations, one must examine 
control within an organization.  Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers call into question the 
belief that superiors prefer outsourcing their monitoring to other agencies (fire alarms) 
(Lupia & McCubbins, 1994; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).  Technology reduces the relative 
cost of ex post control which should alter the stated preference towards these new variants 
of police patrols. 
 
The discussion of shifting, drifting and grifting in Chapter 6 should also expand the concepts 
of discretion and control especially in relation to civil-military theory.  It is not only the 
self-interested, guileful subordinate that may violate a delegation contract.  Subordinates 
may still choose shirking over working; but nanomanaging superiors may now choose 
shifting, drifting, and grifting over delegating and monitoring or delegating and trusting.  
These activities limit the application of democratic control theory when looking at control 
inside an organization.  When the superior is an elected body (e.g. Congress or Parliament) 
they have the right to be wrong, the right to shift, drift, and grift and actively control the 
military (Gregory & Hicks, 1999).  With nanomanagement, superiors inside an organization 
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that do not draw their authority from direct election, certainly have the ability to violate a 
delegation contract.  Whether that is their right is an open question. 
 
Overwhelmingly, social science scholars have examined how, and to what degree, the 
military is controlled by civilians.  While useful in discussing external interactions, a focus on 
interorganizational control limits the discussion and applicability of the wide and established 
literature on rational-choice influenced control theories, institutions, and transaction costs 
that seek to explain what occurs inside an organization.  I hope this study provides a road 
map for future scholars to see that understanding control within the military may help inform 
civil-military control.   
 
Finally, in terms of exogenous factors, the relationship between environmental and role 
uncertainty, and how this may condition behaviour within an organization should be useful 
for organizational theorists.  Further, the observed defensive record creation supports 
patterns of blame avoidance and shifting as tactics of self-preservation in an increasingly 
transparent society (Hood, 2011).  The evidence suggests external pressures for 
accountability can indeed instigate internal, pre-emptive calls for accountability (Power, 
2000a).  However, in Power’s analysis, technology is more of a supporting player, crowded 
out by larger societal forces.  In the logic of nanomanagement, technology that reduces costs 
and increases ex post control takes centre stage enabling a greater accountability.  It is no 
small coincidence that the rise of the audit society corresponded to the dawn of the 
information age.   
 
I am aware that the concepts introduced in this thesis, built from a single case, should not be 
considered the last word on the subject.  Instead, I hope this study introduced terms that 
future research may test, expand, or refute.  Despite being a military case, I anticipate the 
concepts described may strike a chord of familiarity in readers and other researchers, with a 
path for application to different organizations.  This section concludes by looking briefly 
across other organizations for evidence of nanomanagement. 
 
8.2.3 Evidence of nanomanagement elsewhere 
 
While this discussion has focused on a single case, the logic of nanomanagement is not 
unique to the military or war.  In societies that develop and adopt new technologies every 
day that capture ever-increasing detail, that see greater accountability and transparency as a 
normative good, leaders of both public and private institutions have strong incentives to 
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nanomanage.  The quantification of work, the increased ex post control and reduced 
subordinate autonomy, the focus on efficiency—characteristics of production organizations 
and also effects of nanomanagement—can be observed across nearly all other professions. 
 
In the medical profession, many doctors and nurses in both the U.S. (Ash, Berg, & Coiera, 
2004) and the U.K. (P. C. Smith, 2002) are now mandated to follow computerized treatment 
systems and decision trees that guide the doctor’s practice.  When a physician’s judgement 
dictates that they should provide treatment outside of what is prescribed in the decision 
tree, they must write extensive justification to clarify their reasoning, a transaction cost that 
did not occur to this degree prior to information technology adoption (Farkas & van Biesen, 
2011).  Physicians worry that these pre-determined systems will reduce the autonomy of 
new doctors and place more authority in the medical executives and managers that design 
and monitor the decision trees (Harrison, Koppel, & Bar-Lev, 2007; Southern California 
Evidence-Based Practice Center, 2006).  In the U.K. these technologies are seen as eroding 
trust between physicians and their superiors (P. Brown, Alaszewski, Pilgrim, & Calnan, 2011).  
Critics charge that this monitoring fundamentally alters a physician’s motivation, from a 
patient-driven model that depends on the individual doctor’s judgement, to an 
economic-driven model that focuses on efficiency, quantifiable procedures and results 
(Adams & McConaghie, 2011). 
 
In the legal profession, a suite of tracking tools has emerged that allow real-time monitoring 
of attorneys by their supervisors and their clients (Forstenlechner, Lettice, & Tschida, 2009).  
Applications now installed on many attorneys’ computers track activities with “extraordinary 
specificity” monitoring websites visited, time spent on each application, and when emails are 
open read and filed (R. Boyle, 2011).  Programs now exist that allow clients to automatically 
receive screen shots of the attorney’s computer to account and verify for each six-minute 
billing increment.  As digitization produces a record of attorney communications, attorneys 
have increasingly used chat functions that allow information to be shared without creating a 
permanent record that exposes them to liability (Church, 2004; Marcus, 2008).   
 
In the academic profession, cameras have been being installed in classrooms in California 
(Freedberg, 2011) and in England (L. Clark, March 4, 2009) in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of teachers.   Installed in dozens of schools in England, teachers can be given 
live feedback by their supervisor through a concealed earpiece. While headmasters have 
cited improved student performance as justifying the use of these monitoring tools (L. Clark, 
March 4, 2009), teachers complain of “diminished discretion for teachers” (Radin, 2006, p. 
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84), where “measurement then becomes more important than education” (Bradney, 2001, p. 
10; Dill, 2000).  
 
While nanomanagement may be most noticeable across professions, there is broad evidence 
that workers outside the classic professions have also felt the effects of nanomanagement.  
From race car drivers93, to forest rangers94, to prostitutes95, the presence of new technology 
is influencing organizational structures, roles and superior-subordinate relationships.  In 
nearly every type of organization, whatever potential for nanomanagement that exists today 
will grow tomorrow.   
 
8.3 The future of nanomanagement 
 
On the afternoon of May 1, 2011, the President of the United States did not like what he was 
seeing.  Across one of the larger rooms beneath the White House’s West Wing, he stared at 
two plasma screens.  On one he saw the CIA director, who was approximately 11 kilometres 
away at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.   On the other, he saw the commander of the 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), who was approximately 11,000 kilometres away in 
Kabul, Afghanistan.   
                                                          
93
 Historically, car racing involved a largely autonomous driver, relaying his impressions of the car’s 
handling and performance to a waiting pit crew.  Today, Formula One cars carry over 100 telemetry 
sensors, trackers relaying information to the pits and engineers at no cost to the driver’s attention.  
Organized to processes this new flood of data, the hierarchy supporting a race car driver has exploded; 
pit crews of 18 are now supported by senior team officials with data screens beside the track, dozens 
of people monitoring computer screens at the back of the garage, and eight technicians in trucks in the 
parking lot (McKenzie, 2009).  Technology has also displaced decision making from trackside to the 
English countryside.  In 2006, the McLaren Technology Centre opened in Woking, England.  No matter 
whether the race is in Kuala Lumpur or Monaco, with a staff of thousands that “primarily serve as 
mission control,” teams of technicians employ supercomputers and monitoring technology to direct 
track side engineers to make adjustments to the car (Spurgeon, 2006).  While the driver is still thought 
“to do the tactical thinking,” data, supercomputers and technology thousands of miles from the 
steering wheel now form a key measure of whether a team wins or loses (McKenzie, 2009). 
94
 Hebert Kaufman’s Forest Ranger remains a classic study of subordinate autonomy (Kaufman, 1960).  
Yet in the past 50 years, the forest rangers have seen a general erosion of their professional discretion 
and autonomy (Koontz, 2007).  Technology, from smoke detecting cameras, wireless communication 
and satellite imagery that can be monitored from afar has made much of the forest ranger’s job 
obsolete, leading to reductions in the workforce (Greg Brown, Squirrell, & Harris, 2010).   
95
 Traditionally, the sex trade industry operated with a hierarchy of ‘superiors’ standing between a 
prostitute and a client (Phoenix, 2001).  Changes in technology have “have rendered *pimps+ 
superfluous” (Venkatesh, 2011) where technology has contributed to developing a “professional and 
careerist” orientation amongst prostitutes (Murphy & Venkatesh, 2006, p. 131).  Technology has 
driven this flattening of the sex trade hierarchy where “the Internet and the rise of mobile phones 
have enabled some sex workers to professionalize their trade.  Today they can control their image, set 
their prices and sidestep some of the pimps, madams, and other intermediaries that once took a share 
of the revenue” (Venkatesh, 2011).   
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Yet the President thought there was something more vital to see than these two powerful 
men.  He said “I need to watch this” then walked across the hall to a smaller conference 
room.  In this room, Brigadier General Marshall Webb, an assistant commander of JSOC, sat 
at the end of a conference table, with a laptop open.  At the other end of the table was 
another plasma screen, the only one in the White House that showed the black and white, 
real-time overhead feed of a raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan (Schmidle, 2011).   As the Vice 
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
National Security Advisor and a handful of other top aides crammed into the room, their eyes 
fixated on the screen.   
 
For forty minutes, the President and his senior aides “could do nothing but watch” 
twenty-two Navy SEALs, an interpreter and a dog (Scherer, 2011).  For forty minutes, the 
eyes and attention of the leaders representing the top levels of the United States’ military 
and diplomatic power focused on the distant efforts of a few dozen men.  Without knowing 
whether Osama bin Laden was in the compound and the uncontrollable variables of a raid 
deep inside Pakistan, the special operators knew much of this mission’s final outcome was 
uncertain.  Yet they could be certain of this—their actions would be relayed and viewed, in 
real-time, by their entire chain of command including the commander-in-chief, in a quantity, 
speed and quality unfathomable just a few years before (Martin, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 8.2  The White House Situation Room on May 1, 201196  
                                                          
96
 Source (Souza, 2011). 
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The tension in the White House represented far more than the dramatic events playing out 
halfway around the world.  On that afternoon, the tension between superior control and 
subordinate autonomy in an era of nanomanagement played out.   As White House staffers 
“transformed the Situation Room into a war room”, an aide asked Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates how he would like the “command post” set up (Schmidle, 2011).  Secretary 
Gates said, “No, this is not a command post.  At the most this is an observation post.  There 
will be only one direction of communication and that will be from the ground up” (Gates, 
2011).   
 
Gates’ declaration was much more than semantics, but represented the conflict between 
superior control and subordinate autonomy.  In military doctrine an observation post only 
observes.  A command post directs and controls.97  For forty minutes these superiors fixated 
on the raid, diverting their attention from the myriad of tasks they faced.  Had this been a 
command post, a two-way information flow would have allowed the superiors to not only 
observe, but to direct and act. 
 
Yet was this only an observation post?  In the photo, the only figure not watching the screen 
is Brigadier General Marshall Webb, who seems to be typing.  On his laptop were multiple 
chat windows connecting the White House to the ongoing discussions between other 
agencies and command teams in Afghanistan (Schmidle, 2011).   Was Webb communicating 
only with his immediate subordinates?  Was he relaying information up or sending down 
questions and guidance?  Certainly the temptation was there, to ask questions, to make 
suggestions, to issue orders, to know details about outputs in a speed, quantity and quality 
impossible just a few years before.  While this photo has been largely lauded, do we want our 
national leaders in rooms such as these?  How many other scenes like this have occurred that 
may never be publically known?  Would the exact same picture, the exact same activity be 
perceived differently had the raid produced a different result?   
 
From the Secretary of Defense to the general, from the chief of surgery to the head of a law 
firm, superiors are deciding when, why, and in what degree to employ new technologies to 
control and direct subordinates.  Management is the process of controlling people.  
Micromanagement is when superiors control in detail the actions of their immediate 
                                                          
97
 In the military, an observation post is where junior soldiers are positioned to watch and observe for 
enemy activity so they can warn the larger group.  Those in an observation post are not supposed to 
act, but to observe.  A command post is “*a+ facility from which a commander and his or her 
representatives direct operations and control forces. It is organized to gather, process, analyze, 
display, and disseminate planning and operational data and perform other related tasks” (U.S. 
Department of Defense, November 8, 2010, p. 66).   
211 
 
subordinates.  Nanomanagement is different.  Nanomanagement is where superiors use 
technology to control, in ever-increasing detail, the actions of all of their subordinates.  By 
understanding nanomanagement, this thesis has sought to understand a contemporary 
battle in a long fought war between superior control and subordinate autonomy. 
 
Nanomanagement is neither good nor bad.  The costs of nanomanagement—to autonomy 
and discretion, to being trusted, to responding to the requests and demands of removed 
superiors—are real.  These costs will grow.  I imagine a reading of this thesis in 2020, 2040 or 
2060 will look at the technology discussed here as rather quaint, the first drops of a coming 
deluge of tools that will allow ever tighter superior control.  Tomorrow, more will be 
observed.  Tomorrow, less will be obscured.  However, the presence of these tools does not 
predict the manner or degree of their use.  As seen in Baghdad and at the White House, 
individual superiors will continue to use their own judgement.  By making determinations—
of cost, uncertainty and self-interest—how much autonomy should be granted subordinates 
will vary.   
 
For the benefits of nanomanagement are also real.  While few individuals desire to be 
nanomanaged in their daily life, they may benefit when the individuals and organizations 
they depend on for their health, safety and security are more tightly controlled.  A dissipation 
of the fog that permeates not just the battlefield but the muddy layers of bureaucracy 
separating executive from operator, or Secretary of Defense from SEAL, can be seen as a step 
towards a more known, transparent and accountable society.   
 
Yet a brave new world of nanomanagement, where everything is observed and nothing is 
obscured, is not a certainty.  Even if it momentarily arrives, its effects must not be 
permanent.  History teaches that defeats and disruptions cause a re-examination of superior-
subordinate relationships.  With battles yet to be won and lost, the conflict between superior 
control and subordinate autonomy will continue to be contested. 
 
This conflict is at the core of one of the oldest, and still unresolved, philosophical questions—
whether humans truly prefer freedom or order.  In societies that espouse liberty for all, 
nanomanagement is anathema to what many consider the correct way to conduct an 
autonomous life.  Yet those same societies also promise justice for all.  Justice implies control 
and requires transparency, accountability, rules and order.  For those that seek more order, 
more justice, more transparency, more accountability in institutions of power, 
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nanomanagement may not just be a contemporary phenomenon, but the future of superior-
subordinate relationships.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Initial Interview Guide 
Phase I: Introduction, procedures and consent, disclosure of research project and approval. 
Phase II:  Demographics, background and Iraq experience.  Biographical questions identified 
rank, branch, age, source of commission, educational background, and total length of service.  
Iraq experience questions focused on the number of deployments, the start and end date of 
each, the positions held in these deployments, the experience in these positions prior to 
deploying. 
Phase III:  Assessing monitoring.  I asked, “How did you spend a typical day in relation to 
communicating with superiors and subordinates?”  The purpose of this question was to get a 
sense of the work performed by the subordinates.  It also allowed me to capture the richness 
of the command relationships the subject was under.  I probed for the type of 
communication (email, face-to-face, radio, meetings, etc.) to determine the availability of 
information and technology and the physical distance between superiors and subordinates.  I 
then asked questions concerning the physical separation between superiors and 
subordinates.  Further probes included, “How did IT influence your work?  
Prior/during/following an operation, what sort of information was requested from superiors 
and subordinates?  Did you see an example of inappropriate monitoring by superiors/staff?” 
Phase IV: Assessing the environment.  I asked, “How uncertain was the environment?”  I then 
probed for uncertainty about the enemy, the populous and superior/subordinate units. 
Phase V:  Assessing professionalism. I asked, “How do you assess the level of trust? Why 
were you trusted?  Why did you trust?” 
Phase VI:  Assessing hierarchy.  I asked, “What was the least relevant command level and 
why?”  I then probed to determine the level of command which one could eliminate and 
which would have the least impact on the mission. 
Phase VII:  Conclusion and clarification.  I asked all subjects if they had anything else to add.  
Following the completion of their comments, I asked if there were any questions or concerns 
or points that needed clarification.  
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Appendix 2:  Iraq Deployment Interview 
Iraq Deployment Interview 
Admin Information 
Date:   ID   Location:  
   
  Procedures 
Thank you for taking the time to talk.  Before we begin, let me explain the research project. 
This research is part of an academic study, partially funded through the United States Air 
Force Institute for National Security Studies and the Dean of Academic Research, United 
States Military Academy.  This research is part of PhD studies at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science.  While we have permission from [Dean of the CGSC/Dean of 
JSCSC] to conduct this research, we are not reporting to these offices or anyone else in the 
U.S. or U.K. military.  Your answers will be confidential and anonymous.  While the results will 
be used for the PhD dissertation and scholarly publication, your answers will not be 
specifically linked to you, but be grouped with your national peers.  Instead of saying Major X 
stated, the term [“U.S. Major” or “U.K. Major”+ will be used.  The purpose of this work is to 
gain an understanding of the influence of technology and monitoring on your work.  Your 
relationships with superiors and subordinates will be explored. 
All interviews will be audio recorded.  I ask that you refrain from specific identifying 
comments (names).  If you or I feel that something has been said that could later be 
attributed to you, we will stop the tape.  Do you have any questions?  May I proceed? 
START RECORDING 
 
Biographical 
SEX RANK BRANCH AGE SOURCE ED LENGTH 
Male O-4 IN 30-35 ROTC 
College 
grad 
9-12 
Start  End  Position Exp Job 
APR 2003 JUL 
 
2004 
 
Staff 
1-2 
months 
BN S-1; 
humvee 
based 
Start  End  Position Exp  
APR 2007 JUN 
 
2008 
 
Command 
>12 
months 
Stryker 
CO 
How did you spend a typical day in relation to communicating with higher/lower? 
 
 
 
 
Locations 
How did physical distance from superiors/subordinates impact your mission? 
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How uncertain was the environment? 
 
 
 
Communication  
 
How did IT influence your work? 
 
 
Monitoring 
 
Prior to an operation what sort of information was requested from above/below? 
 
Appropriate?  Choose an item. 
 
During an operation, what sort of information was requested from above/below? 
 
Appropriate?  Choose an item. 
 
Following an operation, what sort of information was requested from above/below? 
 
Appropriate?  Choose an item. 
 
An example of an inappropriate monitoring by superiors/staff? 
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Relationships 
 
 
How do you assess the level of trust?  Why were you trusted?  Why did you trust? 
 
 
 
Past/Future Development 
 
 None Little Some Much Total 
Impact of technology on your work?      
 Sig less Less Same More Sig More 
Past deployments      
 Sig less Less Same More Sig More 
Future deployments      
      
 
Least relevant command level?  2 levels up 
 
 
 
Anything else you would like to add? 
 
 
 
Thank you, may I stop the recording? 
 
STOP RECORDING 
 
Any questions?  Concerns? 
 
 
 
SAVE DOCUMENT  
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Appendix 3:  Interview Consent Form 
 
Date of Interview:____________Location:__________________ID:______________________ 
 
RESEARCH PROCEDURES 
This research is being conducted to as part of a PhD study sponsored by the London School of 
Economics and the Institute for National Security Studies. If you agree to participate, you will be asked 
to provide information regarding your recollections of experiences in Iraq. The nature of the study 
revolves around your interaction with subordinates and supervisors. I ask that you refrain from 
including any identifying information (units, specific locations, names of subordinates or supervisors, 
any operational or classified details). If you or the investigator feels that you have inadvertently 
provided identifying information, the interview will stop, the recording will be erased and the 
interview will continue. Your answers will be recorded and be transcribed. 
 
RISKS 
There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this research. 
 
BENEFITS 
There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further research in the study of the 
contemporary military profession. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The data in this study will be confidential. All data files and recordings will be password protected. 
Names and other identifiers will not be placed on surveys or other research data. For coded 
identifiable data, (1) your name will not be included on the surveys and other collected data; (2) a 
code will be placed on the survey and other collected data; (3) through the use of an identification key, 
the researcher will be able to link your survey to your identity; and (4) only the researcher will have 
access to the identification key. 
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. 
If you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study, there is no penalty. There are no 
costs to you or any other party. 
 
CONTACT 
This research is being conducted by Major T.S. Sowers, Department of Social Sciences at the United 
States Military Academy. He may be reached at 845-938-3383 and Thomas.sowers@usma.edu. Please 
contact Dr. Thom Sherlock, Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy for 
questions or to report a research-related problem. You may contact the Research Coordinator at 
845-938-5902 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the 
research. 
 
CONSENT 
I have read this form and agree to participate in this study.    Yes__     No__     Initials_____  
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